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Introduction
Systemic risk, defined in a broad sense as the risk of a global financial meltdown, has
long been a subject of research in finance, both in economics and management. The
classical example is the banking crisis and the Great Depression of the 1930s (see de
Bandt and Hartmann, 2002, for a survey of major works on systemic risk at the time).
But it is undoubtedly the 2007-08 financial crisis that has led to deeply renewing the
interest of regulators and researchers in the concept of systemic risk, especially regarding
the forthcoming macroprudential regulation.
This dissertation is part of the debate on systemic risk and banking supervision by
displaying three main purposes which are: (i) to evaluate the major systemic risk meas-
ures, (ii) to apply and evaluate them from a regulator point of view, and (iii) to suggest
new techniques to improve these measures or to propose new measures. Indeed, even
if the concept of systemic risk is well-known, its measurement remains a challenge (see
Bisias et al., 2012, for a definition and a survey of systemic risk measures). By defini-
tion, systemic risk is unobservable and only systemic events can be observed.1 However,
from a regulatory perspective, it is obvious that the risk of a system-wide collapse should
be measured and expressed in a probabilistic environment. More specifically, setting a
macroprudential regulation requires the evaluation of the contribution of each financial
institution to systemic risk as an externality. How can the contribution of a financial
institution to the system-wide risk be evaluated? How can such a measure such a meas-
ure be validated? These issues and the dramatic consequences on the global economy of
the bankruptcy of Lehman Brothers in 2008 have led to a profound questioning about
the prudential regulations (so far mainly focused on the microprudential aspect in which
the stability of each financial institution ensures the system-wide stability) as well as the
academic notion of systemic risk (Hansen, 2014).
From an academic point of view, systemic risk is often related to the concept of
contagion. To experience a systemic event, a trigger point is needed. According to
the European Central Bank (ECB, 2009), this trigger point can come from two sources:
an exogenous shock, i.e. an idiosyncratic event such as the failure of a market or a
financial institution, or an endogenous shock within the financial system, i.e. a global
1To be more precise, we should mention the concept of systemic uncertainty (in the sense of Knight), since it is assumed
that systemic events can be probabilized.
1
Introduction
macroeconomic imbalance.2 These adverse effects are spread through the entire financial
system due to spillover effects which are local, and/or contagion effects which are global.
Finally, a substantial part of the real economy is affected, leading to a lower economic
welfare. Thus, the systemic threat refers to the idea of negative externalities. The
risk-taking behavior of a financial institution may impact not only its shareholders and
managers, but also other financial institutions (Lepetit, 2010). This interconnectedness
arises from financial transactions in the interbank market (Rochet and Tirole, 1996), or
asset commonality among banks (Allen, Babus and Carletti, 2012).
The general idea of a macroprudential regulation is based on the fact that a financial
institution has to internalize its negative externalities.3 This paradigm shift on the regu-
latory framework has been commissioned by a strong international political willpower, as
illustrated by the six meetings of the G-20 heads of governments about financial markets
and the world economy that took place from 2008 to 2011. This guideline has pro-
duced significant updates to financial regulation that were materialized in 2010 by the
Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act in the United States, and
by the third Basel Accord signed by the members of the Basel Committee on Banking
Supervision (BCBS).4
Hence, if the consumers’ protection against the risk of failure of their bank was at the
heart of the microprudential banking regulations, the financial crisis of 2008 has prompted
to take into account the protection of the whole financial market against a systemic crisis
(Rochet, 2008). To limit the risk of failure of a given institution, the banks under the Basel
II regulation have to satisfy to capital adequacy requirement set for market, counterparty
and operational risks. Most of the time, these capital amounts are computed thanks to
banks’ internal risk models. The transition to a macroprudential regulation (Basel III
for example) involves the identification of the major financial institutions that contribute
most to the overall risk of the financial system – the so-called Systemically Important
Financial Institutions (SIFIs). As SIFIs pose a major threat to the system, they have to be
subject to tighter supervision, extra capital requirements, and liquidity buffers (Financial
Stability Board, 2011a). These additional capital requirements should be proportionate
to the contribution of each financial institution to the system-wide risk.
Three crucial questions arise in this context: (i) how to identify Systemically Import-
ant Financial Institutions (SIFIs), (ii) how to measure the systemic risk contribution in
order to set the capital surcharge, and (iii) how to reveal banks’ commonalities in trading
in order to prevent systemic events.
2See de Bandt, Hartmann and Peydró (2012) for a clear distinction between a systemic event in the “narrow” and
“broad” senses, as well as its classification into “strong” or “weak”. Their updated survey on systemic risk focuses on
contagion effects which are the consequence of a strong systemic event in the narrow sense.
3Whatever the source of its externalities, market risk, credit risk, liquidity risk or operational risk.
4The United States are members of the BCBS.
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Identifying Systemically Important Financial Institutions
In some aspects, banking and biology have many similarities since they are both
complex systems. This is probably why the contagion analogy between the spread of
financial shocks and the transmission of infectious diseases has been so often used in
the academic literature (Haldane and May, 2011). Banks are connected to each other
(through their cross-asset and liability positions and their exposures to common risk
factors) which means that they suffer from but also contribute to the spread of financial
shocks. In case of pandemic the patient zero is looked for in order to figure out the
cause of the infection; in case of a systemic event, it is the financial institutions whose
characteristics (size, interconnectedness, specific role in the markets, etc.) and activity
generate the greatest threat to the stability of the financial system as a whole, i.e. SIFIs
or Global Systemically Important Financial Institutions (G-SIFIs), which are looked for.
How to identify systemically important financial institutions? To assess the systemic
importance of G-SIFIs, an indicator-based measurement approach has been developed
by the regulators. The framework proposed by the BCBS (Financial Stability Board -
International Monetary Fund - Bank for International Settlements, 2009; FSB, 2011b;
Financial Stability Oversight Council, 2012a) provides a score based on five systemic
risk factors: size, interconnectedness, global (cross-jurisdictional) activity, substitutabil-
ity/financial institution infrastructure, and complexity. The first three follow the recom-
mendation of the FSB-IMF-BIS report of 2009, whereas the last two have been added by
the BCBS itself, since complex and international SIFIs are more costly and longer to dis-
entangle (BCBS, 2011a). In this approach based on scores, the fundamental question that
arises, beyond the choice of the indicators that should be included in the score, is their
relative weight. The BCBS has chosen an equally weighted score in which each factor has
a total weight of 20% in the score construction. On the same principle, an equal weight
is also assigned to all indicators used in the composition of a factor. These indicators
are well-defined and correspond to precise accounting or market values (a detailed list of
these individual indicators is provided by the BCBS, 2013b).
The individual score of a given financial institution is then used twice. First, the
score is compared to a cutoff level, set by the BCBS given their supervisory judgment.
Each financial institution with a score above this threshold is considered as a G-SIFI
and is submitted to tighter supervision. Second, scores are used to set the regulatory
capital surcharge. Thus, the next step is to introduce the G-SIFIs’ scores in a bucketing
approach which allocates G-SIFIs into four buckets with their own systemic importance.
Inside a bucket, the systemic importance of these G-SIFIs is homogeneous. Finally,
the magnitude of the higher loss absorbency (HLA) requirement applied to cover the
individual contribution to systemic risk varies according to the bucket where the G-SIFI
is put. This higher level of capital, expressed as a percentage of the risk-weighted assets,
3
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goes from 1% to 2.5%, corresponding to an increase of 0.5% per bucket. Since 2012, the
list of G-SIFIs is disclosed once a year.
This regulatory framework becomes a kind of benchmark for the identification of SIFIs
(Weistroffer, 2011) even if this indicator-based approach aggregates multiple indicators,
including private data. However, this methodology raises a large number of issues. First,
Hurlin and Pérignon (2013) show that an equally weighted score can lead to overstate
the importance of the most volatile indicators. Second, beyond the methodology, publish
a list of SIFIs may have unintended consequences. Like the investors’ perception of the
too-big-to-fail theory, a too-systemic-to-fail view could also lead to positive valuation
effects. Indeed, the market capitalization of such a financial institution may growth
whatever its risk management efforts to reduce its contribution to systemic risk. In
other words, banks may have an incentive to appear as a SIFIs even if it induces a
surcharge of capital and a tighter monitoring from regulators. Moenninghoff, Ongena
and Wieandt (2014) have contributed to this debate in a recent empirical study where
they observe that the new regulation negatively affects the value of the newly regulated
financial institutions, yet they highlight that the official designation of G-SIFIs has partly
offset the desired impact. Third, only banks are taken into account within this framework.
Nevertheless, the financial system is composed of heterogeneous agents, such as insurance
companies (van Lelyveld, Liedorp and Kampman, 2009) and global hedge funds (Chan et
al., 2006, attempt to quantify their potential impact on systemic risk), and both may be
systemically important under certain circumstances. The collapse of Long Term Capital
Management in 1998 shed light on the involvement of hedge funds in systemic risk.
Another issue with this approach lies in defining the scope of the financial system of
reference (see Zigrand, 2014, for a definition of what “system” means in the notion of
systemic risk). Have a European regulator to assess the risk of externalities generated
by the activities of European banks on the Asian and American banks, or should be
restricted to the analysis of impacts in the European financial system? More generally,
this question about the appropriate level-playing field is part of the identification of G-
SIFIs and Domestically Systemically Important Financial Institutions (D-SIFIs). This
identification of D-SIFIs is paramount when a regulator wants to analyze the impact
of a potential failure on a national or regional financial system. Thus, the topology of
the system is important and we have to investigate and delimitate the area in which a
financial institution has a potential impact in case of distress. For example, in August
2014, the Portuguese bank Banco Espirito Santos has been recapitalized with a state aid
of 4.4 billion euros due to large exposures. This bank has never been identified as a G-SIFI
in spite of its poor results in the 2011 stress tests. This institution may be only a D-SIFI
since no European crisis has followed this bail-in. To address this domestic systemic
risk, BCBS (2012) proposes a set of twelve principles to identify D-SIFIs and assess their
4
accurate magnitude of HLA. Unfortunately, this framework is not operational yet and a
disaster, such as the one of August 2014 could happen again with potentially damaging
consequences in Europe. Indeed, the identification of such a D-SIFI is a high priority for
regulators but also for academic researchers (Brämer and Gischer, 2011; Engle, Jondeau
and Rockinger, 2014). My PhD thesis contributes to this literature by proposing a way
to establish the financial institutions which may be systemically risky at a nation level.
The methodology proposed by regulators is not the only way to point out systemically
risky financial institutions. Researchers have proposed several measures to assess the
systemic importance of a financial institution. Their main difficulty is that they usually
do not have access to a set of data able to measure the interconnectedness in banks’
balance sheets (Cerutti, Claessens and McGuire, 2014). Therefore, systemic risk measures
developped by researchers are mainly based on market data and on publicly available
balance-sheet data.
Systemic Risk Measurement
As shown by the regulatory approach, systemic risk cannot be defined according to a
single criterion. Zhou (2009) emphasizes this point when he studies the relation between
the size of a financial institution and its systemic importance. His conclusion is that
size is not a proxy of systemic risk. Additional characteristics have to be considered,
relying on all the components making a financial institution systemically risky. Bisias
et al. (2012) survey thirty-one measures of systemic risk in the economic and financial
literature from the granular foundations and network measures to the forward-looking
risk measurement, among others. De Bandt et al. (2013) also survey a large number
of quantitative indicators, particularly institution-level measures. This former set of
measures is well designed to identify SIFIs.
In order to gauge the contribution of a given institution to the overall systemic risk,
two ways can be distinguished. On the one hand, measures based on market data, such
as stock returns or Credit Default Swaps (CDS) data, and on the other hand measures
based on balance-sheet and regulatory data (when they are available), such as bilateral
exposures.
The first subset of measures focuses on market data. Adrian and Brunnermeier (2011)
extend the traditional VaR through the CoVaR, the prefix Co meaning conditional, con-
tagion, or comovement. The CoVaR captures the loss of the whole financial system
conditional on the distress of a financial institution. To obtain the ∆CoVaR, which rep-
resents the contribution of an institution to the system-wide risk, the authors compute the
difference between the CoVaR obtained during a situation of distress for the institution
and the CoVaR obtained during the median situation for the institution. Acharya et al.
(2010) define the Marginal Expected Shortfall (MES) as well as the Systemic Expected
Shortfall (SES). The marginal contribution of a financial institution captured by the MES
5
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is equal to the historical average of its daily equity returns when daily market returns are
at their 5% or 1% lowest quantile.5 The SES of an institution corresponds to its amount
of equity which drops below its target level, in case of a systemic crisis. In other words,
SES is the propensity of a financial institution to be undercapitalized when the system as
a whole is undercapitalized. Brownlees and Engle (2012), Acharya, Engle and Richardson
(2012) as well as Engle, Jondeau and Rockinger (2014) combine the MES with the market
capitalization and the total amount of liabilities in order to build the SRISK. SRISK takes
leverage and size into account and corresponds to the expected capital shortfall of a given
financial institution, conditional on a substantial market decline.6 The authors interpret
the SRISK as a capital shortfall making a clear relationship with the regulatory purpose
to increase financial stability through higher capital requirement. Still, using asset re-
turns, Billio et al. (2012) focus on time series and propose a Granger-causality measure
of interconnectedness (interpreted as a spillover effect) to assess systemic risk. In the
same vein, Diebold and Yilmaz (2014) present several connectedness measures obtained
using variance decomposition based on stock returns volatility data. The two previous
studies identify the network topology. Corradin, Manganelli and Schwaab (2011) intro-
duce a framework of multivariate regression quantiles to assess the contribution of a given
financial institution. Straetmans and Chaudhry (2012) apply a statistical multivariate
extreme value analysis to realize a cross Atlantic comparison of the financial system-wide
risk. As explained by Markose et al. (2010), CDS had a pernicious role in the financial
crisis and systemic risk measurement based on CDS data have been proposed, such as
their Systemic Risk Ratio. Otherwise, Huang, Zhou and Zhu (2009) provide an estim-
ated risk-neutral probability of default with the Distress Insurance Premium (DIP) index,
whereas Giglio (2012) compute the joint default risk of financial institutions. Beyond this
large but non-exhaustive collection of market-based systemic risk measures, another way
to gauge the systemic contribution of a given financial institution exists.
The second subset of measures focuses on balance-sheet and regulatory data. Green-
wood, Landier and Thesmar (2012), on the basis of data published by the EBA on the
banks’ exposures to the European sovereign debt, distinguish between the contribution
of a given bank to financial sector fragility and its own vulnerability to systemic risk.
Brunnermeier, Gorton and Krishnamurthy (2014) focus on liquidity to understand the
crisis and argue that their Liquidity Mismatch Index (LMI) at the institutional level can
provide valuable information to assess the systemic importance of a financial institution.
As highlighted by Caballero (2010), systemic risk is intrinsically related to the degree
of interconnectedness between financial institutions. Many studies follow this idea and
5Brownlees and Engle (2012) extend this measure to a time horizon of six months through the LRMES thanks to a
conversion formula or multiple simulations.
6Engle and Siriwardane (2014) extend the SRISK by incorporating the structural GARCH model which proposes a
new model of volatility where financial leverage amplifies equity volatility.
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model the financial system as a network to quantify the contagion generated by linkages
between financial institutions. Cont, Moussa and Santos (2012) present the Contagion
Index, a metric for the systemic importance of financial institutions defined as the ex-
pected loss to the network triggered by the default of an institution in stress scenario.
In their work, the systemic importance is based on counterparty exposures. Gouriéroux,
Héam and Monfort (2012) also use a unique dataset of interbank bilateral exposures.
Their methodology can separate the direct effects of a shock (such as a common asset
shock or a specific shock to one bank) from the effects of contagion within the banking
system. Identifying the most sensitive links is also the goal of Demange (2011), that
is why he uses the Threat Index which reflects an externality imposed by a defaulting
bank on the debt repayments of all other banks. This indicator is an alternative measure
to the contagion risk of a bank, most of the time defined as the expected number of
subsequent failures following its initial bankruptcy (see Upper 2011 for a survey). This
identification methodology underlines that the contagion risk is not a one-dimensional
issue. The network topography also matters, as emphasized by Acemoglu, Ozdaglar and
Tahbaz-Salehi (2014) who shed light on the “robust yet fragile” (Haldane, 2009) nature
of financial networks, meaning that a type of network can be very resilient to one type
of shock but fragile under another.
This dissertation relies on a small subset of these individual systemic risk meas-
ures. The chosen sample is composed of the following measures: MES, SES, SRISK
and ∆CoVaR. This choice has been guided by their nice economic interpretations, the
public availability of data, and the real-time investigation allowed by these market-based
systemic risk measures. My purpose is then to contribute to the literature which attempts
to verify whether or not these new individual systemic risk measures are well-designed to
gauge the contribution of a given financial institution to the system-wide risk. Brunner-
meier and Oehmke (2012) have also addressed this issue and they propose a definition of
what a relevant systemic risk measure should be and argue that the allocation principle
is primordial. In order to give a potential answer to this question, Brunnermeier and
Cheridito (2013) suggest the SystRisk measure. An alternative approach is to develop
an axiomatic framework for the measurement and management of systemic risk (Chen,
Iyengar and Moallemi, 2013), as Artzner et al. (1999) have done for the individual risk
measures. The approach presented in my dissertation is complementary to the two il-
lustrated above since the abilities of these measures to identify SIFIs and to resume all
characteristics of systemic risk in a single measure are compared.
Measuring systemic risk and identifying SIFIs requires an in-depth analysis of financial
institutions. A significant part of the systemic risk can only be identified through a
detailed analysis of common activities and strategies among financial institutions.
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Commonality among Banks
Financial institutions contributing the most to systemic risk are subject to a tighter
supervision. This means that market activities such as trading positions with their asso-
ciated liquidity need and ongoing exposures are under scrutiny. Sound risk management
is not a new pillar in the current regulation because internal models are already validated
by regulators through the microprudential approach. However, supervisors are now aware
of macroprudential issues, including the potential for systemic risk to arise from concen-
tration risk and common exposures, even when institutions seem safe when considered
individually (FSB, 2011a).
Correlated risk across banks is not rare and has several sources. First, banks have in-
centives to over-invest in specific asset classes and this result may be exacerbated by the
current regulation. For instance, policy makers have asked that Credit Defaults Swaps
(CDS) be now clear through central counterparties (CCPs), that could dramatically in-
crease the system-wide collateral demand leading to potential destabilizing effects since
only few types of assets are eligible as collateral within CCP frameworks, such as sover-
eign debt (Duffie, Scheicher and Vuillemey, 2014). Second, Hirshleifer, Subrahmanyam
and Titman (1994) show that the sequential nature of information arrival has a significant
impact on trading decisions. Investors who receive common and private information be-
fore others do, become short-term “profit-takers” and have a tendency to trade the same
group of stocks. Third, Acharya and Yorulmazer (2007, 2008) argue that banks have a
strong incentive to herd, especially small banks, in order to maximize their probability of
bailout. This type of behavior from banks increases the likelihood of a systemic risk crisis
and poses for regulators a too-many-to-fail problem.7 Farhi and Tirole (2012) argue that
private leverage choices depend on the anticipated policy reaction to the overall maturity
mismatch. Thus, banks as a whole are doing too much maturity mismatch (too much
short-term debt) leading to higher correlated risk.
To sum up, financial institutions have incentives to correlate their positions on the
overvalued assets. However, these positions are not publicly disclose and only regulat-
ors are able to monitor the degree of commonality among banks from these common
exposures.
Obviously, correlated risks are particularly problematic during financial crises. In-
deed, as market volatility spikes, regulatory capital and collateral requirements tend to
mechanically increase for financial institutions. In response, many banks are forced to
liquidate their positions. Adrian and Shin (2014) empirically illustrate this aspect, show-
ing that to maintain a constant probability of default, financial institutions adjust their
7Brown and Dinç (2009) provide an empirical analysis of the too-many-to-fail effect thanks to a study of bank failures
in twenty-one emerging market countries in the 1990s. They show that this impact is robust to several factors, such as the
too-big-to-fail effect.
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risk exposures very sharply when the economic environment becomes more risky. Brun-
nermeier and Pedersen (2009) propose a model to explain the fact that market liquidity
has commonality across assets, which further amplifies market volatility. Morris and
Shin (1999) explain that correlated risk exposures (interdependence) across banks leads
to higher volatility since financial institutions tend to sell the same assets at the same
time. This blind spot leads to adverse feedback effects which may have dramatic con-
sequences in a crisis period (Persaud, 2000). Herding behavior is hard to prove given
the lack of reliable data. Allen, Babus and Carletti (2012) develop a theoretical model
to analyze the interaction between asset commonality and funding maturity in generat-
ing systemic risk. Cai, Saunders and Steffen (2014) measure the similarity between the
syndicated loan portfolios of two banks and they find positive correlation between this
measure of banks’ interconnectedness and various market-based systemic risk measures
including SRISK and CoVaR.
Commonality across financial institutions matters, but there are no accurate tools to
identify risk exposures at their firm-wide level, across business lines and to other financial
institutions. This challenge remains without standard measures while the need for such
a measure is fundamental. Indeed, financial instability could be reduced by imposing
exposures limits to financial institutions on certain asset classes. In this dissertation, I
an innovative tool measure of risk exposures is proposed. This implied measure of changes
in risk exposures is obtained for a broad spectrum of risks and established at a bank level.
This new methodology could be an accurate way to track commonality in risk exposures
across banks and then prevent a potential build-up of systemic risk.
Assessing the systemic risk is still at its beginnings and the main goal of this disser-
tation is to contribute to this abundant and stimulating literature by proposing three
essays on systemic risk.
Contributions
The first chapter fills in the gap existing in the identification of Domestic Systemic
Important Banks (D-SIBs). This empirical chapter 1 offers an original adjustment of
three systemic risk measures designed in a global framework to evaluate their abilities
to identify D-SIBs as well as G-SIBs. Following the spirit of the Basel III agreement,
this chapter also highlights the shortage of capital that a given bank may have when this
financial institution is jointly identified as G- and D-SIB.
The second chapter provides a theoretical and empirical analysis of the major sys-
temic risk measures (MES, CoVaR and SRISK) based on market data (daily returns).
To do this, chapter 2 introduces a common framework and derive a number of theoretical
properties on these measures. In particular, conditions under which the different meas-
ures lead to similar rankings of SIFIs. This theoretical analysis is complemented by an
empirical analysis on a sample of ninety-four American banks.
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The third chapter proposes an implied measure of banks’ risk exposures to several risk
factors. This new approach, described in chapter 3, extracts private information about
the changes in banks’ risk exposures at an aggregate level from public risk disclosures,
i.e. VaR disaggregated by major risk factors. Using this measure, commonality among
ten international banks is investigated.
Chapter 1: Where is the System?
Chapter 1, entitled “Where is the System?”, provides a methodology to identify both
D-SIBs and G-SIBs.8 According to the fact that the usual market-based systemic risk
measures, such as SRISK and ∆CoVaR, are well designed to identify G-SIBs, this chapter
offers a simple adjustment of these measures to investigate the systemic risk contribution
of a given bank at the domestic level and extract specific additional policy for D-SIBs as
required by the Basel Committee on Banking Supervision (BCBS, 2012).
In this context, even when the system of reference changes, these measures cannot
be used to distinguish between D-SIB and/or G-SIB. This result shows on the one hand
that SRISK is mainly sensitive to the total amount of liabilities of the bank, which does
not depend on the size of the system. On the other hand, ∆CoVaR is highly sensitive to
the choice of the system which leads to a clear distinction between the domestic and the
global level-playing field.
This issue is illustrated within the eurozone where the identification of D-SIBs is very
important. In order to do so, this chapter shows that the difference between two SRISKs
computed at the national and at the European level is a promising tool to identify D-SIBs
and evaluate the potential shortage of capital that a bank may have when this bank is
simultaneously considered as D-SIB and G-SIB.
Chapter 2: A Theoretical and Empirical Comparison of Systemic Risk
Measures
Chapter 2, entitled “A Theoretical and Empirical Comparison of Systemic Risk Meas-
ures”, provides a comprehensive comparison of the major market-based systemic risk
measures (MES, SES, SRISK and ∆CoVaR) that are currently used by central banks
and banking regulatory agencies due to their nice economic interpretations. Although
the Financial Stability Board (FSB) states that the score, measuring the contribution of
a financial institution to the system-wide risk have to reflect size, leverage, liquidity, in-
terconnectedness, complexity, and substitutability. The findings of this chapter indicate
that these measures fall short in capturing the multifaceted nature of systemic risk. So
far, the research in this chapter constitutes the first attempt at comparing, both theor-
etically and empirically, these major systemic risk measures. The result obtained is that
8This article is published in International Economics.
10
most of the variability of these systemic measures can be captured by one market risk
measure or a firm characteristic.
In a common framework, the analytical expressions of these measures allow to uncover
the theoretical link between systemic risk and standard financial risks (systematic risk,
tail risk, correlation and beta), as well as firm characteristics such as leverage and market
capitalization. More precisely, it is shown that MES is highly related to the beta of a
firm, ∆CoVaR is highly related to the Value-at-Risk (firm tail risk) whereas SRISK is
related to the beta and the leverage. Conditions under which the different measures lead
to similar rankings of SIFIs are also derived.
The theoretical analysis is completed by an empirical application focusing on a sample
of ninety-four American banks over the period 2000-2010. Estimation methods from
seminal papers are applied. It is shown that different systemic risk measures lead to
identify different SIFIs. Moreover, the linear regression analysis shows that a one-factor
model explains between 83% and 100% of the variability of the systemic risk estimates.
In cross-section, MES and SRISK are explained by the traditional beta of a firm and its
total amount of liabilities, respectively. In time series, ∆CoVaR is mainly explained by
the VaR.
Chapter 3: Implied Risk Exposures
Chapter 3, entitled “Implied Risk Exposures”, introduces an innovative answer to the
data gap facing regulators and researchers.9 Indeed, to better assess the evolution of
the financial system, more data have to be disclosed by financial institutions (Cerutti,
Claessens and McGuire, 2014). Even if the stress tests leading by the European Banking
Authority (EBA) is a substantial opportunity to observe actual positions or risk exposures
of banks, those tests are not done every year. To overcome this issue, this chapter develops
the Factor Implied Risk Exposures (FIRE) methodology to infer banks’ risk exposures
from current public risk disclosures.
The originality of this technique is to show how to reverse-engineer traditional banks’
risk disclosures, such as the Value-at-Risk (VaR), to obtain an implied measure of their
exposures to equity, interest rate, foreign exchange, and commodity risks. As this chapter
considers a broader spectrum of risks, it extends recent literature which focuses only on
banks’ exposures to interest rate risk, as investigated by Begenau, Piazzesi and Schneider
(2013) as well as Landier, Sraer and Thesmar (2013). It is also shown that the factor
structure for the volatility of equity, documented by Herskovic et al. (2014), is persistent
across the four asset classes, which highlight a certain degree of commonality in volatility
across the assets within a given asset class. The performance of the method used in
this chapter is assessed by systematically comparing the implied risk exposures given by
the FIRE methodology, with statements made by a large financial institution about its
9This article is forthcoming in the Review of Finance.
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actual risk exposures in public filings. The biases on the implied exposures that could be
induced by model risk and estimation risk are also studied by simulation.
The empirical application on ten large US and international banks shows that changes
in risk exposures are negatively correlated with market volatility and changes in risk ex-
posures are positively correlated across banks, which is consistent with banks exhibiting
commonality in trading. The first finding suggests that banks actively manage their risk
exposures according to market conditions, and this can be seen as an attempt to damper
the procyclicality of their regulatory capital. The second finding indicates that banks
rebalance their trading portfolios in a correlated way. However, a pool of large banks
which have a growing common exposure to an asset class is a source of interconnected-
ness between financial institutions that increase the systemic risk, and this concern is
particularly relevant for banking regulators.
12


Chapter 1
Where is the System?10
The aim of this paper is to determine the optimal size of the system (global, suprana-
tional or national) when measuring the systemic importance of a bank. Since 2011, the
Basel Committee on Banking Supervision (BCBS) has tagged global systemically im-
portant banks (G-SIBs) and has imposed a higher regulatory capital of loss absorbency
(HLA) requirement. However, the identification of G-SIBs may overlook banks with
major domestic systemic importance, i.e. the domestic systemically important banks
(D-SIBs). This paper describes how to adjust market-based systemic risk measures to
identify D-SIBs. In an empirical analysis within the eurozone, we show that (i) the
SRISK methodology produces similar rankings whatever the system used. However, (ii)
the SRISK values greatly vary across systems, which calls for imposing the higher of
either D-SIB or G-SIB HLA requirements. Finally, (iii) the ∆CoVaR methodology is
extremely sensitive to the choice of the system.
1.1 Introduction
Since September 15, 2008 and the collapse of Lehman Brothers, extensive research has
been done on systemic risk, considering its definition, measurement, or regulation. While
there is no unanimous definition for systemic risk yet, most definitions agree on three
points that are summarized in the 2001 G-10’s definition:
“Systemic financial risk is the risk that an event will trigger a loss of economic
value or confidence in [sic] a substantial portion of the financial system that
[sic] have significant adverse effects on the real economy.”
Thus, a systemic event corresponds to a trigger point which causes significant disruption
in the financial system and finally spreads out to the real economy. For instance, the
initial shock can be the bankruptcy of a financial institution, which sets off wide turmoils
propagating through the financial system and finally jeopardizing the local and/or global
economy. The key element that concerns systemic risk is the identification of Systemically
10This chapter is based on Benoit (2014), published in International Economics.
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Important Financial Institutions (SIFIs), which correspond to firms that threaten the
system. The nature of the system is well addressed in the context of the United States
because of its particularity as a federal state. However, in Europe, where we are faced with
a sum of countries, the issue is much less obvious. Hence, considering global or domestic
systemically important banks (G- or D-SIBs) does not lead to the same conclusions
and raises numerous questions. Should we evaluate the contribution of a given financial
institution to the risk of the system at a domestic, supranational, or global level? Is the
list of SIBs identical if we change the system used in the analysis? Most importantly,
which definition of the system should be used in the identification process of SIBs?
The objective of this paper is to determine the optimal size of the system when meas-
uring the systemic importance of a bank. To answer the above questions which are crucial
for banking regulators, we adjust market-based systemic risk measures, usually used to
identify G-SIBs, to identify D-SIBs. This approach is closely tied to the current regulat-
ory debate on systemic risk. Indeed, following a request made by the G20, the Financial
Stability Board required an extension of the G-SIBs to include D-SIBs in October 2012.
The Basel Committee on Banking Supervision (BCBS) published a framework for deal-
ing with D-SIBs (BCBS, 2012) in line with its former methodology for assessing G-SIBs
(BCBS, 2011-2013b). This country-by-country approach requires regulators to take into
account a set of new bank-specific factors such as size, interconnectedness, financial insti-
tution infrastructure and complexity of a particular bank within its own financial system.
BCBS emphasizes that national regulators should establish their own list of D-SIBs. By
analogy, identifying the supranational-SIBs should be done by a supranational regulator
while identifying the G-SIBs should be done by a global regulator which assesses the
system in the global context like the BCBS currently does.
This top-down approach implies that additional capital and tighter monitoring of G-
SIBs are of the utmost importance if we want to avoid a wave of major bankruptcies that
would affect the entire global system. A G-SIB is usually so large, interconnected and non-
substitutable that we cannot miss it in the identification process. However, the fact that a
particular bank cannot be seen at the global level does not imply that its contribution to
systemic risk is null. Thus a bank could be a D-SIB without being identified as a G-SIB
and its impact on other domestic banks could be significant and eventually destabilize the
local economy. This is why, a bottom-up approach should be adopted. Taking D-SIBs
into account in elaborating the regulation is even more important if we think that, for
a given bank, its systemic contribution is probably larger in its country than abroad.
For this reason, BCBS requires national authorities to calibrate the level of Higher Loss
Absorbency (HLA) needed for D-SIBs. Consequently, the identification of SIBs changes
depending on the system we focus on.
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To deal with domestic systemic risk, two fundamental questions have to be addressed.
First, what is the nature and the magnitude of the initial shock to identify D-SIBs?
Should we consider a global systemic event or a domestic shock? Second, what should be
the system? What should be the optimal perimeter of the system as well as its specific
risk factors and the number of banks to be taken into account? Should we investigate the
same banks at the global and domestic levels? Should we use a multi-industry system or
only the banking system? This paper aims to answer these questions. Another important
aspect of the systemic risk debate concerns the optimal taxation of SIBs. Indeed, as in
the polluter pays principle, negative externalities created by SIBs have to be internalized
by themselves and not by the taxpayer. In maximizing their private benefits, individual
banks may rationally choose outcomes that are suboptimal on the system-wide level
because they do not take into account these externalities (BCBS, 2013b). Thus, two
aspects are studied by the BCBC to reduce these externalities, on the one hand reducing
the probability of failure of a SIB with the HLA requirement and on the other hand
reducing the impact of the failure of a SIB by improving resolution plans (FSB, 2011a).
This paper contributes to the literature on the identification of D-SIBs in Europe.
Despite the fact that the BCBS would like D-SIBs to be identified, only a few papers
tackle this issue. Elsinger, Lehar and Summer (2006) use a few individual bank charac-
teristics which are easily observable to measure risk at the level of the banking system.
Acharya and Steffen (2012) rank European banks using the Systemic Expected Shortfall
(SES) measure based on the Marginal Expected Shortfall (MES), leverage, and total as-
sets. Engle, Jondeau and Rockinger (2014) propose an adjustment of the Systemic Risk
Measure (SRISK) to identify the D-SIBs but their main focus is still on G-SIB identific-
ation. This paper uses public data and not private information as the BCBS does. The
goal of this paper is to close the gap between the market-based systemic risk measure
applied to identify the G-SIBs and the D-SIB identification.
The present paper puts forward a User-Guide to adjust the two major market-based
systemic risk measures (SRMs) to the choice of the system, and highlight the consequences
the choice of a system can have. This analysis relies on publicly available real-time data,
using the Systemic Risk Measure (SRISK) of Brownlees and Engle (2012), Acharya,
Engle and Richardson (2012) and Engle, Jondeau and Rockinger (2014), and the Delta
Conditional Value-at-Risk (∆CoVaR) of Adrian and Brunnermeier (2011). Indeed, these
popular measures of systemic risk contribution are easily adjustable to different systems,
and the values in the former measure are expressed as an amount of money, allowing
users to quantify the amount of the higher loss absorbency required for a given SIB. To
avoid time lag and obtain results in the same currency, this paper considers the eurozone
countries over the last decade, and this constitutes the global level. The domestic level
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corresponds to each of the 10 member countries of this economic and monetary union.11
The main findings of this paper are the following. First, it shows that (i) the SRISK
measure produces similar rankings regardless of the system used. Second, (ii) the SRISK
values vary significantly across system definitions, which underlines the importance of im-
posing the higher of either D-SIB or G-SIB HLA requirements. Third, (iii) the ∆CoVaR
which mainly captures the degree of interconnectedness between a particular system and
a bank that belongs to this system, is highly sensitive to the choice of the system.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section 1.2 provides a brief literature
review of systemic risk and introduces the general framework to identify G-SIBs and
D-SIBs with their specific factors. Section 1.3 describes the SRISK and the ∆CoVaR
methodologies. Section 1.4 presents the data and the main empirical findings. Section
1.5 offers a summary and a conclusion.
1.2 Principles for SIBs
This section sums up the two main approaches used to identify SIBs and shows that
both are useful. Then its describes the assessment methodologies made by the BCBS to
look for G- and D-SIBs.
1.2.1 Literature Review
In this paper, we do not want to oppose the two traditional approaches tackling sys-
temic risk. In other words, we do not plan to dwell on the question of whether or not
an approach may be more efficient. The first approach is only based on balance sheet
and stock returns data (Acharya et al., 2010; Billio et al., 2011; Adrian and Brunner-
meier, 2011; Acharya, Engle and Richardson, 2012; Brownlees and Engle, 2012), whereas
the second approach requires balance sheet information disaggregated by class of assets
and counterparties (Gouriéroux, Héam and Monfort, 2012, 2013; Greenwood, Landier
and Thesmar, 2012). Furthermore, the Shapley Value can be applied to the two former
approaches (Borio, Tarashev and Tsatsaronis, 2010; Drehmann and Tarashev, 2011a;
Garratt, Webber and Willison, 2012; Gauthier, Lehar and Souissi, 2012; Cao, 2010).
However, as this paper shows, there is an additional issue. Danielsson et al. (2011) ar-
gue that these systemic risk measures contain a high degree of model risk due to their
dependence to the VaR (or ES) which is a noisy riskometer. Our extra model risk is
linked to the mathematical definition of the market index because this latter could be
capitalization-weighted or equally weighted for example. We are going beyond this simple
index construction issue because we use this matter to focus on the optimal size of the
system and so transform it as a force of these market-based SRMs to enhance their ability
to identify D-SIBs.
11Established in January 1, 1999, the eurozone is an economic and monetary union of 17 European Union member states
(in November 2012) which have shared a single currency, the euro, since January 1, 2002.
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The common feature of these different methods is that they are already included
within a particular system which is interesting since the size of the network is particularly
important to capture the degree of interconnectedness of a given financial institution with
its neighbor. For example, Lopez-Espinosa et al. (2012a) derive the CoVaR at a global
level whereas Cerutti, Claessens and McGuire (2014) emphasize the need for additional
data to capture international dimensions of systemic risk. In contrast, Elsinger, Lehar
and Summer (2006) and Acharya and Steffen (2012) apply Marginal Expected Shortfall,
Conditional Expected Shortfall and Systemic Expected Shortfall at the European level.
The only paper that focuses on domestic level, from Brämer and Gischer (2011), adjusts
the indicator-based approach proposed by the BCBS and identifies D-SIBs in the context
of the Australian banking system. Engle, Jondeau and Rockinger (2014) design a specific
econometric multi-factor model to address asynchronous markets. To identify G-SIBs
and D-SIBs among European financial banks with this new model, they explain the
bank’s return by three drivers, a country-wide index, an European index and a world
index. One of the contributions of this paper is to show that this multivariate model
does not outperform the traditional bivariate model when the identification of D-SIBs is
the purpose.
1.2.2 G-SIBs Assessment
To assess the global systemic risk based on data related to the consolidated group,
BCBS has developed a framework (Financial Stability Board - International Monetary
Fund - Bank for International Settlements, 2009; BCBS, 2013a; FSB, 2011b; Finan-
cial Stability Oversight Council, 2012a) which incorporates a score based on systemic
risk factors such as cross-jurisdictional activity, size, interconnectedness, substitutabil-
ity/financial institution infrastructure and complexity (for a complete description, see
BCBS, 2011a, 2013b). BCBS’s view is that global systemic importance should be cap-
tured as a Loss-Given-Default (LGD) concept, which measures the systemic impact that
a bank’s failure may have on the global financial system and the wider economy, rather
than the probability of such a bank’s failure, which refers to the Probability of Default
(PD) concept. Then, following an indicator-based measurement approach, banks get a
score. This number defines the bucket in which they are thrown depending on their po-
sition regarding the cutoff points which delimitate the bucket size. Given the bucket, a
specific amount of HLA is required. This G-SIB’s HLA requirement, which is a minimum
amount, will be added to the Common Equity Tier One of the G-SIB and correspond to
a percentage of its Risk-Weighted Asset.
In addition to this bucketing approach based on the clustering of scores produced
by the methodology, an approach leading to a capital surcharge, addressing systemic
risk also implies being careful with the behavior of those banks. With this risk, the
global financial system faces moral hazard, and being a G-SIB can be viewed as a good
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opportunity because banks are sure to be well capitalized and more intensively monitored.
However, this surcharge can be viewed either as a blessing or a punishment because
financial institutions are explicitly too big and/or too interconnected to be saved (Markose
et al., 2010), and have to quickly raise new capital, which can be very expensive. Even
if banks wanted to reduce their contribution, they would have no strong incentive to do
so. Indeed, their funding cost would increase and the reduction of their risk means a loss
in the return of their market share, then these global actors become less competitive and
could face opposition from shareholders against this strategy. With this public list of
G-SIBs, banks have an explicit guarantee from a government support which may amplify
risk-taking, reduce market discipline, create competitive distortions and so increase the
probability of distress of those banks. For these reasons, a tightly additional supervision
has been requested. Ancillary quantitative indicators relating to specific aspects and
a supervisory judgement based on qualitative information are also used to gauge the
potential effect of a G-SIB (BCBS, 2013b). For example, in 2011, 27 banks were identified
by the score indicator and 2 have been added based on home supervisory judgement
(BCBS, 2011a, 2013b).
Based on this regulatory framework, Table 1.1 reports the worldwide list of G-SIBs
published by the Financial Stability Board in 2011 using data as of end-2009.12 When the
SRISK is presented by its authors at a conference, they argue that this measure is close
to this list of G-SIBs and show that the ranking which is obtained with the SRISK is
not linked to the leverage, the MES (measure of interconnection) and the size (captured
by the market capitalization). Unsurprisingly, SRISK allows to identify 23 out of 29 of
these G-SIBs. Moreover, using this measure it is possible to pinpoint which banks are the
riskiest. However we show that, at this date, the ranking based on the quarterly book
value of liabilities reports 26 out of 29 of these G-SIBs, whereas 25 banks can be found
both in the SRISK and the quarterly book value of debt lists.13 In presenting this table,
our point is not to argue about the identification of G-SIBs, which is carefully done by the
regulator using a thorough methodology to assess systemic risk. Instead, we just want to
point out that a market model-based approach to estimate the contribution of individual
bank to systemic risk (such as the SRISK) is not far from the BCBS output and could be
an useful measure to proxy the systemic contribution of a given firm while this quantity
is close to the total amount of liabilities. The SRISK is a daily measure designed to
gauge the expected capital shortfall that a given bank may have during a global financial
crisis. This quantity can be adjusted to deal with a domestic financial crisis and thus
to potentially identify D-SIB. However, the SRISK as well as the MES and the ∆CoVaR
12An updated list of G-SIBs published in 2012 (Financial Stability Board, 2012), where two banks have been added to
the list (BBVA and Standard Chartered) and three removed (Commerzbank, Dexia and Lloyds, is available).
13According to the updated list of G-SIBs published in 2012 based on end of 2011 data, the SRISK and the quarterly
book value of liabilities identify 21 out of 28 G-SIBs tagged by the BCBS whereas the SRISK and the quarterly book value
of liabilities rankings have 25 institutions in common among the first 28 G-SIBs.
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remain concerned by the robustness of its results. Danielsson et al. (2012) point out that
the signal provided by the MES and the ∆CoVaR is highly unreliable and conclude that
Table 1.1 Systemic Risk Rankings: G-SIBs
December 31, 2009
G-SIBs
FSB SRISK Liability
Bank of America Royal Bank of Scotland BNP Paribas
Bank of China 2, 3 BNP Paribas Royal Bank of Scotland
Bank of New York Mellon 2, 3 Deutsche Bank Deutsche Bank
Banque Populaire CdE 2, 3 Group Crédit Agricole HSBC
Barclays Barclays Group Crédit Agricole
BNP Paribas Mitsubishi UFJ FG Mitsubishi UFJ FG
Citigroup Mizuho FG Barclays
Commerzbank ING Bank Bank of America
Credit Suisse Lloyds Banking Group JP Morgan Chase
Deutsche Bank Commerzbank Citigroup
Dexia Citigroup Mizuho FG
Goldman Sachs 2 Société Générale ING Bank
Group Crédit Agricole UBS Lloyds Banking Group
HSBC Sumitomo Mitsui FG Santander
ING Bank HSBC Société Générale
JP Morgan Chase Unicredit Group UBS
Lloyds Banking Group Bank of America Unicredit Group
Mitsubishi UFJ FG Dexia Commerzbank
Mizuho FG Santander Sumitomo Mitsui FG
Morgan Stanley Credit Suisse Wells Fargo 2
Nordea JP Morgan Chase Credit Suisse
Royal Bank of Scotland Natixis 1, 3 Intesa Sanpaolo SpA 1
Santander Danske Bank A/S 1 Dexia
Société Générale Morgan Stanley Goldman Sachs 2
State Street 2, 3 Intesa Sanpaolo SpA 1 Banco Bilbao V. A. 1
Sumitomo Mitsui FG Nordea Morgan Stanley
UBS KBC Groep NV 1, 3 Nordea
Unicredit Group Banco Bilbao V. A. 1 Danske Bank A/S 1
Wells Fargo 2 Resona Holdings 1, 3 National Australia Bank 1, 2
Sources: FSB and V-Lab website. Notes: In the first column, labeled FSB, we report the list in alphabetic order
of the 29 G-SIBs identified according to the methodology set out in the BCBS document “Global systemically
important banks: Assessment methodology and the additional loss absorbency requirement”, using data as of
end-2009. To be fair we report, in the second column labeled SRISK, the publicly available ranking (available on
the VLab website) of the first 29 G-SIBs identified by the SRISK measure on December 31, 2009. In the third
column, labeled Liability, we disclose the ranking based on the total amount of liabilities dated from December
31, 2009. The following 1 tags banks which are not identified by the FSB, 2 tags banks which are not identified
by the SRISK and 3 tags banks which are not identified by the total amount of liabilities.
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a leverage ratio may offer a more sensible approach to deal with systemic risk. Drehmann
and Tarashev (2011b) argue that simple indicators are able to gauge some aspects of
systemic risk and Benoit et al. (2013) show that the SRISK does not encompass the
multiple facets of systemic risk. In this case, the identification of G-SIB is mainly driven
by the total amount of liabilities because at this global level, principal actors are large
banks which are well-known worldwide.
Dealing with systemic risk means taking the multifaceted threat into account, and one
of the main issues is probably not the identification of G-SIBs since one could reproduce
almost every single future list of G-SIBs using only a combination of simple indicators
such as the amount of liabilities and the leverage. The principal identification issue arises
at a domestic level, where the number of banks which are concerned is different. Indeed,
at the worldwide level, the 75 largest global banks based on the financial year-end Basel
III leverage ratio exposure measure exceeding the threshold of 200 billion euros (BCBS,
2013a), are taken into account, as well as banks that have been classified as a G-SIB
the previous year are included in the sample (BCBS, 2013b). At the domestic level,
this number is smaller and at least the size indicator of the bank has to be updated.
Furthermore, the degree of interconnection is certainly thinner and therefore difficult to
be easily captured. Thus, the BCBS methodology as well as market-based SRMs have to
be modified according to the domestic level-playing field.
1.2.3 D-SIBs Assessment
A set of 12 principles composes the D-SIB framework (BCBS, 2012). The two key
aspects that shape this methodology are:
1. the reference system for the assessment of systemic impact; and
2. the unit of analysis, i.e. the bank which is being concerned.
The Committee responds clearly to these questions, the appropriate reference system
should be the domestic economy whereas the unit of analysis are banks from a (globally)
consolidated perspective. In other words, the localization of the systemic risk event is the
domestic market and its magnitude has to be calibrated to the country specifics. Banks’
subsidiaries are studied at the consolidated state when its banking group is hosted by
the domestic jurisdiction. Indeed, a banking group involved in cross-border activities
potentially has significant spillovers to the domestic economy when its subsidiaries fail.
In contrast with the host authorities which have to assess these foreign subsidiaries at a
local level or sub-consolidated basis from their domestic economy. For example, Emporiki
Bank was a Greek subsidiary of Crédit Agricole until 2012, from the French authority
Crédit Agricole has to be studied at the consolidated perspective, i.e. taking into account
Emporiki Bank’s activities. But from the Greek authority point of view, Emporiki Bank
is in its scope as well as all its foreign subsidiaries but Crédit Agricole is not.
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The D-SIB methodology is designed as the G-SIB approach, 4 bank-specific factors
are used instead of 5, size, interconnectedness, financial institution infrastructure and
complexity. The size of the domestic economy is also required because countries with a
larger banking sector relative to GDP are more likely to suffer from a D-SIB failure in its
own jurisdiction. Banks can be classified as D-SIBs but not as G-SIBs when their domestic
activities have no impact on the global economy but only on the domestic financial system.
A bank identified as a G-SIB can also be classified as a D-SIB in any of the countries in
which the bank has significant operations. However, banks with large global operations
can be classified as a G-SIB but not as a D-SIB if those activities have no significant
impact in any domestic economy (Deloitte, 2013). When the banking group has been
identified as a G-SIB as well as a D-SIB in the home jurisdiction, the national authorities
should impose the higher of either the D-SIB or G-SIB HLA requirements (BCBS, 2012).
Indeed, the BCBC is setting minimum standards of capital, so an asymmetric treatment
is set out for banks which are not G-SIBs but D-SIBs or both at the same time.
For a given bank, one could argue G-SIB HLA has to be higher than the D-SIB HLA
because at the global level, the totality of its interconnections are known and not only
its domestic linkages. Thus a global shock should lead to a bigger HLA requirement.
However, the marginal effect of this global shock is less than the domestic shock, a global
shock is more spread out than the domestic shock. As in an earthquake where the seismic
magnitude and damages are greater the closer you are to the epicenter, the D-SIB HLA
has to be higher than the G-SIB HLA when you face a domestic shock. Moreover, D-
SIB can be viewed as the worst case because a bank is penalized although it is not a
global actor. Banks identified as domestic actors probably want to grow until becoming
principal actors but their growth is reduced due to the HLA requirement. However, given
the repartition of systemic risk in five equal parts, 20% for each systemic risk factor in
the G-SIB methodology, a bank could reduce one of those factors to increase its degree of
interconnectedness and become a global actor without being further penalized. So far, no
incentives have been considered to reduce the degree of interconnectedness or common
exposure of a given financial system to an exogenous source of risk, which is the key
element of systemic risk at a domestic level.
At the domestic level, Brämer and Gischer (2011) replace the cross-jurisdictional activ-
ity by the Domestic sentiment. Another attempt has been made by Engle, Jondeau and
Rockinger (2014) to identify D-SIB with the SRISK measure. Even if they have worked
at the consolidated perspective for each bank, they have used their classic SRISK di-
vided by the GDP of the country to identify D-SIB and so compare and rank banks at
the European level according to their adjusted SRISK. However, to accurately deal with
D-SIB two modification have to be done. First a domestic shock, not a global one should
be applied. Thus, their DRISK has to be preferred to their SRISK. Second, adjusting
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the SRISK figures according to the current GDP has no impact on the domestic ranking
of banks because the denominator is the same for banks of a given country. They only
highlight the size of the banking sector in the national economy although it would be
promising to observe whether or not the national ranking of a given bank differ according
to the localization and the magnitude of the shock (global or domestic).
In this paper, we compute market-based systemic risk measures using publicly avail-
able data. We assume market efficiency because system bank-specific factors need to
be included into the market return, which is the only element to gauge the choice of
the system. The eurozone is an ideal example to challenge all SRMs because it implies
taking into account not only national specifics but also supranational authorities like the
European Central Bank (ECB), which is in charge of the monetary policy. Furthermore,
dealing with national specifics becomes more and more important during a financial crisis
because each country wants to protect its own banking system to avoid bank runs (Dia-
mond and Dybvig, 1983).
1.3 Systemic Risk Measures
In this section, we present the SRISK and the ∆CoVaR which capture the contribution
of a given bank to the risk of the system, both at a European (supranational) and domestic
(national) levels. These measures are derived from a unified framework described in
Appendix 1.6.1 and we show how to adjust both measures to deal with the perimeter of
the system as well as the localization and the magnitude of the shock to evaluate the
systemic contribution of E- and D-SIBs.
1.3.1 SRISK
The SRISK measure proposed by Brownlees and Engle (2012) and by Acharya, Engle
and Richardson (2012) and finally by Engle, Jondeau and Rockinger (2014) extends the
Marginal Expected Shortfall (MES) measure taking into account both the liabilities and
the size of the financial institution, i.e. its financial leverage. The SRISK corresponds
to the expected capital shortfall of a given financial institution, conditional on a crisis
affecting a particular system. In other words, the SRISK is the difference between the
required capital and the available capital. In this perspective, banks with the largest
capital shortfall are assumed to be the greatest contributors to the crisis. Hence, banks
which are not well capitalized are considered the most systemically risky. The SRISK is
defined as:
SRISKit = k Dit − (1− k) (1− LRMESit) Wit , (1.1)
where k is the prudential capital ratio of equity to assets, Dit is the quarterly book
value of total liabilities, and Wit is the daily market capitalization or market value of
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equity.14 The prudential capital ratio k is usually set to 8% but may vary from bank
to bank due to different accounting standards. A well-known example is the divergence
observed between U.S. GAAP and international IFRS accounting systems which could
lead to specific k component.15 In this eurozone study, accounting standards are the same
and prudential capital ratio is fixed at 8% as in Engle, Jondeau and Rockinger (2014).
This systemic risk measure also considers the interconnection of a bank with the rest of
a particular system through the long-run marginal expected shortfall (LRMES) which
captures the sensitivity to bank’s equity return to particular market shocks. The LRMES
is based on MES and corresponds to the drop in the equity value the bank should face
when the particular market falls by more than its Value-at-Risk (VaR). Acharya, Engle
and Richardson (2012) propose to approximate the LRMES, without simulation, using
the daily MES, described in Appendix 1.6.2, as LRMESit ' 1 − exp(18 × MESit).
This approximation represents the bank expected loss per dollar at a time horizon of
six months, conditional on this particular market falling by more than 40% in the next
6-months period (see Appendix 1.6.3). As a consequence, Eq. (1.1) is the subtraction of
two terms, the first part being the non-MES component whereas the second part is the
MES component varying according to the level-playing field.
The useful property of this SRM is that this measure is strongly linked to the choice of
the system with the MES component. Thus, Eq. (1.1) can easily be adapted according to
the level of the regulation that is dealt with. When we focus on G-SIBs identification as
the BCBS does, we consider a global system which means global market. Thus, as argued
by the BCBS when the system of reference changes, the market return used has to be
modified. In this paper, supranational level represented by the eurozone area is studied
and Eq. (1.1) becomes:
SRISKEit = k Dit − (1− k) (1− LRMESEit ) Wit , (1.2)
able to identify E-SIBs. Similarly when we focus on the D-SIBs as the national authorities
in charge of the regulation do, we consider a national system which means domestic market
and obtain the following expression:
SRISKDit = k Dit − (1− k) (1− LRMESDit ) Wit . (1.3)
The two quantities given by Eqs. (1.2) and (1.3) can be expressed in the same currency.
This analysis is not exposed to a currency mismatch or time lag issue because it is an
eurozone investigation. Indeed, the SRISK amount, to be comparable, has to be adjusted
according to the exchange rate, when considering a global level where currencies are still
14As defined in Appendix 1.6.3, the true definition of the SRISK is given by Eq. (1.36) with the max operator, but we
work with the difference of two SRISK in the empirical illustration. Thus, we do not impose this minimum threshold to
obtain the magnitude in the change of the capital shortfall.
15The V-Lab website sets to 5.5% the prudential capital ratio for Europeans financial institutions instead of 8% for
those from the rest of the world, http://vlab.stern.nyu.edu/analysis/RISK.WORLDFIN-MR.GMES.
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linked to a sovereign monetary policy. Because both quantities are comparable for a given
bank, the difference between the two can easily be computed:
SRISKDit − SRISKEit = (1− k) (LRMESDit − LRMESEit ) Wit . (1.4)
Eq. (1.4) captures the shortage of HLA that a given bank may have when this financial
institution is jointly identified as E- and D-SIB. Then, a domestic effect is observed when
SRISKD > SRISKE whereas a eurozone effect arises whether SRISKE > SRISKD. While
an anticipated SRISKD greater than SRISKE due to lower degree of connection of a bank
with its supranational system is likely to happen, the reverse cannot be out of the scope.
In other words, bank i should be more affected by the downturn in its domestic market
than the drop in its supranational market except when the bank owns a lot of subsidiaries
abroad (in this case especially in the supranational area) and when its degree of openness
to foreign activities is large.
Engle, Jondeau and Rockinger (2014) argue that for a domestic crisis, a semiannual
crash of 40% is much more severe in Switzerland than in Hungary due to wide discrep-
ancies in the domestic market volatilities from one country to the other. Moreover, to
identify E- and D-SIBs, the conditional crisis has to take place in the supranational and
national market, respectively. To deal with these two points and according to Appendix
1.6.2 and 1.6.3, the LRMES is written as:
LRMES
D/E
it = 1− exp
(
18×MESit(α)D/E
)
, (1.5)
where MESit(α)D/E captures the specific market conditions.16
To estimate the systemic contribution given by the SRISK, we use a DCC-GARCH
model as Brownlees and Engle (2012) did, and apply a nonparametric kernel estimation
method (Scaillet, 2005) to estimate conditional expectations.17
1.3.2 ∆CoVaR
The ∆CoVaR measure proposed by Adrian and Brunnermeier (2011) extends the
VaR methodology because it allows computing VaR depending on a specific event. The
∆CoVaR of bank i is defined as the difference between the VaR of a particular system
conditional on the distress of bank i, and the VaR of this particular system conditional
on bank i being in its median state. A financial institution is in distress when its loss
is equal to its VaR at the α% level of risk, and in normal state if its loss is equal to its
16See Appendix 1.6.3 for a broader discussion about the SRISK measure.
17We model the conditional variances σ2it and σ2mt according to the asymmetric TGARCH specification (Rabemananjara
and Zakoïan, 1993) and so deal with the heteroskedasticity, and use a DCC model (Engle, 2002) for the time-varying
correlations ρit. The model is estimated in two steps using Quasi Maximum Likelihood. In the kernel estimation, we
set the bandwidth at T−1/5 and choose the standard normal probability distribution function as a kernel function, i.e.
k(u) = φ(u).
26
1.3 Systemic Risk Measures
median return. Thus, the ∆CoVaR is defined as:
∆CoV aRit = CoV aRm|rit=V aRit(α)it − CoV aRm|rit=Median(rit)it (1.6)
= γit [V aRit(α)− V aRit(0.5)] , (1.7)
where γit corresponds to the linear projection coefficient of a particular market return on
the bank return. This proportionality coefficient is fundamentally linked to the correlation
between bank and market returns and market volatility. Appendix 1.6.4 describes Eq.
(1.7) in detail and gives the explicit expression for γit. Like the MES, the ∆CoVaR is a
measure of interconnectedness, both quantities are mainly driven by the return correlation
and this coefficient is different for a particular system. So once again, we can derive two
∆CoVaRs according to the level of the system. For the global system:
∆CoV aREit = γEit [V aRit(α)− V aRit(0.5)] , (1.8)
and for the domestic system:
∆CoV aRDit = γDit [V aRit(α)− V aRit(0.5)] . (1.9)
With the ∆CoVaR, we can compare those quantities separately without being able
to subtract them because they are computed for different system aggregate levels. On
the one hand, Eq. (1.8) is a difference between two CoVaRs of the global market returns
and on the other hand, Eq. (1.9) is a difference between two CoVaRs domestic market
returns. As a consequence, we cannot subtract these two conditional quantiles. To
estimate systemic contributions, ∆CoVaRE and ∆CoVaRD, we also use a DCC-GARCH
model.18
1.3.3 Correlation
SRISK and ∆CoVaR capture the interconnectedness of a given bank i to a particular
system through the correlation between banks and a specific market returns. This is the
single element directly connected to the market. Thus, as soon as the level-playing field
is changed, the correlation also changes and affects SRMs.
Figure 1.1 displays the time series evolution of the conditional correlation of Alpha
Bank.19 As expected, the return correlation of this bank with its domestic market is
higher than its return correlation with the global index. We observe specific changes at
some point, especially at the European level, because the bank is less connected with this
index. Thus, is return correlation able to capture all aspects of systemic risk regardless
18We can also apply a quantile regression of the market return on the firm’s return of a given bank as in Adrian and
Brunnermeier (2011) and obtain a γi coefficient which is constant over time. In the rest of the paper, we report ∆CoVaR
estimated with DCC-GARCH because results are robust to any the methodology applied. Results obtained with quantile
regression without macro-variables are available upon request.
19Alpha Bank is the 3rd bank in Greece and the 273th largest bank worldwide according to the amount of assets at the
end of 2011.
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of the chosen level of the system? The purpose of the next section is to provide some
answers at this question with an empirical illustration.
Figure 1.1 Conditional correlation of Alpha Bank return
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Notes: This figure displays the conditional correlation of Alpha Bank return with its domestic index (blue solid
line) and with its eurozone index (red dashed line). The estimation period is from 01/02/2002 to 12/30/2011.
1.4 Empirical Results
In this section, we implement and comment on an empirical study on the systemic risk
for the eurozone area. A cross-sectional and time series analysis of the results follows a
brief description of the dataset.
1.4.1 Dataset
A sample of 42 European banks belonging to 10 countries has been collected. The
careful choice of these banks was conditioned by the fact that they are all included in the
market indexes representing the entire economy (domestic and eurozone) and not only
banking system, provided by Deutsche Börse on its website with the STOXX indexes.
In this empirical investigation, 11 market indexes, one per country (domestic system)
plus 1 for the eurozone market (global system) are required. The first step to collect
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this dataset is to access to the EURO STOXX Total Market Index (TMI) which is the
eurozone index.20 The second step is selecting the EURO STOXX TMI components and
having the list of its composition. The final list of the banks is obtained after filtering,
e.g. Banque Nationale de Belgique and Bank of Greece are excluded due to their national
central bank status (see Appendix 1.6.5). This list, being composed of banks coming from
10 different countries, enables me to extract 10 domestic STOXX TMI of their respective
countries.21 This website allows the download of these market prices from January 1,
2002 to December 30, 2011 whereas stock prices, annual amount of liability in book value
and daily market value of equity are extracted from Datastream Worldscope over the
same period, which is the third step. Finally, we have computed the log-returns on these
stock prices and market index prices. Unfortunately, no information about the weight of
the components of these indexes is available and the sample of the 42 selected banks is
not large enough to identify all D-SIBs for each Eurozone countries.22
The list of banks is constant for any chosen level of the system because we focus on the
evolution of our SRMs according to the choice of the system. Banks’ data are obtained
at the banking group consolidated perspective and hosted by a single host country. None
of these banks are a subsidiary. Of course, for a given country, the set of banks should
increase at a domestic level because the number of potential D-SIBs grows when the size
of the system is reduced, i.e. smaller bank should be included. To assess these changes we
have performed a cross-sectional analysis to observe if the ranking is consistent across the
system aggregate level. Using time series analysis we also look at the difference between
domestic and global SRM.
1.4.2 Cross-section
This cross-sectional analysis mainly allows to compare rankings delivered by SRISK
and ∆CoVaR when we adjust the level-playing field for their implementation.
Table 1.2 reports the amount (Value), the domestic ranking (RankD) and the eurozone
ranking (RankE) of all banks based on the SRISKD, SRISKE on December 31, 2011.
Domestic and eurozone rankings produced by the SRISKD are identical to those produced
by the SRISKE. This result is the same as in Engle, Jondeau and Rockinger (2014),
where they rank European financial institutions by SRISK in percentage of domestic
nominal Gross Domestic Product (GDP). However, this output could be considered as
lacking reliable since we have no additional information to be extracted from the domestic
ranking. Indeed, even if the localization and the magnitude of the shock are adjusted do
deal with specific factors, rankings remain unchanged which would not be the case with
20This link sends users to the STOXX website, and precisely on the EURO STOXX Total Market Index page,
http://www.stoxx.com/indices/index_information.html?symbol=BKXE .
21This link sends users to the STOXX website, and precisely on the STOXX Austria Total Market page,
http://www.stoxx.com/indices/index_information.html?symbol=TCATP .
22The dataset has been done in July 2012, the current bank’s components of this EURO STOXX TMI index are different
but the steps of the sample composition stay the same.
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Table 1.2 SRISK Systemic Risk Rankings per country and over the eurozone
December 30, 2011
Bank’s Name
SRISKD SRISKE
Value RankD RankE Value RankD RankE
Austria
ERSTE GROUP BANK 13,720 1 15 13,313 1 15
RAIFFEISEN BANK INTERNATIONAL 9,480 2 19 9,258 2 19
OBERBANK AG 192 3 42 192 3 42
Belgium
DEXIA 32,819 1 10 32,840 1 10
KBC GRP 19,727 2 12 19,735 2 12
Germany
DEUTSCHE BANK 157,482 1 1 157,718 1 1
COMMERZBANK 47,953 2 7 48,106 2 7
DEUTSCHE POSTBANK 10,764 3 17 10,851 3 17
Spain
BCO SANTANDER 66,958 1 5 65,993 1 5
BCO BILBAO VIZCAYA ARGENTARIA 29,003 2 11 28,203 2 11
BANKIA 18,161 3 13 18,051 3 13
CAIXABANK 11,079 4 16 11,002 4 16
BCO POPULAR ESPANOL 7,201 5 23 7,088 5 23
BCO SABADELL 4,884 6 27 4,742 6 27
BANCA CIVICA 4,442 7 28 4,474 7 28
BANKINTER 3,230 8 33 3,202 8 33
Finland
POHJOLA BANK 2,269 1 35 2,263 1 35
France
BNP PARIBAS 138,102 1 2 138,076 1 2
CREDIT AGRICOLE 130,007 2 3 129,985 2 3
GRP SOCIETE GENERALE 85,976 3 4 85,927 3 4
NATIXIS 37,049 4 9 37,027 4 9
Greece
NATIONAL BANK OF GREECE 8,054 2 22 7,799 2 22
EFG EUROBANK ERGASIAS 5,949 3 25 5,912 3 25
ALPHA BANK 4,437 4 29 4,396 4 29
PIRAEUS BANK 3,920 5 30 3,913 5 30
BANK OF ATTICA 290 6 40 279 6 40
Ireland
BANK OF IRELAND 10,639 1 18 10,500 1 18
Italy
UNICREDIT 65,162 1 6 64,455 1 6
INTESA SANPAOLO 40,134 2 8 39,228 2 8
BCA MONTE DEI PASCHI DI SIENA 17,022 3 14 16,915 3 14
BCO POPOLARE 9,096 4 20 8,999 4 20
UBI BCA 8,520 5 21 8,464 5 21
BCA POPOLARE EMILIA ROMAGNA 3,709 6 31 3,667 6 31
BCA POPOLARE DI MILANO 3,379 7 32 3,367 7 32
BCA CARIGE 2,026 8 36 1,941 8 36
CREDITO EMILIANO 1,880 9 37 1,842 9 37
CREDITO VALTELLINESE 1,776 10 38 1,763 10 38
BCA POPOLARE DI SONDRIO 921 11 39 883 11 39
CREDITO BERGAMASCO 224 12 41 228 12 41
Portugal
BCO COMERCIAL PORTUGUES 6,606 1 24 6,510 1 24
BCO ESPIRITO SANTO 5,251 2 26 5,042 2 26
BCO BPI 3,096 3 34 3,070 3 34
Notes: This table displays the bank’s name in the first column, the second and third column are divided in three
small columns with results based on SRISKD and SRISKE values, respectively. The small column on the left
reports SRISK figures in million euros, the middle one discloses the rank of the bank in its country whereas the
right column flags the eurozone rank of the bank (number 1 corresponds to the riskiest bank). Rankings are
dated from December 30, 2011.
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rankings extracted when a stronger eurozone shock is applied. When we follow Engle,
Jondeau and Rockinger (2014), we obtain a different eurozone ranking (RankE) due to
their SRISK adjustment by the domestic GDP that we do not make, but we would argue
that the identification of potential D-SIBs would be more thoroughly accomplished if the
domestic rankings (RankD) that are used were different when the shock takes place in
the national system, instead of using identical domestic rankings with and without GDP
adjustment.
The question raised at this point is: Is really SRISK a good measure of Systemic Risk?
Brownlees and Engle (2012) show that SRISK significantly explains the cross-sectional
variation of Fed capital injections. Thus, SRISK seems to be connected with the HLA
requirement. To backtest this idea, the value of the HLA requirement and the amount
of the SRISK have to be compared. The updated list of G-SIBs published by the FSB
(2012) is based on 2011 year-end data and Deutsche Bank appears in the first bucket
whereas Crédit Agricole is printed in the fourth bucket. At this date and according to
Table 1.2, the Deutsche Bank’s amount of SRISKE is equal to 157,718 million euros which
puts this bank on top. The third eurozone bank according to SRISKD and SRISKE is
Crédit Agricole and the amount of the latter is equal to 129,985 million euros. In the first
bucket the magnitude of the HLA requirement corresponds to 2.5% of the Risk-Weighted
Assets (RWA), while this percentage is fixed at 1% for the fourth bucket. The RWA
of Deutsche Bank at the end of 2011 was equal to 381 billion euros leading to a HLA
requirement of 9.525 (2.5%×381) billion euros, and the HLA of Crédit Agricole was equal
to 3.337 (1%×333.7) billion euros due to a RWA of 333.7 billion euros on December 30,
2011. While RWA amount are above SRISK values, the HLA requirement corresponds to
6.04% and 2.57% of the SRISK value for Deutsche Bank and Crédit Agricole, respectively.
Thus, SRISKE overestimated the amount of HLA which is specific to the systemic risk
component whereas SRISK captures the capital shortfall of a given firm when a global
financial crisis happens. Then, SRISK is not only composed of the additional risk due
to the systemic risk component, a market risk component is also included. This analysis
should be extended to econometrically study the link between the HLA requirement and
the SRISK. Compared to the ∆CoVaR, the SRISK is expressed as an amount of money
which is easily comparable between banks but also for a given bank when comparing
different SRISKs. Indeed, when we compute SRISK based on the choice of the system,
the localization and the magnitude of the systemic event is modified.
As a consequence, SRISKD/E values are different and 35 out of 42 of the banks have
SRISKD greater than their SRISKE, highlighting the requirement of additional capital
buffer for these 35 banks when they are jointly identified as D- and E-SIB. By how
much should a D-SIB increase its Tier one capital to satisfy the regulation? If we do
not take into account the SRISK overestimation of the HLA, the difference expressed
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in million euros should exactly produce this additional amount. Table 1.3 reports the
shortage amount of HLA (Value), the domestic ranking (RankD) and the eurozone ranking
(RankE) of all banks based on the difference between SRISKD and SRISKE on December
31, 2011. Assuming that all banks are classified as D- and E-SIB, the higher of either
D-SIB or E-SIB HLA has to be imposed. In this case, the higher of either SRISKD or
SRISKE is required and the difference between the two represent the shortage of HLA
(when the difference is positive) because we set ex ante the accurate amount of HLA
at the eurozone level, as the BCBS want to do with their top-down approach. At the
end of 2011, 35 out of 42 banks had a shortage of HLA. In other words, if banks are
jointly identified as D and E-SIBs it means that the BCO Santander is undercapitalized
by 965 million euros and the National Bank of Greece is undercapitalized by 254 million
euros, whereas the Deutsche Bank is well capitalized because the difference is negative
(we assume that banks already own the SRISKE amount).
The shortage of HLA defined as the difference between SRISKD and SRISKE has the
potential to identify D-SIB and so to be more in line with the bottom-up approach. The
higher this shortage is, the larger is the bankruptcy of the bank at the domestic level
because its SRISKE amount is not sufficient to internalize all its negative externalities.
Then, ranking banks based on this difference enables to identify banks which may be
exclusively D-SIBs, when the shortage is highly positive, and also banks which may be
exclusively E-SIBs, when the shortage is highly negative. Table 1.3 shows that RanksD/E
are not identical compared to those from Table 1.2. Thus, with the RankD ranking, we
can identify which bank is the most domestically risky in a given country. In France,
Société Générale is the riskiest whereas according to SRISKD this bank is behind Crédit
Agricole and BNP Paribas.
Once again we would like to backtest this shortage of HLA. Table 1.4 reports the
sum of this shortage per country at 3 different dates. We set to 0 the amount when the
difference between SRISKD and SRISKE is negative because we assume that banks meet
the SRISKE amount. At the end of the sample, Spain and Italy are the two countries
with the higher amount of total shortage, 2.235 million and 2.101 million respectively,
whereas Belgium and Germany have no shortage. This highlight emphasizes the Spanish
and Italian distress during the year 2011 even if these sums were below those at the end
of 2009. Germany’s results show that its banks are well capitalized and no need of capital
injection is required. Belgium banks were already recapitalized at this date and explains
the 0 value. This table also shows that the domestic impact of these banks evolves over
time which is a good property. Indeed, the Greek shortage reached its peak of 2.811
million euros in this table on December 31, 2009 during the sovereign debt crisis and
declined to 349 million euros on December 30, 2011. This result captures the bailout of
the Greek economy, which started in 2010.
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Table 1.3 Shortage of HLA Rankings per country and over the eurozone
December 30, 2011
Bank’s Name
SRISKD - SRISKE
Value RankD RankE
Austria
ERSTE GROUP BANK 407 1 5
RAIFFEISEN BANK INTERNATIONAL 223 2 7
OBERBANK AG 0 3 35
Belgium
DEXIA -21 2 38
KBC GRP -8 1 37
Germany
DEUTSCHE BANK -236 3 42
COMMERZBANK -153 2 41
DEUTSCHE POSTBANK -87 1 40
Spain
BCO SANTANDER 965 1 1
BCO BILBAO VIZCAYA ARGENTARIA 800 2 3
BANKIA 110 5 12
CAIXABANK 78 6 17
BCO POPULAR ESPANOL 113 4 11
BCO SABADELL 142 3 9
BANCA CIVICA -33 8 39
BANKINTER 28 7 25
Finland
POHJOLA BANK 6 1 34
France
BNP PARIBAS 26 2 26
CREDIT AGRICOLE 22 3 28
GRP SOCIETE GENERALE 49 1 19
NATIXIS 21 4 29
Greece
NATIONAL BANK OF GREECE 254 1 6
EFG EUROBANK ERGASIAS 37 3 24
ALPHA BANK 41 2 21
PIRAEUS BANK 7 3 33
BANK OF ATTICA 10 4 32
Ireland
BANK OF IRELAND 140 1 10
Italy
UNICREDIT 707 2 4
INTESA SANPAOLO 906 1 2
BCA MONTE DEI PASCHI DI SIENA 107 3 13
BCO POPOLARE 97 4 14
UBI BCA 56 6 18
BCA POPOLARE EMILIA ROMAGNA 42 7 20
BCA POPOLARE DI MILANO 13 11 31
BCA CARIGE 85 5 16
CREDITO EMILIANO 38 8 22
CREDITO VALTELLINESE 13 10 30
BCA POPOLARE DI SONDRIO 38 9 23
CREDITO BERGAMASCO -4 12 36
Portugal
BCO COMERCIAL PORTUGUES 96 2 15
BCO ESPIRITO SANTO 209 1 8
BCO BPI 26 3 27
Notes: This table displays the bank’s name in the first column, the second column is divided in three small
columns with results based on SRISKD - SRISKE values. The small column on the left reports SRISKD -
SRISKE figures in million euros, the middle one discloses the rank of the bank in its country whereas the right
column flags the eurozone rank of the bank (number 1 corresponds to the riskiest bank). Rankings are dated
from December 30, 2011.
33
Chapter 1: Where is the System?
Table 1.4 Shortage of Higher Loss Absorbency per country
Country September 30, 2008 December 31, 2009 December 30, 2011
Austria 96 708 630
Belgium 0 180 0
Germany 0 0 0
Spain 3,313 3,900 2,235
Finland 0 3 6
France 871 556 119
Greece 1,852 2,811 349
Ireland 93 111 140
Italy 1,260 2,729 2,101
Portugal 1,108 901 331
Notes: This table displays the country’s name in the first column, the second, third and fourth column report
the shortage of HLA in million euros whether all banks in the country are considered as D- and E-SIB at the
same time on September 30, 2008, December 31, 2009 and December 30, 2011, respectively.
Table 1.5 reports the amount (Value), the domestic ranking (RankD) and the eurozone
ranking (RankE) of all banks according to the ∆CoVaRD and ∆CoVaRE on December
31, 2011. Domestic rankings are almost the same even though some discrepancies are ob-
served especially for Italy, Spain and Greece, whatever the system considered. Although
both ∆CoVaRs produce approximately the same ranking of D-SIBs, the ∆CoVaRD should
be preferred because the domestic system in each country is more suitable to rank banks
at the domestic level. The importance (weight) of a domestic bank is better captured
inside its domestic index than through an European index. Eurozone ranking derived
from the domestic and the eurozone systems are completely different. For instance, the
National Bank of Greece is the 14th largest E-SIB, according to the national market, but
only the 31st E-SIB when we use the eurozone index. Results are similar for all Greek
banks, their ∆CoVaRD are twice as much than their ∆CoVaRE. This accentuated the
great distress of the Greek economy at the end of 2011, and emphasizes also the fact that
this national system was not the most important in the eurozone with regard to its size
captured by the relative GDP (relative GDP less than 3%). In contrast, Spain (relative
GDP greater than 10%) and Italy (relative GDP greater than 15%) are the two countries
which can significantly destabilize the eurozone, especially Spain with the ∆CoVaRE of
its G-SIBs banks like Santander and Banco Bilbao Vizcaya Argentaria being greater than
their ∆CoVaRD. In other words, the systemic contribution of these banks is larger in
the eurozone than in their home country. We observe the same phenomena for French,
German and Belgium banks. To sum up, global rankings based on the ∆CoVaRD have
no value as long as this eurozone ranking puts on top D-SIBs (not all, as we can see for
Bankia which is in the bottom of both lists) belonging to a domestic system in distress on
a particular date. Furthermore, we observe that even after the nationalization of Dexia,
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Table 1.5 ∆CoVaR Systemic Risk Rankings per country and over the eurozone
December 30, 2011
Bank’s Name
∆CoVaRD ∆CoVaRE
Value RankD RankE Value RankD RankE
Austria
ERSTE GROUP BANK 1.58 1 24 1.33 1 19
RAIFFEISEN BANK INTERNATIONAL 1.48 2 29 1.26 2 20
OBERBANK AG 0.12 3 42 0.12 3 42
Belgium
DEXIA 0.74 2 39 1.18 1 25
KBC GRP 0.75 1 38 1.07 2 30
Germany
DEUTSCHE BANK 2.03 1 10 1.88 1 5
COMMERZBANK 1.50 2 27 1.40 2 18
DEUTSCHE POSTBANK 0.63 3 41 0.58 3 39
Spain
BCO SANTANDER 2.51 1 3 2.07 1 1
BCO BILBAO VIZCAYA ARGENTARIA 2.46 2 4 2.02 2 2
BANKIA 1.07 8 35 0.88 8 36
CAIXABANK 1.75 5 19 1.54 4 12
BCO POPULAR ESPANOL 2.18 3 9 1.79 3 7
BCO SABADELL 1.25 7 30 0.99 7 32
BANCA CIVICA 1.58 6 25 1.44 6 16
BANKINTER 1.79 4 16 1.45 5 15
Finland
POHJOLA BANK 2.42 1 5 1.82 1 6
France
BNP PARIBAS 2.01 1 11 1.92 1 3
CREDIT AGRICOLE 1.85 3 15 1.75 3 8
GRP SOCIETE GENERALE 1.99 2 12 1.90 2 4
NATIXIS 1.64 4 23 1.55 4 11
Greece
NATIONAL BANK OF GREECE 1.90 1 14 1.04 1 31
EFG EUROBANK ERGASIAS 1.52 3 26 0.81 4 38
ALPHA BANK 1.65 2 22 0.91 2 33
PIRAEUS BANK 1.15 4 32 0.90 3 34
BANK OF ATTICA 1.01 5 37 0.43 5 41
Ireland
BANK OF IRELAND 1.09 1 34 1.20 1 22
Italy
UNICREDIT 2.63 2 2 1.56 2 10
INTESA SANPAOLO 2.76 1 1 1.68 1 9
BCA MONTE DEI PASCHI DI SIENA 2.27 3 7 1.45 4 14
BCO POPOLARE 2.28 4 6 1.43 5 17
UBI BCA 2.21 5 8 1.51 3 13
BCA POPOLARE EMILIA ROMAGNA 1.75 8 18 1.15 9 27
BCA POPOLARE DI MILANO 1.75 7 17 1.18 7 24
BCA CARIGE 1.65 10 21 1.17 8 26
CREDITO EMILIANO 1.99 6 13 1.24 6 21
CREDITO VALTELLINESE 1.67 9 20 1.14 10 28
BCA POPOLARE DI SONDRIO 1.49 11 28 1.08 11 29
CREDITO BERGAMASCO 0.66 12 40 0.53 12 40
Portugal
BCO COMERCIAL PORTUGUES 1.10 2 33 0.88 3 37
BCO ESPIRITO SANTO 1.04 3 36 0.89 2 35
BCO BPI 1.25 1 31 1.20 1 23
Notes: This table displays the bank’s name in the first column, the second and third column are divided in three
small columns with results based on ∆CoVaRD and ∆CoVaRE values, respectively. The small column on the
left reports ∆CoVaR figures in percentage, the middle one discloses the rank of the bank in its country whereas
the right column flags the eurozone rank of the bank (number 1 corresponds to the riskiest bank). Rankings are
dated from December 30, 2011.
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this bank is considered the riskiest Belgian bank based on ∆CoVaRE, but not on ∆CoVaRD.
Those results show that ∆CoVaR is extremely sensitive to the choice of the system and
highlights that large banks, such as Deutsche Bank, Santander, BBVA, BNP Paribas,
Société Générale and Unicredit are more affected by an eurozone shock compared to
the others. A theoretical argument explains these results: rankE from ∆CoVaRD is not
useful because the γDit coefficients corresponding to the linear projection coefficient of
a domestic market return on the bank i return cannot be compared. In this case, the
dependent variable is the same only at the domestic level (rankD) whereas to rank at
the European level (rankE) based on ∆CoVaRD, we assume that the 10 domestic market
returns are comparable, which is a strong assumption. This comment is no longer veri-
fied when we use ∆CoVaRE, RankD do not produce additional information compared to
RankE when we observe the country-per-country ranking.
Whatever the system used, SRISKsD/E produce similar rankings at domestic and
eurozone levels, but the difference between SRISKD and SRISKE can identify D-SIB
which are not E-SIB and conversely. In contrast, ∆CoVaR leads to two different rankings,
and ∆CoVaRD should be applied to identify D-SIBs as well as the ∆CoVaRE to look for
E-SIBs.
1.4.3 Time series
The time series analysis of these measures confirms our previous cross-sectional findings
and emphasizes the dynamics of these measures to evaluate the systemic contribution of
banks over time. Individual plots display results of Alpha Bank but another bank could
be used to illustrate our purposes.
Before focusing on Alpha Bank, let’s generalize the analysis with some descriptive
statistics about the evolution through time of the ranking. For each measure, we compute
the Kendall rank-order correlation coefficient between the European systemic risk ranking
obtained at time t and the one obtained at time t−1. The average correlations are 98.4%
for SRISKD, 98.4% for SRISKE, 93.5% for ∆CoVaRD, and 94.7% for ∆CoVaRE, and are
always statistically significant. Thus, rankings are stable through time and the same fact
can be observed for the rankings based on the difference between SRISKD and SRISKE,
and on the MES. We also evaluate the stability of the systemic ranking obtained at
time t between the European ranking from SRISKD and SRISKE on the one hand, and
from ∆CoVaRD and ∆CoVaRE on the other hand. The average of the Kendall rank-order
correlation coefficient is 95.8% for the SRISK and 49.2% for the ∆CoVaR. This coefficient
is statistically significant over time for the SRISK emphasizing the predominant effect
of the non-MES component in the ranking based on SRISK. The Kendall rank-order
correlation is sometimes non-significant for the ∆CoVaR especially during the sovereign-
debt crisis in 2010-2012. This result highlights the sensitivity of the ∆CoVaR to the
choice of the system and shows that ∆CoVaRD gives additional information which may
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be useful at the domestic level. However, ranking banks at the European level based
on ∆CoVaRD does not make sense because we sort conditional quantile from different
domestic market index, i.e. various conditional domestic market indexes distribution.
This is the main difference between the ∆CoVaR and the MES (SRISK) because MES
involves comparing the distribution of a firm’s stock return, conditional on a market
crisis. The average Kendall rank-order correlation between the European ranking based
on MESD and MESE is equal to 74.3%, and this coefficient is always significant.
Figure 1.2 SRISK of Alpha Bank
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Notes: This figure displays the SRISKD (blue solid line) and the SRISKE (red dashed line) of Alpha Bank in
million of euros. The estimation period is from 02/01/2002 to 12/30/2011.
Figure 1.2 displays the evolution of both SRISKD and SRISKE for Alpha Bank from
January 2, 2002 and December 30, 2011. The gap between domestic and eurozone SRISK
is not constant over time although the coefficient of correlation between these two systemic
risk measures is equal to 0.99. Moreover, when both markets are in crisis, curves are closer.
As predicted, for this bank SRISKD is above the SRISKE because the domestic MES is
above the eurozone MES, as shown by Figure 1.3 where dynamics of the LRMESsD/E
are plotted. The correlation coefficient reported in Figure 1.1 is lower at a global level
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for a technical reason. Indeed, the weighting factor of this bank used to construct the
eurozone index is lower than the one used to build the domestic index. The correlation
coefficient is the main driver of the LRMES and explains why the LRMESD is above the
LRMESE. Thus, the sensitivity of Alpha Bank to a domestic equity shock is greater than
its sensitivity to an eurozone equity shock. In average over the period, the difference
between SRISKD and SRISKE is equal to 544 million euros but the difference is twice as
much in average for National Bank of Greece and EFG Eurobank Ergasias.
Figure 1.3 LRMES of Alpha Bank
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Notes: This figure displays the LRMESD and the LRMESE of Alpha Bank return with its domestic index (blue
solid line) and with its eurozone index (red dashed line) in percentage. The estimation period is from 01/02/2002
to 12/30/2011.
As observed in Figure 1.2, if a bank is simultaneously identified as a D- and E-SIB then
the higher of either D-SIB or E-SIB HLA requirements has to be met. Figure 1.4 displays
this shortage of HLA for Alpha Bank over the period. The dynamics of the shortage show
that this amount relies on the firm’s characteristics and economic conditions. The amount
of this shortage for Alpha Bank reached its top around 1,800 million euros in 2005 and
was at its lowest at the end of 2011, around 41 million.
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Figure 1.4 Shortage of HLA of Alpha Bank
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Notes: This figure displays the shortage of HLA (blue solid line) of Alpha Bank in million of euros whether this
bank is considered as D- and E-SIB at the same time. The estimation period is from 02/01/2002 to 12/30/2011.
Figure 1.5 displays 4 radar plots where the breakdown by banks of the total shortage of
HLA for a given country is realized at 3 different dates. In Italy, strong change appeared
over time while Unicredit and Intesa Sanpaolo remains the main contributors but UBI
BCA has been removed from this list of large contributors since 2009. In Spain, Santander
and BBVA remain the main contributors to the total shortage over time. It means that
their domestic effect is high and has to be internalized. In other words, their amount
of capital requirement is undervalued due to their domestic impact. In Greece, National
Bank of Greece and EFG Eurobank Ergasias as well as Alpha Bank and Piraeus Bank on
December 31, 2009 were major systemic risk contributors. However, as in Table 1.4, their
contribution has significantly decreased at the end of the period. In France, BNP Paribas
was on top on September 30, 2008 but was replaced by Crédit Agricole on December 31,
2009. At year-end 2011 their contributions were close to 0.
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Figure 1.5 Radar plots of shortage of HLA per country
Notes: This figure displays 4 radar plots with three snapshots each, of the breakdown by banks of a particular
country of the shortage of Higher Loss Absorbency (expressed in million euros) when all banks are considered as
D- and E-SIB at the same time. In the top left-hand corner, there is the Italian radar plot; in the top right-hand
corner, the Spanish radar plot; in the bottom left-hand corner, the Greek radar plot; and in the bottom right-hand
corner, the French radar plot. Tickers from Appendix 1.6.5 are used to represent the country’s banks. These
snapshots are dated from September 30, 2008 (blue solid line), December 31, 2009 (red solid line) and December
30, 2011 (green solid line).
Figure 1.6 displays the evolution of both ∆CoVaRD and ∆CoVaRE for Alpha Bank
from January 2, 2002 and December 30, 2011. The correlation coefficient between the
domestic ∆CoVaRD and the eurozone ∆CoVaRE is equal to 0.65. This coefficient is
low due to the choice of the estimation method which allows to produce a time-varying
proportional coefficient between the ∆CoVaR and VaR. Indeed, if we estimate ∆CoVaR
with a quantile regression with or without macro-variables, we have a perfect correlation
between both ∆CoVaRs. In this case, the time series dynamics are the same for the
both national and the eurozone systems. However, it does not mean that the ranking
is the same because the magnitude between these curves can be large. The ∆CoVaR is
extremely sensitive to the estimation method. Moreover, contrary to the SRISK (MES)
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approach, in the ∆CoVaR approach, the localization of the system of reference has an
impact only on the γD/E coefficient and not on the magnitude of the systemic event which
corresponds in both cases to the VaR of the financial institution. With this figure, we
show that the ∆CoVaRE can be above the ∆CoVaRD due to a higher interconnection
between banks in the eurozone than in their own market. At the end of the period, we
observe that the ∆CoVaRD remains high whereas the ∆CoVaRE becomes lower and less
volatile. The systemic contribution of Alpha Bank is then higher within its domestic
market than at the eurozone level because the return correlation with the global market
decreases, as we can see in Figure 1.1.
Figure 1.6 ∆CoVaR of Alpha Bank
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Notes: This figure displays the ∆CoVaRD (blue solid line) and the ∆CoVaRE (red dashed line) of Alpha Bank
in percentage. The estimation period is from 01/02/2002 to 12/30/2011.
This empirical part shows the evidence that the choice of the system is a key factor
in measuring systemic risk contribution with the SRISK and the ∆CoVaR. We also
point out that the correlation between the financial institution and its system is the only
mathematical tool to take into account this change in the system aggregate level. Jiang
(2012) argues that the dependence among bank and market returns is nonlinear and
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that copula approaches need to be used to capture this dependence, yet even with this
methodology the level-playing field is crucial.
1.5 Conclusion
The identification of the systemically important banks is a high-priority task for reg-
ulators around the world even if identifying and measuring systemic risk is a challenge
(Hansen, 2014). While most research focuses on firms that are globally systemic (G-SIBs),
this paper applies market-based systemic risk measures in a domestic and eurozone frame-
work in order to identify and regulate D-SIBs (BCBS, 2012), and study their behavior
when the system of reference changes. Simple quantification of systemic risk based on
market data may be too restrictive and their model unrealistic. However, these SRMs
are powerful tools to understand and validate the discretion of the regulators’ action
on systemic risk policy. At the European level, home and host authorities, both being
the domestic supervisors of a given bank with its subsidiaries, conduct their supervision
after the identification of E-SIBs. Any additional requirements and other policy measures
to internalize the risk posed by a D-SIB should be clearly documented by the national
authorities and follow the principles stated by the BCBS, i.e. the Global/European reg-
ulator. Following this guideline, we have adjusted market-based SRMs used to identify
G-SIBs to investigate the systemic risk contribution of a given bank at the domestic level
and extract specific additional policy for D-SIBs as required by the BCBS.
Our main conclusions are the following. First, the SRISK methodology produces
identical rankings regardless of the reference system used because SRISK-based ranking
is mainly sensitive to the total amount of liabilities of the bank, which does not depend
on the size of the system. Thus, this measure fails to identify D-SIBs but the difference
between SRISKD and SRISKE, in which the impact of the liabilities disappears, allows to
identify D-SIBs, as well as the most systemic countries within the eurozone. This property
of the difference between SRISKD and SRISKE is due to the fact that we capture the
spread between the degree of interconnection of the bank with the European system and
the domestic system through the LRMES. Moreover, this difference captures the shortage
of HLA that a given bank may have when this financial institution is jointly identified
as E- and D-SIB. Second, our findings also indicate that in the ∆CoVaR methodology a
bank could be identified as E-SIBs but not as D-SIBs, and conversely. In this measure,
for a given bank, the systemic event is not specific to the system of reference and its
magnitude remains the same. However, the dependent variable of the linear projection of
a particular market return on the bank return is not the same. To overcome this issue and
thus to rank banks when the same dependent variable is used, we apply the ∆CoVaRD
to identify D-SIBs and the ∆CoVaRE for E-SIBs.
This paper highlights the lack of specific factors directly connected to the system in
which the bank is operating. A network approach, already used to deal with systemic
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risk (Eisenberg and Noe, 2001; Demange, 2011), seems to be an attractive approach to
capture all the characteristics of the system but it requires more data to be collected.
Thus, producing an accurate domestic systemic risk measure based on a network approach
should be a priority.
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1.6 Appendices
1.6.1 Appendix: The Framework
We consider a simple bivariate model where the demeaned market return at time t,
rmt, and the demeaned firm return of a given bank i at time t, rit, are expressed as:
rmt = σmt εmt , (1.10)
rit = σit εit , (1.11)
where σit and σmt are the conditional standard deviations whereas εit and εmt are the
conditional standardized residuals. The conditional correlation between market and bank
returns ρit is equal to:
ρit =
σimt
σit σmt
⇔ ρit σit = σimt
σmt
, (1.12)
where σimt is the conditional covariance. The conditional systematic risk of a given bank
βit is defined as follows:
βit =
σimt
σmt σmt
= σimt
σ2mt
. (1.13)
According to the market model, the bank return is:
rit = βit rmt + ηit
= σimt
σ2mt
σmt εmt + ηit
= σimt
σmt
εmt + ηit
= ρit σit εmt + ηit
= ρit σit εmt + σηit ξit . (1.14)
Then we compute the bank variance:
V(rit) = σ2it = σ2it ρ2it + σ2ηit . (1.15)
The first part of Eq. (1.15) corresponds to the systematic risk whereas the second part
is the idiosyncratic risk. Hence, we extract the idiosyncratic risk when we subtract the
systematic risk from the total risk of bank i as shown in the following equation:
⇒ σ2ηit = σ2it
[
1− ρ2it
]
(1.16)
⇒ σηit = σit
√
1− ρ2it . (1.17)
Thus the bank return becomes:
rit = ρit σit εmt + σit
√
1− ρ2it ξit
= σit
(
ρit εmt +
√
1− ρ2it ξit
)
. (1.18)
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Finally, we obtain the exact same framework as Brownlees and Engle (2012):
rmt = σmt εmt , (1.19)
rit = σit ρit εmt + σit
√
1− ρ2it ξit , (1.20)
(εmt, ξit) ∼ D , (1.21)
where rmt ⊥ ξit, the process νt = (εmt, ξit)′ is i.i.d. over time but not in cross-section, and
satisfies E(νt) = 0 and E(νtν ′t) = I2, a two-by-two identity matrix, and D is a bivariate
distribution of these standardized innovations, which is assumed to be unknown.
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1.6.2 Appendix: The MES Formula
According to Appendix A and the definition of the expected shortfall of a particular
market return:
ESmt(α) = Et−1
(
rmt | rmt < C
)
=
N∑
i=1
wSit Et−1
(
rit | rmt < C
)
, (1.22)
where N firms form the particular system, noted S, and rit denotes the return of firm
i at time t. Similarly, the market return of this particular system is the value-weighted
average of all firm returns including in this particular system, rmt =
∑N
i=1w
S
it rit, where
wSit denotes the relative market capitalization of firm i within this particular system.
According to Scaillet (2004), we have the following expression for the MES of a given
specific event C on the market return for a level of risk α can be expressed as:
MESit(α) =
∂ESmt(C)
∂wSit
= Et−1
(
rit | rmt < C
)
= σit Et−1
(
εit | εmt < C
σmt
)
= σit Et−1
(
ρit εmt +
√
1− ρ2it ξit | εmt <
C
σmt
)
. (1.23)
And we have:
MESit(α) = σit ρit Et−1
(
εmt | εmt < C
σmt
)
+ σit
√
1− ρ2it Et−1
(
ξit | εmt < C
σmt
)
. (1.24)
In this application, C = V aRmt(α), which is the Value-at-Risk (at the α = 5% level of
risk) of the reference market and its associated expected shortfall is given by:
ESmt(α) = Et−1
(
rmt | rmt < V aRmt(α)
)
, (1.25)
and the MES is equal to:
MESit(α) = σit ρit Et−1
(
εmt | εmt < V aRmt(α)
σmt
)
+ σit
√
1− ρ2it Et−1
(
ξit | εmt < V aRmt(α)
σmt
)
. (1.26)
Caporin and de Magistris (2012) show that Eq. (1.26) only holds as an approximation
with log-returns.
46
1.6 Appendices
1.6.3 Appendix: SRISK Formula
Engle, Jondeau and Rockinger (2014) in their paper Systemic Risk in Europe define
the capital shortfall of a given bank i as follow:
CSi,t:t+T = Et−1
[
k Ai,t+T −Wi,t+T |Crisist:t+T
]
= Et−1
[
k (Di,t+T +Wi,t+T )−Wi,t+T |Crisist:t+T
]
= Et−1
[
k Di,t+T − (1− k) Wi,t+T |Crisist:t+T
]
, (1.27)
where Ai,t andWi,t denote the value of the assets and equity of bank i and k is a prudential
capital ratio of equity to assets. In the short-run, Di,t+T = Di,t and the financial leverage
is defined as Li,t = Ai,t/Wi,t, so that Di,t = (Li,t − 1) Wi,t :
CSi,t:t+T =
(
k (Li,t − 1)− (1− k) Et−1
[
Wi,t+T
Wi,t
∣∣∣∣∣Crisist:t+T
])
Wi,t , (1.28)
where
Et−1
[
Wi,t+T
Wi,t
∣∣∣∣∣Crisist:t+T
]
= 1 + Et−1
[
Wi,t+T
Wi,t
− 1
∣∣∣∣∣Crisist:t+T
]
= 1− LRMESi,t:t+T , (1.29)
and LRMESi,t:t+T = −Et−1
[
Wi,t+T
Wi,t
− 1
∣∣∣Crisist:t+T ] which is the long-run marginal ex-
pected shortfall of the bank’s return in case of a financial crisis event. Eq. (1.28) can be
rewritten as:
CSi,t:t+T =
[
k (Li,t − 1)− (1− k) (1− LRMESi,t:t+T )
]
Wi,t
= k Di,t − (1− k) (1− LRMESi,t:t+T ) Wi,t . (1.30)
For a worldwide crisis, the systemic event is approximated by a fall of 40% at a time of
horizon six months. This decline corresponds to the worst six months market drop over
the last decade on the US market (i.e. S&P500). Then LRMES is defined as:
LRMESi,t:t+T = −Et−1
(
Ri,t:t+T |Rm,t:t+T ≤ −40%
)
, (1.31)
where Ri,t:t+T and Ri,t:t+T are cumulative returns defined as:
Ri,t:t+T = exp
(
T∑
j=1
ri,t+j
)
− 1 and Rm,t:t+T = exp
(
T∑
j=1
rm,t+j
)
− 1 ,
ri,t and rm,t are the log-return of bank i and the log-return of the particular market index
(as given in Appendix B) respectively, T = 126. Then, the LRMES is estimated by:
LRMESi,t:t+T =
−1
S∑
s=1
I
(
R
(s)
M,t:t+T ≤ −40%
) S∑
s=1
R
(s)
i,t:t+T × I
(
R
(s)
m,t:t+T ≤ −40%
)
. (1.32)
where I(x) = 1 if x is true and 0 otherwise. Empirically, this simulation is time consuming
and even if it leads to accurate estimation of the long-run marginal expected shortfall,
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some cautions have to be apply after the steps of simulation to end up with stationary
returns and not explosive MES trajectories (Banulescu and Dumitrescu, 2013).
Thus, Acharya, Engle and Richardson (2012) compute the LRMES without simulation.
They approximate it by:
LRMESi,t:t+T = −
(
exp(18×MESi,t)− 1
)
= 1− exp(18×MESi,t) , (1.33)
where MES is the one day loss expected if market return is less than −2%. In this paper,
this loss is replaced by the daily market VaR at the 5% level of risk and so take into
account the volatility difference of a particular market and end up with MESit(α) (see
Appendix B). Then, the generalized formula of the capital shortfall is equal to:
CSi,t:t+T = k Di,t − (1− k) exp
(
θi ×MESi,t(α)
)
Wi,t , (1.34)
where θi = θ = 18 which is the calibration used by Acharya, Engle and Richardson (2012)
for the US stock market. This coefficient is assumed to be constant across banks and
through time within a particular market. However, this coefficient should be bank-specific
as in the simulated way. A specific θi coefficient to take into account for the difference
in volatility of the market returns across countries for a given bank could be used. This
coefficient is defined as followed:
θi =
Et
(
Ri,t:t+T |Rm,t:t+T ≤ V aRm,t:t+T (α)
)
Et
(
Ri,t:t+1|Rm,t:t+1 ≤ V aRm,t:t+1(α)
) , (1.35)
where V aRm,t:t+T (α) is a semi-annual market VaR at the 5% level of risk whereas
V aRm,t:t+1(α) is a daily market VaR at the 5% level of risk. However, this methodo-
logy leads to very different estimation of θi and far from the 18 which is the average value
through banks of Eq. (1.35) in the US stock market. To avoid this issue which could
lead to inaccurate SRISK results and focus on this assumption later, we also assume that
θi coefficient is constant over time and the same for all banks to obtain the same MES
transformation. Thus, its value is set at 18. To conclude, the systemic contribution of
firm i is the positive capital shortfall:
SRISKi,t:t+T = max
(
0 ;CSi,t:t+T
)
= max
(
0 ; k Di,t − (1− k) exp
(
θ ×MESi,t(α)
)
Wi,t
)
. (1.36)
The contribution to aggregate SRISK by any bank is also given by:
SRISK%i,t:t+T =
SRISKi,t∑
j ∈ J
SRISKj,t
, (1.37)
where J = {banks with positive SRISK}.
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1.6.4 Appendix: The CoVaR Formula
The CoVaR corresponds to the VaR of a particular market obtained conditional on
some event C(rit) observed for bank i belongs to this particular system:
Pr
(
rmt ≤ CoV aRm|C(rit)t
∣∣∣ C(rit)) = α , (1.38)
where α is the level of risk of this conditional probability. Given the simple bivariate
process describes in Appendix A as:
rmt = σmt mt , (1.39)
rit = σit it , (1.40)
where (rmt, rit) ∼ D, D is a bivariate distribution with νt = (rmt, rit)′ satisfies E(νt) =
0, and E(νtν ′t) = Ht =
(
σ2mt ρit σit σmt
ρit σit σmt σ
2
it
)
, the conditional variance/covariance
matrices. If the conditional mean function of rmt is linear in rit, the first two conditional
moments of rmt given rit = c can be expressed by the following:
E
(
rmt | rit = c
)
= cov(rmt, rit)
σ2it
× c
= ρit σit σmt
σ2it
× c
= ρit σmt
σit
× c , (1.41)
V
(
rmt | rit
)
= V(rmt)−
[
1− ρ2it
]
= σ2mt (1− ρ2it) . (1.42)
We standardized this particular market return and get:
Pr
(
rmt − ρit σmtσit × rit
σmt
√
(1− ρ2it)
≤ CoV aR
m|C(rit)
it − ρit σmtσit × rit
σmt
√
(1− ρ2it)
∣∣∣∣∣∣ C(rit)
)
= α . (1.43)
Thus, when bank i is in distress we have C(rit) : rit = V aRit(α), Eq. (1.43) is expressed
as:
CoV aR
m|rit=V aRit(α)
it =
ρit σmt
σit
× V aRit(α) +
(
σmt
√
(1− ρ2it)
)
G−1(α) , (1.44)
where G(.) is the conditional distribution of rmt.
When bank i is just fine, C(rit) : rit = Median(rit), Eq. (1.43) becomes:
CoV aR
m|rit=Mediani
it =
ρit σmt
σit
×Median(rit) +
(
σmt
√
(1− ρ2it)
)
G−1(α)
= ρit σmt
σit
× V aRit(0.5) +
(
σmt
√
(1− ρ2it)
)
G−1(α) . (1.45)
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Finally, the systemic contribution of a given bank i to the risk of a particular system is
equal to
∆CoV aRit = CoV aRm|rit=V aRit(α)it − CoV aRm|rit=Median(rit)it
= ρit σmt
σit
× V aRit(α) +
(
σmt
√
(1− ρ2it)
)
G−1(α)
−
ρit σmt
σit
× V aRit(0.5) +
(
σmt
√
(1− ρ2it)
)
G−1(α)

∆CoV aRit =
ρit σmt
σit
[
V aRit(α)− V aRit(0.5)
]
. (1.46)
where the linear projection coefficient of a particular market return on the bank return is
equal to γit = ρit σmt / σit. When we assume a location-scale distribution for rit, we have
V aRit(α) = σit F−1(α), with F (.) the marginal distribution of it (this pdf is symmetric
around 0) and F−1(α) is the empirical quantile of the standardized innovations of rit.
Thus, the systemic contribution corresponds to ∆CoV aRit = ρit σmt F−1(α).
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1.6.5 Appendix: Dataset
Tickers and Company Names per Country
Austria (3)
EBS ERSTE GROUP BANK
OBS OBERBANK AG
RBI RAIFFEISEN BANK INTERNATIONAL
Belgium (2)
DEXB DEXIA
KBC KBC GRP
Germany (3)
CBK COMMERZBANK
DBK DEUTSCHE BANK
DPB DEUTSCHE POSTBANK
Spain (8)
BCIV BANCA CIVICA
BKIA BANKIA
BKT BANKINTER
BBVA BCO BILBAO VIZCAYA ARGENTARIA
POP BCO POPULAR ESPANOL
SAB BCO SABADELL
SAN BCO SANTANDER
CABK CAIXABANK
Finland (1)
POH1S POHJOLA BANK
France (4)
BNP BNP PARIBAS
ACA CREDIT AGRICOLE
GLE GRP SOCIETE GENERALE
KN NATIXIS
Greece (5)
ALPHA ALPHA BANK
TATT BANK OF ATTICA
EUROB EFG EUROBANK ERGASIAS
ETE NATIONAL BANK OF GREECE
TPEIR PIRAEUS BANK
Ireland (1)
BIR BANK OF IRELAND
Italy (12)
CRG BCA CARIGE
BMPS BCA MONTE DEI PASCHI DI SIENA
PMI BCA POPOLARE DI MILANO
BPSO BCA POPOLARE DI SONDRIO
BPE BCA POPOLARE EMILIA ROMAGNA
BP BCO POPOLARE
CB CREDITO BERGAMASCO
CE CREDITO EMILIANO
CVAL CREDITO VALTELLINESE
ISP INTESA SANPAOLO
UBI UBI BCA
UCG UNICREDIT
Portugal (3)
BPI BCO BPI
BCP BCO COMERCIAL PORTUGUES
BES BCO ESPIRITO SANTO
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Chapter 2
A Theoretical and Empirical
Comparison of Systemic Risk
Measures23
We derive several popular systemic risk measures in a common framework and show that
they can be expressed as transformations of market risk measures (e.g. beta). We also
derive conditions under which the different measures lead to similar rankings of system-
ically important financial institutions (SIFIs). In an empirical analysis of US financial
institutions, we show that (i) different systemic risk measures identify different SIFIs
and that (ii) firm rankings based on systemic risk estimates mirror rankings obtained by
sorting firms on market risk or liabilities. One-factor linear models explain most of the
variability of the systemic risk estimates, which indicates that systemic risk measures fall
short in capturing the multiple facets of systemic risk.
2.1 Introduction
The recent financial crisis has fostered extensive research on systemic risk, either on its
definition, measurement, or regulation. Of particular interest is the identification of the
financial institutions that contribute the most to the overall risk of the financial system
– the so-called Systemically Important Financial Institutions (SIFIs). The Financial
Stability Board (2011) defines SIFIs as “financial institutions whose distress or disorderly
failure, because of their size, complexity and systemic interconnectedness, would cause
significant disruption to the wider financial system and economic activity”. As they pose
a major threat to the system, regulators and policy makers from around the world have
called for tighter supervision, extra capital requirements, and liquidity buffers for SIFIs
(Financial Stability Board, 2011).24
23This chapter is based on Benoit, Colletaz, Hurlin and Pérignon (2014).
24For some banks, the benefits of being designated a SIFI outweigh the costs. As put by Douglas Flint, the chairman
of HSBC (http://www.guardian.co.uk/business/2011/nov/06/banks-disappointed-not-on-g-sifi-list): “I see it as a label
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In practice, there are two ways of measuring the contribution of a given financial
institution to the risk of the system. The first approach relies on information on positions
and risk exposures. This confidential information is provided by the financial firms to
the regulator.25 The second approach only relies on public market data, such as stock
returns, option prices, or CDS spreads, as they are believed to reflect all information
about publicly traded firms. Four prominent examples of such measures are the Marginal
Expected Shortfall (MES) and the Systemic Expected Shortfall (SES) of Acharya et al.
(2010), the Systemic Risk Measure (SRISK) of Acharya, Engle and Richardson (2012)
and Brownlees and Engle (2012), and the Delta Conditional Value-at-Risk (∆CoVaR)
of Adrian and Brunnermeier (2011).26 Very few crisis-related papers made a higher
impact both in the academia and on the regulatory debate than this series of papers.
Over the past four years, hundreds of research papers have discussed, implemented, and
sometimes generalized, these systemic risk measures.27 Furthermore, in discussions with
central bankers and regulators, we learned that these measures are currently used to
monitor potentially systemically important firms.
The goal of this paper is to propose a comprehensive comparison of the major systemic
risk measures (MES, SES, SRISK, and ∆CoVaR). The systemic risk measures we consider
in this paper have nice economic interpretations. First, the MES corresponds to a firm’s
expected equity loss when market falls below a certain threshold over a given horizon,
namely a 2% market drop over one day for the short-run MES, and a 40% market drop
over six months for the long-run MES (LRMES). The basic idea is that the banks with the
highest MES contribute the most to market declines; thus, these banks are the greatest
drivers of systemic risk. Second, the SES and SRISK measure the expected capital
shortfall of an institution conditional on a financial crisis occurring. The intuition is that
the firm with the largest capital shortfall that occurs precisely during the system crisis,
should be considered as the most systemically risky. Third, the CoVaR corresponds to
the Value-at-Risk (VaR) of the financial system conditionally on a specific event affecting
a given firm. The contribution of a firm to systemic risk (∆CoVaR) is the difference
between its CoVaR when the firm is, or is not, in financial distress. As an illustration, we
that would attract customers, because such banks would be forced to hold more capital and be subject to more intense
regulation”. Araten and Turner (2013) find that funding cost is significantly lower for SIFIs than for non-SIFIs.
25See Elsinger, Lehar and Summer (2006), FSB-IMF-BIS (2009), Basel Committee on Banking Supervision (2011a),
Financial Stability Oversight Council (2012a), Gouriéroux, Héam and Monfort (2012), Greenwood, Landier and Thesmar
(2012), and Glasserman and Young (2013).
26Other related papers include Huang, Zhou and Zhu (2009, 2012), Drehmann and Tarashev (2011b), Gray and Jobst
(2011), Kritzman et al. (2011), Acharya and Steffen (2012), Billio et al. (2012), Bisias et al. (2012), Gauthier, Lehar and
Souissi (2012), Giglio (2012), Gouriéroux and Monfort (2011), White, Kim and Manganelli (2012), Oh and Patton (2013),
and Yang and Zhou (2013).
27See for instance Adams, Füss and Gropp (2010), Fong and Wong (2010), Danielson et al. (2011, 2012), Colletaz,
Pérignon and Hurlin (2012), Engle, Jondeau and Rockinger (2014), Idier, Lamé and Mésonnier (2012), Lopez-Espinosa et
al. (2012a, 2012b), Cao (2013), and Ergun and Girardi (2013). For recent media coverage, see Bloomberg Businessweek
(2011), The Economist (2011), and Rob Engle’s interview on CNBC (2011). For online computation of systemic risk
measures, see the Stern-NYU’s V-Lab initiative at http://vlab.stern.nyu.edu/welcome/risk/.
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display in Figure 2.1, the evolution of several systemic risk measures for Lehman Brothers
between 2000 and 2008. We see that all risk measures raise around 2006 and that SRISK
increases much more, in relative terms, than the other measures.
Figure 2.1 Time Series Evolution of Systemic Risk Measures
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Notes: The figure displays the MES (solid line, left axis), the ∆CoVaR (dotted line, left axis) and the SRISK
(dashed line, right axis) of Lehman Brothers (LEH).
There are two main parts in our analysis. First, we derive the systemic risk measures
in a common framework and show theoretically that they can be expressed in terms of
market risk measures. In particular, we find that (i) MES corresponds to the product of
the market’s expected shortfall (market tail risk) and the firm beta (firm systematic risk)
and that (ii) ∆CoVaR corresponds to the product of the firm VaR (firm tail risk) and the
linear projection coefficient of the market return on the firm return. Furthermore, (iii)
we derive conditions under which the different measures lead to similar rankings of SIFIs.
Second, we propose an empirical comparison of the systemic risk measures by considering
a sample of top US financial institutions over the period 2000 - 2010. This comparison
aims to answer the following key questions: Do the different risk measures identify the
same SIFIs? And if not, what are the reasons? Our empirical analysis delivers some key
insights on systemic risk. First, we show that different risk measures lead to identifying
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different SIFIs. On most days, there is not a single institution simultaneously identified
as a top-10 SIFI by all measures. Second, there is a strong positive relationship between
MES and firm beta, which implies that systemic risk rankings of financial institutions
based on MES mirror rankings obtained by sorting firms on betas. Third, we reach a
similar conclusion for SRISK and liabilities. Fourth, as the empirical ∆CoVaR of a firm
is strongly correlated with its VaR, ∆CoVaR brings limited added value over and above
VaR to forecast systemic risk. In a linear regression analysis, we show that a one-factor
model explains between 83% and 100% of the variability of the systemic risk estimates,
which indicates that standard systemic risk measures fall short in capturing the multiple
facets of systemic risk.
Our paper makes several contributions to the academic literature on systemic risk.
To the best of our knowledge, this is the first attempt to derive the major systemic risk
measures within a common framework. Our analytical expressions allow us to uncover the
theoretical link between systemic risk and standard financial risks (systematic risk, tail
risk, correlation, and beta), as well as firm characteristics such as leverage and market
capitalization. Unlike purely empirical horse races, our theoretical comparison is not
plagued by estimation risk or concerns about sample composition and sample periods.
Another reason for us to not running an empirical horse race is that it is impossible to
measure ex post the contribution of a given firm to the risk of the system. As a result,
there is no benchmark and we cannot assess the validity of a given measure by analysing
its forecasting errors.28
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2.2 provides the general defini-
tions of the three considered systemic risk measures and presents the common framework
used for the comparison. Section 2.3 proposes a theoretical analysis of the MES, SRISK,
and ∆CoVaR measures. In Section 2.4, we describe the data and present the main em-
pirical findings. Section 2.5 summarizes and concludes.
2.2 Methodology
2.2.1 Definitions
In this section, we provide a formal definition for the considered systemic risk measures.
We consider N firms and denote rit the return of firm i at time t. Similarly, the market
return is the value-weighted average of all firm returns, rmt =
∑N
i=1witrit, where wit
denotes the relative market capitalization of firm i.
28Sedunov (2012) tests whether measures of systemic risk exposures can forecast financial institutions’ returns during
systemic crisis periods in 1998 and 2008. Giglio, Kelly and Pruitt (2013) evaluate the empirical success of systemic risk
measures, based on their predictive ability for low quantiles of the conditional distribution of macroeconomic outcomes.
One could argue that instead one could use as a benchmark the actual list of the Global SIFIs published by the Financial
Stability Board (2012), and see which measure can best reproduce it. However, in such an analysis we first must assume
the truthfulness of the list and moreover we could always imagine a parametric systemic risk measure sufficiently flexible
to reproduce any particular ranking on a given date.
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MES and SES
The MES is the marginal contribution of an institution i to systemic risk, as measured
by the Expected Shortfall (ES) of the system. Originally proposed by Acharya et al.
(2010), the MES was recently extended to a conditional version by Brownlees and Engle
(2012). By definition, the ES at the α% level is the expected return in the worst α% of
the cases, but it can be extended to the general case, in which the returns exceed a given
threshold C. Formally, the conditional ES of the system is defined as:29
ESmt(C) = Et−1
(
rmt | rmt < C
)
=
N∑
i=1
wit Et−1
(
rit | rmt < C
)
. (2.1)
Then, the MES corresponds to the partial derivative of the system ES with respect to
the weight of firm i in the economy (Scaillet, 2004).30
MESit(C) =
∂ESmt(C)
∂wit
= Et−1
(
rit | rmt < C
)
. (2.2)
The MES can be viewed as a natural extension of the concept of marginal VaR proposed
by Jorion (2007) to the ES, which is a coherent risk measure (see Artzner et al., 1999).
It measures the increase in the risk of the system (measured by the ES) induced by a
marginal increase in the weight of firm i in the system. The higher the firm MES, the
higher is the individual contribution of the firm to the risk of the financial system.
An extension of the MES is the Systemic Expected Shortfall (SES). The latter corres-
ponds to the amount a bank’s equity drops below its target level (defined as a fraction k
of assets) in case of a systemic crisis when aggregate capital is less than k times aggregate
assets:
SESit
Wit
= k Lit − 1− Et−1
(
rit |
N∑
i=1
Wit < k
N∑
i=1
Ait
)
(2.3)
where Lit is the leverage (Ait/Wit), Ait denotes the total assets, and Wit is the market
capitalization or market value of equity. Acharya et al. (2010) show that the conditional
expectation term can be expressed as a linear function of the MES:
SESit =
(
k Lit − 1 + θ MESit + ∆i
)
Wit (2.4)
where θ and ∆i are constant terms.
SRISK
The SRISK measure proposed by Acharya, Engle and Richardson (2012) and Brown-
lees and Engle (2012) extends the MES in order to take into account both the liabilities
29We follow the original notations of the different authors: ES, MES, VaR, CoVaR and ∆CoVaR are typically negative
whereas SES and SRISK are typically positive.
30To simplify the notation, we use MESit (respectively ESit) instead of MESi,t|t−1 (respectively ESi,t|t−1), but it
should be understood as the conditional MES (respectively ES) computed at time t given the information available at time
t− 1.
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and the size of the financial institution. The SRISK corresponds to the expected cap-
ital shortfall of a given financial institution, conditional on a crisis affecting the whole
financial system. In this perspective, the firms with the largest capital shortfall are as-
sumed to be the greatest contributors to the crisis and are the institutions considered as
most systemically risky. We follow Acharya, Engle and Richardson (2012) and define the
SRISK as:
SRISKit = max
0 ;
Required Capital︷ ︸︸ ︷
k (Dit + (1− LRMESit)Wit)−
Available Capital︷ ︸︸ ︷
(1− LRMESit)Wit
 (2.5)
where k is the prudential capital ratio and Dit is the book value of total liabilities. Note
that if we define the leverage as Lit = (Dit +Wit)/Wit, SRISK becomes:
SRISKit = max
[
0 ; [k (Lit − 1)− (1− k) (1− LRMESit)]Wit
]
(2.6)
and we notice that SRISK increases with the leverage. We clearly see that the expressions
for SRISK and SES in equations (2.4) and (2.6) are almost identical. As a result, in the
rest of the paper we only focus on SRISK.
The SRISK also considers the interconnection of a firm with the rest of the system
through the long-run marginal expected shortfall (LRMES). The latter corresponds to
the expected drop in equity value the firm would experiment if the market were to fall by
more than a given threshold within the next six months. Acharya, Engle and Richardson
(2012) propose to approximate it using the daily MES (defined for a threshold C equal
to -2%) as LRMESit ' 1 − exp(18 ×MESit). This approximation represents the firm
expected loss over a six-month horizon, obtained conditionally on the market falling by
more than 40% within the next six months (for more details, see Acharya, Engle and
Richardson, 2012).
∆CoVaR
The last systemic risk measure is the ∆CoVaR of Adrian and Brunnermeier (2011).
This measure is based on the concept of Value-at-Risk, denoted VaR(α), which is the
maximum loss within the α%-confidence interval (see Jorion, 2007). Then, the CoVaR
corresponds to the VaR of the market return obtained conditionally on some event C(rit)
observed for firm i:31
Pr
(
rmt ≤ CoV aRm|C(rit)t
∣∣∣ C(rit)) = α. (2.7)
The ∆CoVaR of firm i is then defined as the difference between the VaR of the financial
system conditional on this particular firm being in financial distress and the VaR of the
financial system conditional on firm i being in its median state. To define the distress of
31To simplify the notations, we neglect the conditioning with respect to past information, but the CoVaR is a conditional
VaR with respect to both C(rit) observed for firm i and the past returns rm,t−k.
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a financial institution, various definitions of C(rit) can be considered. Because they use
a quantile regression approach, Adrian and Brunnermeier (2011) consider a situation in
which the loss is precisely equal to its VaR:
∆CoV aRit(α) = CoV aRm|rit=V aRit(α)t − CoV aRm|rit=Median(rit)t . (2.8)
A more general approach would consist in defining the financial distress of firm i as a
situation in which the losses exceed its VaR (see Ergun and Girardi, 2012):
∆CoV aRit(α) = CoV aRm|rit≤V aRit(α)t − CoV aRm|rit=Median(rit)t . (2.9)
2.2.2 A Common Framework
The different systemic risk measures analyzed in this paper have been developed within
very different frameworks. For instance, Adrian and Brunnermeier (2011) allow for tail
dependence and use a quantile regression approach to estimate the ∆CoVaR. Differently,
Brownlees and Engle (2012) model time-varying linear dependencies and use a multivari-
ate GARCH-DCC model to compute the MES. Hence, their direct comparison is not
straightforward since some empirical differences may be due to the estimation strategies.
Differently, we derive all these risk measures within a unified theoretical framework to
provide a level playing field. Following Brownlees and Engle (2012), we consider a bivari-
ate GARCH process for the demeaned returns:
rt = H1/2t νt (2.10)
where r′t = (rmt rit) denotes the vector of market and firm returns and where the ran-
dom vector ν ′t = (εmt ξit) is i.i.d. and has the following first moments: E(νt) = 0 and
E(νtν ′t) = I2, a two-by-two identity matrix. The Ht matrix denotes the conditional
variance-covariance matrix:
Ht =
 σ2mt σit σmt ρit
σit σmt ρit σ
2
it
 (2.11)
where σit and σmt denote the conditional standard deviations and ρit the conditional
correlation. No particular assumptions are made about the bivariate distribution of the
standardized innovations νt, which is assumed to be unknown. We only assume that
the time-varying conditional correlations ρit fully captures the dependence between the
firm and market returns.32 Formally, this assumption implies that the standardized
innovations εmt and ξit are independently distributed at time t.
2.3 A Theoretical Comparison of Systemic Risk Measures
2.3.1 MES
Given Equations (2.10) and (2.11), the MES can be expressed as a function of the firm
return volatility, its correlation with the market return, and the comovement of the tail
32We will relax this assumption in the empirical analysis in Section 2.4.
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of the distribution (see Appendix 2.6.1):
MESit(C) = σit ρit Et−1
(
εmt | εmt < C
σmt
)
+ σit
√
1− ρ2it Et−1
(
ξit | εmt < C
σmt
)
. (2.12)
The MES is expressed as a weighted function of the tail expectation of the standardized
market residual and the tail expectation of the standardized idiosyncratic firm residual.
As the dependence between market and firm returns is completely captured by their
correlation, the conditional expectation Et−1
(
ξit | εmt < Cσmt
)
is null. In order to facilitate
the comparison with the ∆CoVaR, we consider a threshold C equal to the conditional
VaR of the market return, which is defined as Pr [rmt < V aRmt(α)| Ft] = α where Ft
denotes the information set available at time t.
Proposition 1. The MES of a given financial institution i is proportional to its sys-
tematic risk, as measured by its time-varying beta. The proportionality coefficient is the
expected shortfall of the market:
MESit(α) = βit ESmt(α) (2.13)
where βit = cov(rit, rmt)/var(rmt) = ρitσit/σmt denotes the time-varying beta of firm i
and ESmt(α) = Et−1(rmt | rmt < V aRmt(α)) is the expected shortfall of the market.
The proof of Proposition 1 is in Appendix 2.6.1.33 This proposition has two main
implications. First, on a given date, the systemic risk ranking of financial institutions
based on MES (in absolute value) is strictly equivalent to the ranking that would be
produced by sorting firms according to their betas. Indeed, since the system ES is not
firm-specific, the greater the sensitivity of the return of a firm with respect to the market
return, the more systemically-risky the firm is. Consequently, under our assumptions,
identifying SIFIs using MES is equivalent to consider the financial institutions with the
highest betas. Second, for a given financial institution, the time profile of its systemic risk
measured by its MES may be different from the evolution of its systematic risk measured
by its conditional beta. Since the market ES may not be constant over time, forecasting
the systematic risk of firm i may not be sufficient to forecast the future evolution of its
contribution to systemic risk.
Note that Proposition 1 is robust with respect to the choice of the threshold C that
determines the system crisis. For any threshold C ∈ R, the MES is still proportional
to the time-varying beta (see proof in Appendix 2.6.1). The only difference is that
the proportionality coefficient, Et−1(rmt | rmt < C), is different from the system ES if
C 6= V aRmt(α). However, this coefficient remains common to all firms.
33For some particular distributions, both the ES and the MES of the market returns can be expressed in closed form. For
instance, if εmt follows a standard normal distribution, then V aRmt(α) = σmtΦ−1(α) and ESmt(α) = −σmtφ(Φ−1(α))α,
where φ(.) and Φ(.), respectively, denote the standard normal probability distribution function and cumulative distribution
function. Therefore, MESit(α) = −βitσmtλ(Φ−1(α)), where λ(z) = φ(z)Φ(z) denotes the Mills ratio.
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2.3.2 SRISK
We show in Section 2.2 that SRISK is a function of the MES. As a result, a corollary
of Proposition 1 is that SRISK can be expressed as a function of the beta, leverage, and
market capitalization of the financial institution:
SRISKit ' max
[
0 ;
[
k (Lit − 1)− (1− k) exp
(
18× βit × ESmt(α)
)]
Wit
]
. (2.14)
SRISK is an increasing function of the systematic risk, as measured by the conditional
beta since ESmt(α) is typically a negative number and the prudential capital ratio k is
smaller than one. However, unlike with MES, systemic-risk rankings based on SRISK
are not equivalent to rankings based on betas. SRISK-based rankings also depend on the
leverage and on the market capitalization of the financial institution.
Accounting for market capitalization and liabilities in the definition of the systemic
risk measure tends to increase the systemic risk score of large firms. This result is in
line with the too-big-to-fail paradigm, whereas the MES tends to be naturally attracted
by interconnected institutions (through the beta), which is more in line with the too-
interconnected-to-fail paradigm (Markose et al., 2010). In that sense, the SRISK can be
viewed as a compromise between both paradigms.
2.3.3 ∆CoVaR
In our theoretical framework, it is also possible to express ∆CoVaR, defined for a
conditioning event C(rit) : rit = V aRit(α), as a function of the conditional correlations,
volatilities, and VaR. Given Equations (2.10) and (2.11), we obtain the following result:
Proposition 2. The ∆CoVaR of a given financial institution i is proportional to its tail
risk, as measured by its VaR. The proportionality coefficient corresponds to the linear
projection coefficient of the market return on the firm return.
∆CoV aRit(α) = γit
[
V aRit(α)− V aRit(0.5)
]
(2.15)
where γit = ρitσmt/σit. If the marginal distribution of the returns is symmetric around
zero, ∆CoVaR is strictly proportional to VaR:
∆CoV aRit(α) = γit V aRit(α). (2.16)
The proof of Proposition 2 is in Appendix 2.6.2.34 The fact that the proportionality
coefficient between ∆CoVaR and VaR is firm-specific has some strong implications. Let
us, for instance, consider two financial institutions i and j, with V aRit < V aRjt. Given
the relative correlations between the returns of firms i and j with the market return
(respectively ρit and ρjt), and the volatilities σit and σjt, we could observe ∆CoV aRit <
34Adrian and Brunnermeier (2011) derive the CoVaR and the ∆CoVaR under the normality assumption. They show
that ∆CoV aRit(α) = ρitσmtΦ−1(α) or equivalently γitσitΦ−1(α), where σitΦ−1(α) denotes the VaR(α) of the firm.
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∆CoV aRjt or ∆CoV aRit > ∆CoV aRjt. This means that the most risky institution in
terms of VaR is not necessarily the most systemically risky institution. In other words, on
a given date, the systemic risk ranking over N financial institutions based on ∆CoVaR is
not equivalent to a VaR-based ranking. In that sense, ∆CoVaR is not equivalent to VaR
as already pointed out by Adrian and Brunnermeier (2011) in their Figure 1. Indeed,
they report a weak relationship between an institution’s risk in isolation, measured by
its VaR, and its contribution to system risk, measured by its ∆CoVaR. However, for a
given institution, ∆CoVaR is proportional to VaR. Consequently, forecasting the future
evolution of the contribution of firm i to systemic risk is equivalent to forecast its risk in
isolation.
There are three comments to be made here. First, the proportionality coefficient in
Equation (2.16), γit, is not a beta as it is the linear projection coefficient of the market
return on the firm return, and not the opposite. Second, the proportionality coefficient is
not always time-varying. For instance, when the variance-covariance matrix is constant or
when ∆CoVaR is estimated through quantile regression as in Adrian and Brunnermeier
(2011), the coefficient is constant. Third, Proposition 2 remains valid when ∆CoVaR
is estimated using market-valued total asset returns instead of stock returns.35 The
proportionality coefficient in equation (2.16) would then depend on the firm leverage and
the average leverage in the market.
2.3.4 Comparing Systemic-Risk Rankings
The main objective of any systemic risk analysis is to rank firms according to their
systemic risk contribution and, in turn, identify the SIFIs. The key question is then to
determine whether the different systemic risk measures lead to the same conclusion. A
natural way to answer this question is to analyze their ratio.
Proposition 3. For a given financial institution i at time t, the ratio between its ∆CoVaR
and its MES is:
∆CoV aRit(α)
MESit(α)
= fit × gmt. (2.17)
If the marginal distribution of the firm return is symmetric, fit = V aRit(α)/σ2it and gmt =
σ2mt/ESmt(α). If the distribution is not symmetric, V aRit(α) is replaced by V aRit(α) −
V aRit(0.5).
The ∆CoVaR/MES ratio is the product of two terms. The first term is firm-specific
(fit), whereas the second is common to all firms (gmt).36 The fact that this ratio is firm-
35Adrian and Brunnermeier (2011) define the growth rate of market-valued total assets as r˜it = (Wit Lit −
Wi,t−1 Li,t−1)/(Wi,t−1 Li,t−1). If we define rit = (Wit − Wi,t−1)/Wi,t−1 and lit = (Lit − Li,t−1)/Li,t−1, we get
1 + r˜it = (1 + rit)(1 + lit). Quarterly leverage data need to be linearly interpolated to generate daily leverage data.
36If we assume normality for the marginal distributions of εmt and ξit, this ratio has a closed form:
∆CoV aRit(α)
MESit(α)
= −
(
σmt
σit
) Φ−1(α)
λ(Φ−1(α))
.
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specific implies that the systemic risk rankings based on the two measures may not be the
same. Consider two different financial institutions i and j such that i is more systemically
risky than j according to ∆CoVaR, ∆CoV aRit < ∆CoV aRjt. It is possible to observe a
situation where i is less risky than j according to the MES measure, MESit > MESjt.
In other words, the SIFIs identified by the MES and by the ∆CoVaR may not be the
same. Note that this result can be extended to the SRISK since the latter depends on
MES.
Our theoretical framework also permits to derive conditions under which both rankings
are convergent, respectively divergent.
Proposition 4. A financial institution i is more systemically risky that an institu-
tion j according to the MES and the ∆CoVaR measures, MESit(α) ≤ MESjt(α) and
∆CoV aRit(α) ≤ ∆CoV aRjt(α), if:
ρit ≥ max
(
ρjt,
ρjt σjt
σit
)
(2.18)
and if the conditional distributions of the two standardized returns rit/σit and rjt/σjt are
identical and location-scale.
The proof of Proposition 4 is in Appendix 2.6.3.37 The interpretation of this result
works as follows. If σit > σjt, inequality (2.18) becomes ρit ≥ ρjt. In the other case, if
σit < σjt, the inequality becomes ρit ≥ ρjtσjt/σit. In both cases, the interpretation is
the same: the higher the correlation between the returns of the SIFIs and the market,
the more likely it is that MES and ∆CoV aR will lead to a convergent diagnostic. This
result comes from the fact that correlation captures both the sensitivity of the system
return with respect to the firm return (∆CoVaR dimension) and the sensitivity of the
firm return with respect to the system return (MES dimension).
The systemic risk rankings based on SRISK and ∆CoVaR can also be compared. In
this case, the comparison depends on the liabilities and market capitalizations of the two
firms. For simplicity, let us consider two financial institutions with the same level of
liabilities.
Proposition 5. A financial institution i is more systemically risky than a financial in-
stitution j (with the same level of liabilities) according to the SRISK and the ∆CoVaR
measures, SRISKit(α) ≥ SRISKjt(α) and ∆CoV aRit(α) ≤ ∆CoV aRjt(α), if
ρit ≥ ρjt and Wit ≤ Wjt × exp [18× ESmt(α)× (βjt − βit)] (2.19)
where Wit and Wjt denote the market capitalizations of both firms.
The proof of Proposition 5 is in Appendix 2.6.4. ∆CoVaR and SRISK provide a
similar systemic risk ranking if and only if (i) the correlation of the riskier firm with the
37If the conditional distributions are not identical and/or not location-scale, the corresponding condition has the same
form and implies that the correlation ρit exceeds a given threshold (see Appendix 2.6.3).
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system is higher than the correlation of the less risky institution and (ii) if the riskier
firm has the lower market capitalization. Since both firms are assumed to have the same
level of liabilities, this condition means that the ranking are similar if the riskier financial
institution has the higher leverage. In other words, if the SIFIs have a high leverage
and are very correlated with the system, ∆CoVaR and SRISK will lead to the same
conclusion. As soon as one of these conditions is violated, the ranking of the financial
institutions will be divergent.
2.4 An Empirical Comparison of Systemic Risk Measures
We have shown in our theoretical analysis that systemic risk measures (i) can be
expressed as linear transformations of market risk measures (ES, VaR, beta) and (ii)
lead similar rankings under rather restrictive conditions. These results have been derived
within the common framework presented in Section 2.2.2. However, in practice, the
dependence between financial asset returns may be richer (i.e. not linear) than in Section
2.2.2 and thus our results may not hold in real financial markets.
For this reason, in this section, we relax the assumptions made in Equations (2.10)
and (2.11) for asset returns. In our empirical analysis, we implement the same estimation
methods as in the original papers presenting the MES, SRISK, and CoVaR, and we use
the same sample as in Acharya et al. (2010) and Brownlees and Engle (2012). This sample
contains all U.S. financial firms with a market capitalization greater than $5 billion as of
end of June 2007 (see Appendix 2.6.5 for a list of the 94 sample firms). For our sample
period, January 3, 2000 - December 31, 2010, we extract daily firm stock returns, value-
weighted market index returns, number of shares outstanding, and daily closing prices
from CRSP. Quarterly book values of total liabilities are from COMPUSTAT. Following
Brownlees and Engle (2012), we estimate the MES and SRISK using a GARCH-DCC
model. The coverage rate is fixed at 5%, and the threshold C is fixed to the unconditional
market daily VaR at 5%, which is equal to 2% in our sample. The ∆CoVaR is estimated
with a quantile regression as proposed by Adrian and Brunnermeier (2011). We discuss
in detail the estimation techniques of all systemic risk measures in Appendix 2.6.6.
2.4.1 Rankings: SIFI or not SIFI?
In practice, systemic risk measures are used to classify firms between SIFIs and non-
SIFIs (Financial Stability Board, 2012). The formers are more closely scrutinized by
regulators and are subject to additional capital requirements and/or liquidity buffers.
Within a given bucket of SIFIs, the level of extra capital requirement is the same regard-
less of the exact ranking of the firm within the bucket. The goal is then to identify the
top tier banks in terms of contribution to the risk of the system. Of lesser importance is
the exact value of the systemic risk measures or the exact ranking of the bank. In order to
compare the SIFIs identified by several systemic risk measures, we need to set the size of
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the SIFI group. In the rest of the analysis, we use the top 10 financial institutions, which
corresponds to approximately 10% of our sample. It is also close to the actual number of
US SIFIs (namely 8) identified by the Financial Stability Board (2012) in its list of global
systemically important banks. As a robustness check, we also provide results based on
the top 20 financial institutions.
The main finding from this preliminary analysis is that the different risk measures
identify different SIFIs. For instance, Table 2.1 displays the tickers of the top 10 financial
institutions according to their systemic risk contribution measured by the MES, SRISK,
and ∆CoVaR, respectively, for the last day of our sample period (December 31, 2010). On
that day, there is not a single institution simultaneously identified as a SIFI by the three
measures. Only two financial institutions (Bank of America and American International
Group) are simultaneously identified by MES and SRISK, whereas ∆CoVaR identifies
only three financial institutions (H&R Block, Marshall & Ilsley, and Janus Capital) in
common with MES but none with SRISK. Furthermore, the SRISK-based top 10 list is
clearly tilted towards the largest financial institutions (Bank of America, Citigroup, JP
Morgan, etc.), whereas it is not necessarily the case for MES and ∆CoVaR. Indeed, these
measures do not take into account the market capitalization and level of liabilities of
the financial institutions. Note that we reach a similar conclusion when we consider the
top 20 financial institutions, with only three firms being simultaneously identified by the
three risk measures (see Appendix 2.6.7).
Table 2.1 Systemic Risk Rankings
Rank MES SRISK ∆CoVaR
1 MBI BAC HRB
2 AIG C MI
3 MI JPM BEN
4 CBG MS CIT
5 RF AIG WU
6 LM MET AIZ
7 JNS PRU AXP
8 HRB HIG JNS
9 BAC SLM NYB
10 UNM LNC MTB
Notes: The column labeled MES displays the ranking of the top 10 financial institutions based on MES, ranked
from most to least risky. The following two columns display the top 10 financial institutions based on SRISK
and ∆CoVaR, respectively. The ranking is for December 31, 2010. See Appendix 2.6.5 for the list of firm names
and tickers.
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The findings about diverging rankings is not specific to any particular date. Indeed,
out of 2,767 days in our sample, there are 1,263 days (45.7%) during which none of
the 94 financial institutions is jointly included in the top 10 ranking of the three risk
measures. Figure 2.2 shows the daily percentage of concordant pairs between the top 10
SIFIs identified by the different risk measures. On average, the percentage of concordant
pairs between MES and SRISK is 18.9%, which means that, on average, only two SIFIs
out of ten are common to both measures. Over our 11-year sample, this percentage has
ranged between 0% and 60%; the latter percentage corresponding to the peak of the crisis
in October 2008. During a crisis, the MES tends to rise because asset correlation goes to
one and both beta and ES increase. Similarly, the SRISK is rising because both leverage
and correlation increase and market capitalization drops (see Equation 2.14). The figures
are much lower for SRISK and ∆CoVaR, with on average 9.9% of concordant pairs. The
highest level of similarity is obtained for MES and ∆CoVaR, with an average percentage
of concordant pairs of 43%. We see in Appendix 2.6.7 that the conclusion remains the
same when we focus on the top 20 firms.
Figure 2.2 Different Risk Measures, Different SIFIs
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Notes: These figures show the daily percentage of concordant pairs between the top ten financial institutions
based one MES and SRISK (top panel), the top 10 financial institutions based on SRISK and ∆CoVaR (middle
panel), and the top 10 financial institutions based on ∆CoVaR and MES (bottom panel).
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Even if these systemic risk measures are divergent, they deliver a consistent ranking
for a given institution. Indeed, for each measure, we compute the Kendall rank-order
correlation coefficient between the systemic risk ranking obtained at time t and the one
obtained at time t − 1. The average correlations are 91.3% for MES, 97.7% for SRISK,
and 93.4% for ∆CoVaR, and are always statistically significant. This result indicates
that the rankings produced by these measures are stable through time. This is a nice
property to have since it would make little sense for a measure to regularly classify a
bank as SIFI on one day, and as non-SIFI on the following day. Therefore, the divergence
of the systemic risk rankings is not due to the instability of a particular measure but
instead to their fundamental differences.
2.4.2 Main Forces Driving Systemic Risk Rankings
After having shown that rankings vary across systemic risk measures, we investigate
the reasons for these variations. We display in Table 2.2 the top 10 SIFIs, as of December
31, 2010, according to the three systemic risk measures, as well as the top 10 firms
based on market capitalization, liabilities, leverage, beta, and VaR.38 There are three
striking results in this table. First, MES and beta tend to identify the same SIFIs.
On that day, seven out of the ten highest beta firms are also identified among the top
10 SIFIs according to their MES. Even if the rankings provided by the two measures
are not exactly the same, the 70% match between the MES and beta provide empirical
support to Proposition 1. Indeed, the ranking based on MES is, in practice, mainly
driven by systematic risk. Second, the SRISK-based ranking is mainly sensitive to the
liabilities/leverage of the firms. We have shown in the previous section, that the SRISK
can be considered as a compromise between the too-big-to-fail paradigm (through the
liabilities) and the too-interconnected-to-fail paradigm (through the beta). However, in
practice the SRISK-based ranking seems to be largely determined by the indebtedness of
the firms. On that day, eight out of the top 10 SIFIs identified by the SRISK, are also
the financial institutions with the highest level of liabilities and seven have the highest
leverage. On the contrary, only two are in the high-beta list. Third, the ∆CoVaR ranking
is not determined by the VaR, since only three out of the top 10 SIFIs are also in the
high-VaR list. These results are by no means specific to this date as shown in Figure 2.3
and remain pervasive during the entire sample period. Furthermore, they also hold valid
when we consider the top 20 firms.
We investigate further the relationship between MES and beta in Figure 2.4. This
scatter plot compares the average MES,MESi(α) = T−1
∑T
t=1 |MESit(α)|, to the average
beta, βi = T−1
∑T
t=1 βit, for the 61 firms that have been continuously traded during
our sample period.39 This plot confirms the strong relationship between MES (y-axis)
38See Appendix 2.6.6 for a discussion of the estimation of the firms’ beta and VaR.
39The data requirement allows us to estimate the average ES of the market return over the same period for all firms.
67
Chapter 2: A Theoretical and Empirical Comparison of Systemic Risk Measures
and firm beta (x-axis). In line with Proposition 1, the OLS estimated slope coefficient
(0.0248) is extremely close to the unconditional ES of the market at 5%, 0.0252 or 2.52%
(see Equation 2.13).40 The main implication of this result is that systemic risk rankings
of financial institutions based on their MES tend to mirror rankings obtained by sorting
firms on betas.
Table 2.2 Systemic Risk Rankings and Firm Characteristics
Rank MES SRISK ∆CoVaR MV LTQ LVG β VaR
1 MBI BAC HRB JPM BAC SLM MBI MBI
2 AIG C MI WFC JPM HIG LM MI
3 MI JPM BEN C C LNC JNS AIG
4 CBG MS CIT BAC WFC MS MI RF
5 RF AIG WU GS GS PRU CBG HRB
6 LM MET AIZ BRK MS MET AIG SNV
7 JNS PRU AXP USB MET GNW ACAS HBAN
8 HRB HIG JNS AXP AIG BAC AMTD BAC
9 BAC SLM NYB MET PRU AIG BAC FITB
10 UNM LNC MTB MS HIG RF ETFC JNS
Pairs MES SRISK ∆CoVaR MV LTQ LVG β VaR
SRISK 2 –
∆CoVaR 3 0 –
MV 1 5 1 –
LTQ 2 8 0 7 –
LVG 3 8 0 3 6 –
β 7 2 2 1 2 2 –
VaR 7 2 3 1 2 3 5 –
Notes: In the upper panel, the column labeled MES displays the ranking of the top 10 financial institutions based
on MES, listed from most to least risky. The following seven columns display the top 10 financial institutions
based on SRISK, ∆CoVaR, market value of equity (MV), liabilities (LTQ), leverage (LVG), conditional beta (β),
and VaR, respectively. In the lower panel, we report the number of concordant pairs between two risk measures
or firm characteristics. The ranking is for December 31, 2010. See Appendix 2.6.5 for the list of firm names and
tickers.
40Similar results (not reported) are obtained when we consider unconditional (constant) betas rather than conditional
betas, or when we consider the firm MES and beta at a given point in time rather than averages.
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Figure 2.3 Driving Forces of Systemic Risk Rankings
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Notes: The top figure shows the daily percentage of concordance between the top 10 financial institutions given
the MES and the top 10 financial institutions given the beta. The next three figures show the daily percentage
of concordance between the first 10 financial institutions given the SRISK and the first 10 financial institutions
given the beta, leverage or liabilities. The bottom figure shows the daily percentage of concordance between the
top 10 financial institutions given the ∆CoVaR and the top 10 financial institutions given the VaR.
Should we worry about the fact that MES and beta give similar rankings? We think
that this is a serious concern for the following reasons. First, if beta is believed to be a
good proxy for systemic risk, why not ranking firms on betas in the first place? Second,
this leads to confusion between systemic risk and systematic risk (market risk). The
latter being already accounted for in the banking regulation since the 1996 Amendment
of the Basel Accord as regulatory capital depends on the banks’ market risk VaR. Third,
betas tend to increase during economic downturns, which makes MES procyclical.
Although the SRISK is by construction a function of the MES, it is much less sensitive
to beta. Unlike for MES-beta (top panel in Figure 2.3, 85.1% match), the matching is
far from being perfect for SRISK-beta, with an average percentage of concordant pairs
of 23.3%. SRISK rankings is more closely related to leverage (71.4% match on average),
69
Chapter 2: A Theoretical and Empirical Comparison of Systemic Risk Measures
especially during relatively calm periods. Until the beginning of 2007, the percentage
of concordant pairs was about 100%: the ranking produced by the SRISK was exactly
the same as the leverage-based ranking for the top 10 SIFIs. However, this perfect
concordance disappears during the crisis and the percentage of concordant pairs between
SRISK and leverage falls to 20% in 2008. This difference can be explained by the increase
in correlations, and consequently in the MES, observed during the crisis. Such an increase
implies a modification of the weight given in the SRISK to the interconnectedness measure
compared to the size of the firm. As a consequence, during the crisis, the percentage of
concordance between the SRISK and beta rankings increases to reach 60% in October
2008 (second panel in Figure 2.3). On the contrary, the matching between the SRISK and
the liabilities-based rankings has been close to 100% since the 2008 crisis. Consequently,
the SRISK tend to identify the same SIFIs as the leverage in quiet periods and the same
SIFIs as the liabilities during crisis periods.
Figure 2.4 Systemic Risk or Systematic Risk?
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Notes: The scatter plot shows the strong cross-sectional link between the time-series average of the MES at
5% estimated for each institution (y-axis) and its beta (x-axis). The beta corresponds to the average of the
time-varying beta βit. Each point represents a financial institution and the solid line is the OLS regression line
with no constant. The estimation period is from 01/03/2000 to 12/31/2010.
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Figure 2.5 CoVaR is not Equivalent to VaR in the Cross-Section
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Notes: The scatter plot shows the cross-sectional link between the time-series average of the ∆CoVaR estimated
for each institution (y-axis) and its VaR at 5% (x-axis). Each point represents an institution and the solid line
is the OLS regression line with no constant. The estimation period is from 01/03/2000 to 12/31/2010.
As for the ∆CoVaR, we see that the ranking is pretty much orthogonal to other rank-
ings. Of particular interest is the little overlap between the ∆CoVaR ranking and the
VaR ranking (bottom panel in Figure 2.3). As already pointed out by Adrian and Brun-
nermeier (2011) in their Figure 1, ∆CoVaR is not equivalent to VaR. In Figure 2.5, we
replicate their Figure 1 by comparing the averages ∆CoV aRi = T−1
∑T
t=1 ∆CoV aRit(α)
and V aRi = T−1
∑T
t=1 V aRit(α) for the 94 sample firms. We also report a weak relation-
ship between an institution’s risk in isolation, measured by its VaR, and its contribution
to system risk, measured by its ∆CoVaR. In that sense, ∆CoVaR is definitely not VaR.
However, the latter conclusion is more questionable for a given institution. Figure
2.6 compares the dynamics of the ∆CoVaR and VaR of Bank of America over the entire
sample period. We see that the two lines match almost perfectly and there is a theoretical
reason for this. Indeed, with quantile regression, ∆CoVaR is strictly proportional to the
VaR (see Appendix 2.6.6). Hence, for a given financial institution, ∆CoVaR is nothing
else but VaR. This result is robust to the estimation method used. Indeed, the correlation
is still equal to one if we include state variables in the quantile regression. When the
∆CoVaR is estimated with a DCC model (not reported), the correlation is not one
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anymore but remains very high. This strong relationship between ∆ CoVaR and VaR
in the time series domain has some important implications. Consider a given bank that
wants to lower its systemic risk score. Given the fact that the key driver of the bank’s
∆CoVaR is the VaR of its stock return, the bank has to make its stock return distribution
less leptokurtic and/or skewed.
Figure 2.6 CoVaR is Equivalent to VaR in Time Series
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Notes: The figure displays the ∆CoVaR (solid line, left y-axis) and the 5%-VaR (dashed line, right y-axis) of
Bank of America (BAC).
The main forces driving these three systemic risk measures can be summarized in
a simple regression. We consider for each systemic risk measure a single-factor model
in which the measure is successively explained by the market capitalization, liabilities,
leverage, beta, and VaR. We consider two types of regressions: cross-sectional regressions
for each of the 757 days in the sample and time-series regressions for each of the 94 sample
firms. In Table 2.3, we report the average, minimum, maximum and standard deviations
of the R2 associated to the 757 or 94 regressions, respectively. The sample period covers
2008-2010.
In the cross-sectional dimension, 95% of the variance of the MES of the firms is ex-
plained by the beta. This result confirms our previous findings about the similarities
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in the rankings produced by the two measures. However, we can also observe that in
the time series dimension, 95% of the variance of the MES is explained by the VaR.
The results for the SRISK confirm that it is much highly correlated to the leverage and
liabilities rather than to the beta of the firm. The average R2 of thecross-section re-
gressions with the liabilities is equal to 83%, whereas it is only equal to 11% for beta.
As for ∆CoVaR, we get a perfect correlation in time series with the VaR of the firms,
for the above-mentioned reasons. In cross-section, the average R2 of the five models for
the ∆CoVaR is relatively low (the maximum average R2 is 32% for beta). Overall our
regression results clearly indicate that each considered systemic risk measure captures
one dimension only of systemic risk, and this dimension corresponds to either the market
risk (VaR or beta) or the liabilities of the firm.
One could argue that the large R2 reported in Table 2.3 (time series panel) may be
the sign of a spurious regression. It is indeed well known that time series regressions of
non-stationary and non-cointegrated series can lead to artificially inflated R2. To rule
out this explanation, we run all the time series regressions taking the variables in first
differences and the average R2 remain high for all three measures (average R2 (all) is
0.9061 for MES, 0.6522 for SRISK, and 1 for ∆CoVaR). Note that the perfect correlation
between VaR and ∆CoVaR is a direct consequence of the quantile regression method
used to generate the ∆CoVaR (see Equation (2.66) in Appendix 2.6.6).
2.5 Conclusion
Systemic risk is one of the most elusive concepts in finance. In practice, a good
risk measure for systemic risk should capture many different facets that describe the
importance of a given financial institution in the financial system. For instance, the
Financial Stability Board states that systemic risk score should reflect size, leverage,
liquidity, interconnectedness, complexity, and substitutability. In this paper, we have
studied several popular systemic risk measures that are currently used by central banks
and banking regulatory agencies. Our findings indicate that these measures fall short in
capturing the multifaceted nature of systemic risk. We have shown, both theoretically
and empirically, that most of the variability of these three systemic measures can be
captured by one market risk measure or firm characteristics.
The quest for a proper systemic risk measures is still ongoing but we have reasons to
remain optimistic as more data become available, with better quality, higher frequency,
and wider scope (see G20 Data Gaps Initiative, Cerutti, Claessens and McGuire, 2012).
Given the very nature of systemic risk, future risk measures should combine various
sources of information, including balance-sheet data and proprietary data on positions
(e.g. common risk exposures à la Greenwood, Thesmar and Landier, 2012) and market
data (e.g. CDS à la Giglio, 2012).
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2.6 Appendices
2.6.1 Appendix: Proof of Proposition 1 (MES)
Proof. Let us consider the Cholesky decomposition of the variance-covariance matrix Ht:
H
1/2
t =
 σmt 0
σit ρit σit
√
1− ρ2it
 (2.20)
Given Equation (2.10), the market and firm returns can be expressed as:
rmt = σmt εmt (2.21)
rit = σit ρit εmt + σit
√
1− ρ2it ξit. (2.22)
For any conditioning event C:
MESit(C) = Et−1
(
rit | rmt < C
)
= σit ρit Et−1
(
εmt | εmt < C
σmt
)
(2.23)
+ σit
√
1− ρ2it Et−1
(
ξit | εmt < C
σmt
)
. (2.24)
If we assume that ξit and εmt are independent, we have:
MESit(C) = σit ρit Et−1
(
εmt | εmt < C
σmt
)
(2.25)
or equivalently:
MESit(C) = σit ρit Et−1
(
εmt | rmt < C
)
. (2.26)
Let βit = cov(rit, rmt)/var(rmt) = ρitσit/σmt denotes the time-varying beta of firm i.
Combining βit with Equation (2.26), we obtain:
MESit(C) = βit σmt Et−1
(
εmt | rmt < C
)
= βit Et−1
(
rmt | rmt < C
)
. (2.27)
The MES is expressed as the product between the time-varying beta and the truncated
expectation of the market return for any given threshold C. By definition, the expected
shortfall of the market return ESmt(α) corresponds to the truncated expectation of the
market return for a given threshold equal to the conditional VaR (Jorion, 2007), C =
V aRmt(α):
ESmt(α) = Et−1
(
rmt | rmt < V aRmt(α)
)
. (2.28)
Then, the MES defined for the specific event C = V aRmt(α), denoted MESit(α), is
simply expressed as the product of time-varying firm beta and expected shortfall of the
market return:
MESit(α) = βit ESmt(α). (2.29)
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2.6.2 Appendix: Proof of Proposition 2 (∆CoVaR)
Proof. We consider two cases: a general case with ρit 6= 0 and a special case with ρit = 0.
Given Equations (2.10) and (2.11), if ρit 6= 0 then the market return can be expressed as:
rmt =
σmt
σitρit
rit −
σmt
√
1− ρ2it
ρit
ξit. (2.30)
For each conditioning event form C(rit) : rit = C, CoVaR is defined as follows:
Pr
(
rmt ≤ CoV aRm|rit=Ct
∣∣∣ rit = C) = α (2.31)
or equivalently:
Pr
ξit ≤ ρit
σmt
√
1− ρ2it
(
σmt
σitρit
C − CoV aRm|rit=Ct
) ∣∣∣∣∣∣ rit = C
 = 1− α. (2.32)
When the conditional mean function of ξit is linear in rit, the first two conditional moments
of ξit given rit = C can be expressed as:
E
(
ξit | rit = C
)
= cov(ξit, rit)
σ2it
× C
=
σit
√
1− ρ2it
σ2it
× C
=
√
1− ρ2it
σit
× C (2.33)
V
(
ξit | rit
)
= V(ξit)− Vrit
[
E (ξit | rit)
]
= V(ξit)×
1− (cov(ξit, rit)
σ2it
)2
σ2it

= 1−
σit
√
1− ρ2it
σ2it
2 σ2it
= ρ2it. (2.34)
Consider G(.) the conditional (location-scale) demeaned and standardized cdf of ξit such
that:
E
 1
ρit
ξit −
√
1− ρ2it
σit
× C
 ∣∣∣∣∣∣ rit = C
 = 0 (2.35)
V
 1
ρit
ξit −
√
1− ρ2it
σit
× C
 ∣∣∣∣∣∣ rit = C
 = 1. (2.36)
Thus, Equation (2.32) is expressed as:
1
ρit
 ρit
σmt
√
1− ρ2it
(
σmt
σitρit
C − CoV aRm|rit=Ct
)
−
√
1− ρ2it
σit
× C
 = G−1(1− α).
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By rearranging these terms, we write the general expression of the CoVaR:
CoV aR
m|rit=C
t = −σmt
√
1− ρ2it G−1(1− α) +
ρitσmt
σit
C. (2.37)
The CoVaR defined for the conditioning event C(rit) : rit = Median(rit), has a similar
expression:
CoV aR
m|rit=Median(ri)
t = −σmt
√
1− ρ2it G−1(1− α) +
ρitσmt
σit
F−1(0.5). (2.38)
where F (.) denotes the marginal cdf of the firm return. Then, for each conditioning event
form C(rit) : rit = C, the ∆CoVaR is defined as:
∆CoV aRit(C) = CoV aRm|rit=Ct − CoV aRm|rit=Median(rit)t
= ρitσmt
σit
×
[
C −Median(rit)
]
(2.39)
= γit ×
[
C −Median(rit)
]
(2.40)
where γit = ρitσmt/σit denotes the time-varying linear projection coefficient of the market
return on the firm return. If the marginal distribution of rit is symmetric around zero,
then F−1(0.5) = 0, and we have:
∆CoV aRit(C) =
ρitσmt
σit
× C = γit × C. (2.41)
As in Adrian and Brunnermeier (2011), ∆CoVaR denoted ∆CoV aRit(α) and defined for
a conditioning event C(rit) : rit = V aRit(α) is:
∆CoV aRit(α) = γit ×
[
V aRit(α)− V aRit(0.5)
]
(2.42)
or
∆CoV aRit(α) = γit × V aRit(α) (2.43)
if the marginal distribution of the firm return is symmetric around zero.
We now consider the case where ρit = 0 and the bivariate process becomes:
rmt = σmt εmt (2.44)
rit = σit ξit (2.45)
(εmt, ξit) ∼ D (2.46)
where νt = (εmt, ξit)′ satisfies E(νt) = 0 and E(νtν ′t) = I2, and D denotes the bivariate
distribution of the standardized innovations. It is straightforward to show that:
Pr
(
rmt ≤ CoV aRm|rit=V aRit(α)t
∣∣∣ rit = V aRit(α)
)
= Pr
(
rmt ≤ CoV aRm|rit=V aRit(α)t
)
= α.
Hence, we have CoV aRit(α) = σmtF−1m (α) and ∆CoV aRit(α) = 0, where Fm(.) denotes
the cdf of the marginal distribution of the standardized market return.
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2.6.3 Appendix: Proof of Proposition 4 (Rankings MES-∆CoVaR)
Proof. First, given Equation (2.15), the inequality ∆CoV aRit(α) ≤ ∆CoV aRjt(α) is
then equivalent to:
ρit
σit
×
[
V aRit(α)− V aRit(0.5)
]
≤ ρjt
σjt
×
[
V aRjt(α)− V aRjt(0.5)
]
. (2.47)
If we assume that the conditional distribution of the firm return is a location scale dis-
tribution, then V aRit(α) = σitF−1i (α) where F−1i (α) denotes the conditional α-quantile
of the standardized return rit/σit. The inequality becomes:
ρit ×
[
F−1i (α)− F−1i (0.5)
]
≥ ρjt ×
[
F−1j (α)− F−1j (0.5)
]
. (2.48)
For simplicity, we assume that the two conditional distributions for firms i and j are
identical, i.e. F−1i (.) = F−1j (.) = F−1(.). The difference F−1(α) − F−1(0.5) is typically
a negative number, so the inequality ∆CoV aRit(α) ≤ ∆CoV aRjt(α) can be reduced to
the simple condition ρit ≥ ρjt.
∆CoV aRit(α) ≤ ∆CoV aRjt(α)⇐⇒ ρit ≥ ρjt. (2.49)
Second, the inequality MESit(α) ≤ MESjt(α) means that βit ≥ βjt since the system
ES is negative, ESmt < 0. Given the definition of conditional beta, this inequality is
equivalent to the condition σitρit ≥ σjtρjt:
MESit(α) ≤MESjt(α)⇐⇒ σitρit ≥ σjtρjt. (2.50)
We have simultaneously MESit(α) ≤ MESjt(α) and ∆CoV aRit(α) ≤ ∆CoV aRjt(α)
when conditions (2.49) and (2.50) are satisfied. Given the relative values of the volatilities,
two cases can be studied separately.
Case a: σit ≥ σjt. Conditions (2.49) and (2.50) are satisfied if ρit ≥ ρjt.
Case b: σit < σjt. Conditions (2.49) and (2.50) are satisfied if ρit ≥ ρjtσjt/σit.
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Then, the systemic risk rankings (MES and ∆CoVaR) of both financial institutions
are identical when we have:
ρit ≥ max
(
ρjt,
ρjtσjt
σit
)
. (2.51)
If the two conditional distributions Fi(.) and Fj(.) are different, but location-scale, this
condition becomes:
ρit ≥ max
ρjt, ρjt [F−1j (α)− F−1j (0.5)][F−1i (α)− F−1i (0.5)]
 (2.52)
and if they are not location-scales it is:
ρit ≥ max
ρjt, ρjtσit[V aRjt(α)− V aRjt(0.5)]
σjt[V aRit(α)− V aRit(0.5)]
. (2.53)
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2.6.4 Appendix: Proof of Proposition 5 (Rankings SRISK-∆CoVaR)
Proof. Given the definition of the SRISK, firm i is more risky than firm j if:[
k (Lit − 1)− (1− k) exp
(
18× βit × ESmt(α)
)]
Wit ≥[
k (Ljt − 1)− (1− k) exp
(
18× βjt × ESmt(α)
)]
Wjt .
or equivalently
k Dit − (1− k) Wit exp
(
18× βit × ESmt(α)
)
≥
k Djt − (1− k) Wjt exp
(
18× βjt × ESmt(α)
)
.
For simplicity, we consider two firms with the same level of liabilities, Dit = Djt. Then,
the inequality SRISKit(α) ≥ SRISKjt(α) is equivalent to:
Wit exp
(
18× βit × ESmt(α)) ≤ Wjt exp
(
18× βjt × ESmt(α)
)
. (2.54)
As shown in Appendix C, under some mild assumptions, we have:
∆CoV aRit(α) ≤ ∆CoV aRjt(α)⇐⇒ ρit ≥ ρjt. (2.55)
The systemic risk ranking given by the SRISK and the ∆CoVaR are convergent when
conditions (2.54) and (2.55) are satisfied. These conditions can be expressed as constraints
on both the correlation and the market value of the riskiest firm i:
ρit ≥ ρjt and Wit ≤ Wjt exp
[
18× ESmt(α)× (βjt − βit)
]
. (2.56)
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2.6.5 Appendix: Dataset
Tickers and Company Names by Industry Groups
Depositories (29) Insurance (32)
BAC Bank of America ABK Ambac Financial Group
BBT BB&T AET Aetna
BK Bank of New York Mellon AFL AFLAC
C Citigroup AIG American International Group
CBH Commerce Bancorp AIZ Assurant
CMA Comerica Inc. ALL Allstate Corp.
HBAN Huntington Bancshares AOC Aon Corp.
HCBK Hudson City Bancorp WRB W.R. Berkley Corp.
JPM JP Morgan Chase BRK Berkshire Hathaway
KEY Keycorp CB Chubb Corp.
MI Marshall & Ilsley CFC Countrywide Financial
MTB M&T Bank Corp. CI CIGNA Corp.
NCC National City Corp. CINF Cincinnati Financial Corp.
NTRS Northern Trust CNA CNA Financial Corp.
NYB New York Community Bancorp CVH Coventry Health Care
PBCT Peoples United Financial FNF Fidelity National Financial
PNC PNC Financial Services GNW Genworth Financial
RF Regions Financial HIG Hartford Financial Group
SNV Synovus Financial HNT Health Net
SOV Sovereign Bancorp HUM Humana
STI Suntrust Banks LNC Lincoln National
STT State Street MBI MBIA
UB Unionbancal Corp. MET MetLife
USB US Bancorp MMC Marsh & McLennan
WB Wachovia PFG Principal Financial Group
WFC Wells Fargo & Co PGR Progressive
WM Washington Mutual PRU Prudential Financial
WU Western Union SAF Safeco
ZION Zions TMK Torchmark
TRV Travelers
UNH UnitedHealth Group
UNM Unum Group
Broker-Dealers (10) Others (23)
AGE A.G. Edwards ACAS American Capital
BSC Bear Stearns AMP Ameriprise Financial
ETFC E*Trade Financial AMTD TD Ameritrade
GS Goldman Sachs AXP American Express
LEH Lehman Brothers BEN Franklin Resources
MER Merill Lynch BLK BlackRock
MS Morgan Stanley BOT CBOT Holdings
NMX Nymex Holdings CBG C.B. Richard Ellis Group
SCHW Schwab Charles CBSS Compass Bancshares
TROW T. Rowe Price CIT CIT Group
CME CME Group
COF Capital One Financial
EV Eaton Vance
FITB Fifth Third Bancorp
FNM Fannie Mae
FRE Freddie Mac
HRB H&R Block
ICE Intercontinental Exchange
JNS Janus Capital
LM Legg Mason
NYX NYSE Euronext
SEIC SEI Investment Company
SLM SLM Corp.
81
Chapter 2: A Theoretical and Empirical Comparison of Systemic Risk Measures
2.6.6 Appendix: Estimation Methods
In order to compute the MES, the SRISK and the beta for each financial institu-
tion, we implement the estimation method of Brownlees and Engle (2012) and use the
model defined in Equations (2.10) and (2.11). The conditional variances σ2it and σ2mt are
modeled according to a TGARCH specification (Rabemananjara and Zakoïan, 1993). The
time-varying correlations ρit are modeled with a symmetric DCC model. We estimate
the model in two steps, using Quasi Maximum Likelihood (QML). Given the estimated
correlations and variances, ρ̂it, σ̂2it and σ̂2mt, we estimate the beta, MES and SRISK as
follows:
Beta: Given the market model defined in Equations (2.10) and (2.11), the estimated
time-varying beta of the firm i is:
β̂it =
ρ̂it σ̂it
σ̂mt
. (2.57)
In order to asses the robustness of our results we also consider a constant beta estimated
by OLS with a linear market model rit = αi + βi rmt + εt.
MES and SRISK: When we allow for nonlinear dependencies between the firm and
market returns, the MES can no longer be expressed as the product of the market
ES and the time-varying beta of this firm. Indeed, the conditional tail expectation
Et−1(ξit | εmt < C/σmt) in the expression of the MES (Equation 2.12) can differ from
zero. This term captures the tail-spillover effects from the financial system to the finan-
cial institution that are not captured by the correlation. Additionally, if both marginal
distributions of the standardized returns are unknown, then the conditional expectation
Et−1(εmt | εmt < C/σmt) is also unknown. Consequently, both tail expectations must
be estimated. To do so, we follow Brownlees and Engle (2012) and use a nonparametric
kernel estimation method (Scaillet, 2005). We consider an unconditional threshold C
equal to the unconditional VaR of the system.41 Then, if the standardized innovations
εmt and ξit are i.i.d., the nonparametric estimates of these tail expectations are given by:
Êt−1
(
εmt | εmt < κ
)
=
T∑
t=1
K(κ−εmt
h
) εmt
T∑
t=1
K(κ−εmt
h
)
(2.58)
Êt−1
(
ξit | εmt < κ
)
=
T∑
t=1
K(κ−εmt
h
) ξit
T∑
t=1
K(κ−εmt
h
)
(2.59)
where κ = V aRm(α)/σmt, K(x) =
∫ x/h
−∞ k(u) du, k(u) is a kernel function, and h is a
positive bandwidth parameter. Following Scaillet (2005), we fix the bandwidth at T−1/5
41Results obtained with C = V aRmt(α), where V aRmt(α) denotes the conditional VaR, are similar and available upon
request.
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and choose the standard normal probability distribution function as a kernel function, i.e.
k(u) = φ(u). The final elements needed to compute the MES are the conditional variance
and correlation estimated with a GARCH-DCC model. Then, the MES is defined as:
M̂ESit
(
V aRm(α)
)
= σ̂it ρ̂it Êt−1
(
εmt | εmt < κ
)
+ σ̂it
√
1− ρ̂2it Êt−1
(
ξit | εmt < κ
)
. (2.60)
The LRMES is derived from the MES by using to the approximation proposed by Acharya,
Engle and Richardson (2012), LRMESit ' 1 − exp(18 ×MESit). This approximation
represents the firm expected loss over a six-month horizon, obtained conditionally on
the market falling by more than 40% within the next six months (for more details, see
Acharya, Engle and Richardson, 2012). Finally, the SRISK is obtained from the LRMES
according to Equation (2.6):
̂SRISKit = max
[
0 ;
[
k Lit − 1 + (1− k) ̂LRMESit
]
Wit
]
(2.61)
where k is the prudential capital ratio (set to 8%), Lit is the leverage, and Wit is the
market value of equity.
VaR: The unconditional VaR of the system return, used to define the conditioning event
in the MES, is simply estimated by the empirical quantile of the past returns:
V̂ aRm(α) = percentile
(
{rmt}Tt=1 , α
)
. (2.62)
The conditional VaR of firm i, used in the ∆CoVaR definition, is computed from the QML
estimated conditional variances issued from the TGARCH model. If we assume that the
marginal distribution of the standardized firm returns is a location-scale distribution, the
conditional VaR satisfies V̂ aRit(α) = F−1i (α) σ̂it, where Fi(.) denotes the true distribution
of the standardized returns rit/σit and σ̂2it is the estimated conditional variance. Because
the quantile F−1i (α) is unknown, we estimate it by its empirical counterpart.
∆CoVaR: For any conditioning event C(rit) : rit = Ct, ∀Ct ∈ R, the CoVaR satisfies:∫ CoV aRm|Ctt
−∞
fri,rm(x,Ct)dx = α
∫ ∞
−∞
fri,rm(x,Ct)dx (2.63)
where fri,rm(x, y) denotes the joint distribution of (rit, rmt). There is no closed form
for the CoVaR, but it can be estimated in various ways including a copula function, a
time-varying second-order moments model, or by bootstrapping past returns. Adrian and
Brunnermeier (2011) suggest to use a standard quantile regression (Koenker and Bassett,
1978) of the market return on a particular firm return for the α-quantile:
rmt = µiα + γiα rit. (2.64)
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For a conditioning event C(rit) : rit = V aRit(α), where V aRit(α) denotes the conditional
VaR of the ith financial institution, the CoVaR defined by:
Pr
(
rmt ≤ CoV aRm|V aRit(α)
∣∣∣ rit = V aRit(α)) = α (2.65)
is estimated by ĈoV aR
m|V aRit(α) = µ̂iα + γ̂iαV̂ aRit(α), where µ̂iα and γ̂iα denote the estim-
ated parameters of the quantile regression. A similar result is obtained for the CoVaR
defined for the median state of the institution, ĈoV aR
m|Median(ri)
t = µ̂iα + γ̂iαV̂ aRit(0.5).
Then, by definition, the ∆CoVaR is equal to:
̂∆CoV aRit(α) = γ̂iα
[
V̂ aRit(α)− V̂ aRit(0.5)
]
. (2.66)
In order to assess the robustness of our results, we consider two alternative estimators of
the CoVaR (not presented). The first one is based on an augmented quantile regression:
rmt = µiα + γiα rit + ψiα Mt−1 (2.67)
where Mt−1 denotes a vector of lagged state variables as in Adrian and Brunnermeier
(2011). The second estimator is based on a GARCH-DCC model: the ∆CoVaR is ob-
tained from the estimated time-varying second-order moments. Given Equations (2.10)
and (2.11), the estimated DCC-∆CoVaR is defined as:
̂∆CoV aRit(α) = γ̂it
[
V̂ aRit(α)− V̂ aRit(0.5)
]
(2.68)
where γ̂it = ρ̂itσ̂mt/σ̂it.
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2.6.7 Appendix: Robustness Check
Table 2.4 Systemic Risk Rankings (Top 20 Firms)
Rank MES SRISK ∆CoVaR
1 MBI BAC HRB
2 AIG C MI
3 MI JPM BEN
4 CBG MS CIT
5 RF AIG WU
6 LM MET AIZ
7 JNS PRU AXP
8 HRB HIG JNS
9 BAC SLM NYB
10 UNM LNC MTB
11 ACAS GS EV
12 STI RF PGR
13 ETFC PFG HCBK
14 AMTD GNW LM
15 HBAN STI MBI
16 SNV MI TROW
17 LNC MBI GS
18 FITB ETFC MMC
19 HIG COF BLK
20 CIT SNV RF
Notes: The column labeled MES displays the ranking of the top 20 financial institutions based on MES,
ranked from most to least risky. The following two columns display the top 20 financial institutions
based on SRISK and ∆CoVaR, respectively. The ranking is for December 31, 2010. See Appendix 2.6.5
for the list of firm names and tickers.
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Chapter 3
Implied Risk Exposures42
We show how to reverse-engineer banks’ risk disclosures, such as Value-at-Risk, to obtain
an implied measure of their exposures to equity, interest rate, foreign exchange, and
commodity risks. Factor Implied Risk Exposures (FIRE) are obtained by breaking down
a change in risk disclosure into a market volatility component and a bank-specific risk
exposure component. In a study of large US and international banks, we show that (i)
changes in risk exposures are negatively correlated with market volatility and (ii) changes
in risk exposures are positively correlated across banks, which is consistent with banks
exhibiting commonality in trading.
3.1 Introduction
There are many reasons for financial institutions to have correlated risk exposures. First,
capital regulations around the world incentivize banks to over-invest in certain favorable
asset classes, such as sovereign debt. Second, banks may share superior information, and
as such, follow similar investment strategies (Hirshleifer, Subrahmanyam and Titman,
1994). Third, banks have incentives to herd to maximize the likelihood of being bailed
out (Acharya and Yorulmazer, 2007, 2008; Farhi and Tirole, 2012).
Correlated risks are especially problematic during financial crises. Indeed, as market
volatility spikes, regulatory capital and collateral requirements tend to mechanically in-
crease for financial institutions. In response many banks are forced to liquidate their
positions, which further amplifies market volatility (Brunnermeier and Pedersen, 2009;
Merrill et al., 2013). The resulting adverse feedback effects are stronger when banks have
correlated risk exposures as they tend to sell the same assets at the same time (Morris
and Shin, 1999; Persaud, 2000).
A traditional approach to measuring banks’ risk exposures is to regress the banks’
stock returns on potential risk factors (Flannery and James, 1984; Bhattacharyya and
Purnanandam, 2011). Alternatively, O’Brien and Berkowitz (2006) regress the daily
trading revenues of six US banks on the ten-year US Treasury rate and other market
42This chapter is based on Benoit, Hurlin and Pérignon (2014), forthcoming in the Review of Finance.
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risk factors. They find that US banks exhibit high level of heterogeneity in their risk
exposures, except for interest rates. More recently, some new approaches have been
proposed to infer banks’ exposures to interest rate risk from accounting data. Begenau,
Piazzesi and Schneider (2013) use a portfolio approach to measuring banks’ exposures to
interest rate risk from data on loans and interest rate swaps. They show that derivatives
increase banks’ exposure to interest rate risk. Landier, Sraer and Thesmar (2013) show
that the interest rate sensitivity of US banks’ profit increases with their income gap,
which is defined as the difference between assets and liabilities that mature in less than
one year.
This paper proposes a new and simple way to measure risk exposures. Unlike previous
papers, we do not focus on interest rate risk and consider a broader spectrum of risks,
namely equity risk, interest rate risk, foreign exchange (FX) risk, and commodity price
risk. Furthermore, we extract implied risk exposures of banks from their public risk
disclosures, with special emphasis on Value-at-Risk (VaR).43 We exploit the fact that
the level of risk disclosures depends on two main factors. It first reflects current market
conditions and as such, tends to rise with market volatility. A second driving force of a
bank’s risk disclosure, but one that is often hidden to the public eye, is the actual risk
exposures of the bank. Indeed, taking over a major stock broker would lead to a higher
equity VaR for the acquiring bank. Similarly, implementing a directional trading strategy
on the commodity market would certainly inflate the commodity risk figures.
We show how to decompose a change in risk disclosure into a market volatility com-
ponent and a bank-specific risk exposure component. The trick we use is straightforward,
yet powerful. For a broad family of distributions, the VaR is defined as the product of the
standard deviation of the return and the dollar amount invested (up to a constant scaling
factor). Consequently, the change in VaR can either be due to a change in volatility
or in the amount invested, or both. As the former two pieces of information are public
information, they can be used to extract an implied measure of the latter. This frame-
work, which we dub “Factor Implied Risk Exposure” or FIRE, allows us to answer two
important questions: (i) How do banks adjust their risk exposures in response to volat-
ility shocks? (ii) Are changes in risk exposures correlated across banks? In other words,
we investigate whether banks exhibit commonality in trading and whether correlation in
risk exposures strengthens when financial markets are under stress.
We assess the performance of the FIRE in an innovative way. For a large financial
institution, we systematically compare the implied risk exposures given by the FIRE
with statements made by the firm about its actual risk exposures in public filings. Using
quarterly data between 2003Q1 and 2013Q3, we find that the changes in risk exposures
estimated by FIRE and the ones disclosed by the firm always display the same sign.
43The VaR corresponds to a loss that should only be exceeded with a given target probability over a given time horizon
(Jorion, 2007). We show in Section 3.4.1 that our methodology can also be implemented with other types of risk disclosures.
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We believe that this is reassuring evidence that our method provides meaningful risk
estimates. We also study by simulation the biases on the implied exposures that could be
induced by model risk and estimation risk. Overall, we find that the bias in the exposures
is relatively small whatever the experiment and the sample size considered.
To develop the intuition underlying our approach, we display in Table 3.1 the changes
in VaR for ten large US and international banks during an episode of substantial reduction
in volatility (2008Q4-2009Q4). The VaR figures have been computed by the banks with
a 99% confidence level and a one-day horizon. One attractive feature of this dataset is
that it includes risk figures (factor VaR) that are defined separately for each source of
risk: equity, interest rate, FX, and commodity price. During this period, volatility fell
across all asset classes. The actual reduction in volatility was 46% in the equity market,
43% in the fixed-income market, 39% in the FX market, and 59% in the commodity
market.44 Despite the overall drop in volatility, we identify 17 cases, out of 40, in which
the VaR increased over the same period. One potential explanation of this puzzling result
is that volatility (↓) and risk exposures (↑) moved in opposite directions and that the risk
exposure effect dominated the volatility effect for some banks.
Table 3.1 Change in Factor VaR and Factor Volatility between 2008 and 2009
%∆V aR Equity Interest Rate Foreign Exchange Commodity
Bank of America 54 137 355 442
BNP Paribas -30 -35 -48 25
Citigroup -18 -40 -62 20
Crédit Agricole -56 -73 -57 200
Crédit Suisse 33 36 -56 17
Deutsche Bank 7 -15 -37 10
Goldman Sachs 161 -46 -42 0
JPMorgan Chase -7 -51 -74 -12
Morgan Stanley 0 45 86 4
UBS 11 -26 -56 -40
%∆V olatility -46 -43 -39 -59
Notes: The source for the VaR figures are the EDGAR database for US banks and firms’ websites for international
banks. We use a specific implied volatility index for each risk factor. The volatility on the equity market is
measured by the Chicago Board Options Exchange VIX index. The volatility on the fixed income market is
measured by the Merrill Lynch MOVE index, which tracks the volatility of Treasury bond prices using implied
volatility from 30-day options. The volatility on the foreign exchange market is measured by the Deutsche
Bank CVIX index, an average 3-month implied volatility for all the major currency pairs. The volatility on
the commodity market is measured by the Chicago Board Options Exchange OVX index, a measure of 30-day
implied volatility in West Texas Intermediate crude oil prices. Bold figures denote positive percentage changes.
All sample banks report end-of-quarter daily VaR except Bank of America and BNP Paribas that report average
daily VaR for each quarter. Values are expressed in percentage points.
44We use a specific volatility index for each risk factor (see caption of Table 3.1 for more details).
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In the empirical part of the paper, we use quarterly VaR data publicly disclosed by
the same ten US and international banks between 2007 and 2013. We use separate VaR
figures for each major source of risk: equity, interest rate, FX, and commodity. To control
for concurrent changes in volatility, we use several proxies including implied volatility and
historical volatility. Our empirical analysis leads to several new findings on the risk-taking
behavior of banks. First, we find that VaR covaries more frequently and more strongly
with risk exposures than with market volatility. This result contrasts with the abundant
literature on VaR computation in which attention is made on forecasting volatility models
as the portfolios’ weights are assumed to be constant. We show in this paper that when
we allow for time-variation in the risk exposures, we end up with a much richer VaR
dynamics. Second, we show that changes in risk exposures are negatively correlated
with volatility changes, which suggests that banks curb risk when financial markets are
under stress. This finding is consistent with the model of Adrian and Shin (2014) in
which financial intermediaries adjust their risk exposures in reaction to changing economic
conditions, in order to maintain a constant probability of default. Third, consistent with
banks engaging in commonality in trading, we show that changes in risk exposures are
positively correlated among banks. When contrasting periods of increasing volatility and
periods of decreasing volatility, we find that the negative relationship between volatility
and risk exposures, as well as commonality in risk exposures are present in all market
conditions.
Our paper makes several contributions to the literature on financial risk management.
First, on the methodological side, we show how to extract an implied measure of changes
in banks’ risk exposures from publicly available data on VaR and volatility. By doing so,
we complement Taylor (2005) who shows how to generate volatility forecasts from market
risk disclosures. Second, we empirically document the presence of commonality in the risk
exposures of large banks. Our decomposition of the changes in risk disclosure allows us
to directly test for similarities in trading positions by looking at bank risk exposures and
not at trading profit-and-loss data (Berkowitz, Christoffersen and Pelletier, 2011). In two
distinct studies of large US banks, Berkowitz and O’Brien (2002) and Jorion (2006) both
report a moderate correlation between US banks’ trading profit-and-loss, which suggests
that there is significant heterogeneity in banks’ risk exposures. Differently, our study of
the joint dynamics of banks’ risk exposures indicates that banks rebalance their trading
portfolios in a correlated way.45 Third, we contribute to the debate on the procyclicality
of regulatory capital. We report a negative correlation between market volatility and risk
exposures, which suggests that banks actively manage their risk exposures according to
45Our empirical analysis can be seen as a test of the regulation-induced herding effects of banks put forward by Morris
and Shin (1999) and Persaud (2000), among others. Their argument is that a rise in market volatility increases the VaR
of banks and triggers concurrent asset sales from banks, which in turn increases volatility further as well as banks’ VaR,
etc. Overall our empirical findings are consistent with regulation-induced herding.
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market conditions. This contrarian risk-taking behavior can be seen as an attempt to
damper the procyclicality of bank regulatory capital. Fourth, as our methodology relies
on a certain degree of commonality in volatility across the assets within a given asset
class, we show that the factor structure recently documented by Herskovic et al. (2014)
for the volatility of equity is persistent across asset classes.
Our study is also related to the theory on the propagation of financial shocks. In their
general-equilibrium model, Pavlova and Rigobon (2008) show that portfolio constraints,
such as VaR constraints, can increase the comovement of the stock prices. While in
their framework, only one agent is constrained in his portfolio choice, we consider a
situation in which many financial institutions may be forced to curb their positions due
to the tightening of their constraints. Furthermore, as banks tend to rebalance their risk
exposures at the same time and in the same direction after a shock, our study provides
empirical evidence in support of the theoretical predictions of Danielsson, Shin, and
Zigrand (2004), which state that VaR constraints can exacerbate shocks further.
We envision the FIRE methodology to be used by both regulators and practition-
ers. For instance, banking regulators could use FIRE as a way to detect the build-up of
excessive risk concentration or crowded trades among large financial institutions. Altern-
atively, FIRE could allow market participants to extract some signals from the flows of
risk disclosures made by well-informed financial institutions. These signals could then be
used to build investment strategies.
The outline of the paper is as follows. In Section 3.2, we present a methodology
allowing us to extract information about changes in banks’ risk exposures from public
data. Section 3.3 presents the empirical analysis using actual VaR data for a sample of
large US and international banks. We show in Section 3.4 how to extend the methodology
to other types of risk disclosures and to time-varying skewness and kurtosis. Section 3.5
summarizes and concludes our study.
3.2 FIRE Methodology
3.2.1 Theory
When the distribution of the (demeaned) returns belongs to the location-scale family,
the conditional VaR of an asset can be expressed as:
V aRt = − σt F−1(α) Wt (3.1)
where σt is the conditional volatility of the asset return, F−1(α) is the α-quantile of
the standardized return distribution, and W is the dollar amount invested in the asset
(Jorion, 2007). We see that there are two factors driving the VaR in this set-up, namely
the volatility and the amount invested.46 The change in amount invested can be due to
46The two-dimensional nature of VaR is made clear in Goldman Sachs’ 2013 10-K report (page 103): “even if our
positions included in VaR were unchanged, our VaR would increase with increasing market volatility and vice versa”.
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the return of the asset or to inflow/outflow from the investor. The change in VaR is given
by:
∆V aRt = V aRt+1 − V aRt (3.2)
= − F−1(α)
(
σt+1 Wt+1 − σt Wt
)
. (3.3)
While this relation only holds if F−1(α) remains constant over time, we relax this as-
sumption in Section 3.4.2. Under this assumption, the percentage change in VaR is:
∆V aRt
V aRt
=
− F−1(α)
(
σt+1 Wt+1 − σt Wt
)
− σt F−1(α) Wt (3.4)
or equivalently
1 + %∆V aRt =
(
1 + %∆σt
)(
1 + %∆Wt
)
. (3.5)
As a result, the percentage change in the dollar amount invested in the asset is:
%∆Wt =
1 + %∆V aRt
1 + %∆σt
− 1. (3.6)
This equation is extremely useful. It allows us to infer the change in amount invested
(unknown) from the change in VaR and volatility (both being observed).47
Although our methodology is very general, we focus in this paper on the actual risk
disclosures of financial institutions. A common practice at large banks is to disclose their
VaR for each risk factor, such as equity, interest rate, FX, and commodity (Pérignon and
Smith, 2010; Basel Committee on Banking Supervision, 2011b). Specifically, a factor
VaR indicates the maximum loss, at the 1−α confidence level over a given horizon, that
can be due to a given source of risk. For each bank i, we model the bank return on factor
f , Rift, as a function of the factor return, Rft, and an idiosyncratic return, εift:
Rift = βift Rft + εift. (3.7)
For instance, for equity, this means that the return on the bank’s equity portfolio can
be imperfectly correlated with the US equity market, as proxied by the S&P 500 stock
index. The idea behind the one-factor structure is that we focus on a subportfolio that
is predominantly affected by one major source of risk (e.g. equity portfolio, commodity
portfolio). From Equation (3.7), we can express the variance of Rift, σ2ift, as:
σ2ift = β2ift σ2ft + σ2εt (3.8)
where σ2ft is the variance of the factor return and σ2εt is the variance of the idiosyncratic
return.48 In that case, VaR is defined as:
V aRift = − σift F−1if (α) Wift (3.9)
= −
√
β2ift σ
2
ft + σ2εt F−1if (α) Wift (3.10)
47With non-zero mean processes, the conditional mean of the return needs to be subtracted in Equation (3.1). However,
given the short horizon considered, the variance term is much larger than the mean so that the mean can safely be ignored.
48Consistent with Equation (3.8), Herskovic et al. (2014) show that there exists a strong factor structure for the volatility
of equities. We show in Section 3.2.5 that other asset classes also exhibit strong volatility factor structures.
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and Equation (3.1) becomes:
V aRift = − σft F−1if (α) Eift (3.11)
where F−1if (α) is the α-quantile of the standardized factor return and Eift is the risk
exposure of firm i with respect to factor f at time t, which is defined by:
Eift = Wift
√√√√β2ift + σ2εtσ2ft (3.12)
' Wift βift when σεt  σft. (3.13)
What this expression tells us is that there are two main ways for a bank to modify its risk
exposure: first, the bank can change the size of its portfolio and second, it can modify
the sensitivity of its portfolio with respect to a risk factor.49 The change in VaR is given
by:
∆V aRift = − F−1if (α)
(
σft+1 Eift+1 − σft Eift
)
(3.14)
and the percentage change in VaR is:
∆V aRift
V aRift
=
− F−1if (α)
(
σft+1 Eift+1 − σft Eift
)
− σft F−1if (α) Eift
(3.15)
1 + %∆V aRift =
(
1 + %∆σft
)(
1 + %∆Eift
)
. (3.16)
The percentage change in risk exposure between dates t and t+ 1 is given by:
%∆Eift =
1 + %∆V aRift
1 + %∆σft
− 1. (3.17)
Equation (3.17) is the key result of the FIRE methodology. It gives an expression for the
changes in risk exposure as a function of the changes in VaR and in the volatility of the
risk factor.
Note that the change in risk exposure given by Equation (3.17) is driven by both price
and quantity effects: when prices move then the dollar amount invested automatically
changes even if no active exposure changes (buys/sells) are made. To disentangle the
price and quantity effects, one would need the individual VaR of all the securities or
derivative contracts included in the bank portfolio. We provide some empirical evidence
in Section 3.4 that suggests that commonality in risk exposure is not mainly driven by a
price effect.
It is also important to notice that the FIRE methodology works with both long and
short positions. For a short position, the VaR is defined by:
V aRift = − σift F−1if (1− α) Eift (3.18)
49If no single exposure in the portfolio accounts for more than an arbitrarily small share of the portfolio, then the
variance of the portfolio return obtained when the portfolio size tends to infinity is fully determined by the variance of the
common factor and σεt  σft (see Gordy, 2003).
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with Eift < 0 (Giot and Laurent, 2003). In that case, the percentage change is also given
by Equation (3.15) and the percentage change in risk exposure by Equation (3.17).50
3.2.2 The Main Assumption in the FIRE Methodology
The main assumption in the FIRE methodology is that the quantile F−1(α) is constant
through time. In the one-asset case (Equations (3.1)-(3.4)), the quantile remains constant
as long as the distribution of the asset return does not change from one date to the next.
In the case of a portfolio (Equations (3.9)-(3.15)), there are two sources of time variation
in the quantile of the portfolio return distribution: changes in the distribution of the
assets and changes in the portfolio weights. However, even when the weights are time-
varying, the quantile remains constant if we consider conditional distributions for the
asset returns that are closed in aggregation (e.g. normal distribution). Otherwise, the
generalized FIRE presented in Section 3.4.2 has to be used in order to take into account
the time variation in the quantile.
Conversely, when the portfolio contains a large number of assets, as it is most likely the
case for the trading portfolios of the large banks studied in this paper, this distribution
assumption can be relaxed. On a given date, if the number of assets tends to infinity and
the bank’s portfolio is sufficiently diversified, the conditional distribution of the portfolio
return tends to a normal distribution, as the Central Limit Theorem applies. As a
consequence, the quantile of the standardized portfolio return converges towards Φ−1(α)
and there is no need to assume that the distributions are closed in aggregation. This
limiting argument applies even if the individual returns are heterogeneously conditionally
distributed (Liapounov Central Limit Theorem, see Greene, 2012, page 1082) and when
the returns are weakly dependent in the cross-sectional dimension (see Bajgrowicz and
Scaillet, 2012).
3.2.3 Case Study on Goldman Sachs
In order the check whether the changes in risk exposures produced by the FIRE meth-
odology make economic sense, it would be ideal to compare the estimated risk exposure
changes to the actual risk exposure changes. As the latter are typically unknown to the
public, such comparison is hard to make in practice. However, we found one firm for
which the comparison is possible. Indeed, Goldman Sachs makes some statements in its
quarterly public filings about the recent changes in its trading portfolio. To our know-
ledge, Goldman Sachs is the only financial institution to make such public announcements
in a systematic way over an extended period of time.
50If we further assume that the marginal distribution F is symmetric, then the VaR becomes V aRift =
−σift F−1f (α)
∣∣Eift∣∣ for both long and short positions. Under the symmetry assumption, the FIRE methodology is
robust to a change in position from a long position to a short position, and vice versa. In the symmetric case, the
percentage change in risk exposure is still given by Equation (3.17).
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Figure 3.1 FIRE Analysis of Goldman Sachs’ Equity VaR
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Notes: This figure displays the quarterly, average, 95%-confidence level, one-day ahead equity VaR of Goldman
Sachs (grey bars) and VIX index (red line). The sample period covers 2003Q1-2013Q4, the VaR figures are in
USD millions, and the VIX index is in percentage points. Note that the gap in VaR data immediately after
November 2008 is due to the fact that the company changed its fiscal year-end from November to December.
To be able to extract the implied risk exposures, we collect quarterly equity VaR fig-
ures from all Goldman Sachs 10-Q forms between 2003Q1 and 2013Q3. These figures
are one-day 95% VaRs averaged over a given quarter. Furthermore, we control for con-
temporaneous changes in volatility in the stock market using the VIX index. Figure 3.1
displays the quarterly values of the equity VaR along with the VIX index (both are av-
erage measures over the quarter). Eyeballing the figure shows little covariation between
the VaR and the market volatility. In fact, if anything, the correlation is negative.51 For
instance, the sharp increase in volatility between 2007 and 2008 corresponds to a period
of massive reduction in risk disclosure for the firm. The negative relationship between
equity VaR and VIX may seem surprising at first sight, and especially if we refer to the
abundant literature on tail risk in which the positive relationship between tail risk and
51We obtain similar pattern when we replace the VIX by the standard-deviation of daily returns on the S&P500 stock
index using a three-month estimation window.
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volatility is crucial (see for instance the excellent survey by Christoffersen, 2009). The
fundamental positive relationship between VaR and volatility is of course true if the risk
exposure remains constant through time. However, in practice, this condition is violated
as trading positions can significantly vary from one quarter to the next.
For each quarter Q in year Y, we extract the change in equity risk exposure between
quarter Q in year Y and quarter Q in year Y-1 using the FIRE methodology. We display
the changes in equity VaR, volatility, and risk exposure in Table 3.2. We notice that the
VaR increased steadily between 2003 and 2007 whereas the volatility decreased over the
same period. This preliminary piece of evidence confirms that VaR is not only driven by
the volatility and that changes in risk exposure are likely to play an important role in
the dynamics of the risk disclosure. The relationship between the VaR and the market
volatility remains negative over the entire sample period. Differently, the changes in VaR
and in risk exposures are positively correlated.
As a cross-validation exercise, we contrast the risk exposure estimates with statements
made by the firm about its current equity risk exposure. In each quarterly report, Gold-
man Sachs complements the VaR figures with information about any substantive changes
in its investment strategy over the past year. For instance, in its 10-Q form dated May
2008, Goldman Sachs mentions that “Our average daily VaR increased to $184 million
for the second quarter of 2008 from $133 million for the second quarter of 2007. The in-
crease was primarily due to higher levels of volatility [...]. These increases were partially
offset by a decrease in exposures to equity prices”. Over this particular period (2008Q2
vs. 2007Q2), the FIRE methodology successfully indicates the direction of the change in
risk exposures. It generates a 51% decrease in implied risk exposure for equity while, at
the same time, the VIX index increased by 61%.
We conduct a similar analysis for all 30 quarterly reports between 2004Q1 and 2013Q3.
For each quarter, we compare the change in equity risk exposure provided by the FIRE
methodology with the information disclosed by the firm in its 10-Q report. As shown in
Table 3.2 and Figure 3.2, we have not found a single case in which the changes in risk
exposure given by FIRE and by the 10-Q forms are of opposite signs. Note that this
result is not due to any major trend in risk exposures as reductions in risk exposures
are almost as frequent as increases in risk disclosure in our sample (nine decreases and
eleven increases). Furthermore, there are another ten quarters for which Goldman Sachs
made no particular comments. Interestingly, we notice that these quarters correspond
to periods during which the equity risk exposure revealed by the FIRE was more stable.
We find that during high VaR change quarters (|∆V aR/V aR| > 30%), the firm makes
comments in 94.1% of the cases (16 out of 17 quarters), whereas during low VaR change
quarters (|∆V aR/V aR| < 30%), the firm makes comments in only 30.8% of the cases (4
out of 13 quarters).
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Figure 3.2 Empirical Performance of the FIRE Methodology
Notes: This figure displays the percentage change in implied equity risk exposure of Goldman Sachs (GS) between
2003Q1 and 2013Q3. For each quarter Q in year Y, we extract the change in equity risk exposure between quarter
Q in year Y and quarter Q in year Y-1 using the FIRE methodology. The 30 quarters have been divided into
three sub samples according to statements made by the firm in its 10-Q reports regarding its actual change in risk
exposures. There are nine quarters during which the firm stated that its equity risk exposure did go down (Panel
A), ten quarters during which the firm made no statements about its change in equity risk exposure (Panel B),
and eleven quarters during which the firm stated that its equity risk exposure did go up (Panel C). In each panel,
the quarters are ranked chronologically. See Table 3.2 for a list of the quarters in each panel.
We consider a series of robustness checks. First, we replace average VaR and VIX
values by their end-of-quarter values. We, again, systematically compare the estimated
change in risk exposures given by the FIRE methodology to actual statements made by
the firm for the 30 different quarters. Second, we conduct a similar analysis using annual
10-K forms between 2004 and 2013, which leads to another 20 comparisons. In annual
reports, the company compares its average (respectively year-end) equity-risk exposures
in year Y to its average (respectively year-end) equity-risk exposures in year Y-1. For
these 50 comparisons, there are specific comments from the firm in 27 cases. In two
cases only the sign of the change in implied risk exposure does not match the company’s
report. However, in both cases, the implied changes in risk exposures is small (-2% and
6%), which makes misclassification more likely.
Overall, the results in this case study are encouraging. Despite the assumptions we
made about the distribution and the factor structure of the return, the FIRE methodology
seems to produce some risk estimates that fit well with reality. In Section 3.3, we expand
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the analysis to more banks and factors and investigate the comovements in risk exposures
across banks.
3.2.4 Monte Carlo Simulations
In practice, both the VaR and the volatility estimates can be affected by estimation
risk or model risk. For instance, banks may not correctly and promptly incorporate
dynamic volatility in their VaR models. This is for instance the case when the VaR is
computed by historical simulation. In this section, we study by simulation the potential
biases on the FIRE that come from estimation and model risks.
To better understand the problem, we need to distinguish three elements: (i) the true
data generating process (DGP) of the return, (ii) the internal model used by the bank to
compute its VaR, and (iii) the volatility model used by the econometrician to implement
the FIRE method. For simplicity, we call the latter model the FIRE model.
In our context, there are two sources of model risk. First the bank VaR model may
not match with the DGP (Escanciano and Olmo, 2011). For instance, the bank computes
historical simulation VaRs whereas the DGP is a GARCH(1,1). Second, the FIRE model
may not match with the bank VaR model. For instance, the econometrician uses a
GARCH(1,1) model whereas the bank uses historical simulation. We will see below that
only the latter type of model risk can be problematic to extract risk exposures.
Moreover, estimation risk is also at play as soon as the parameters of the bank VaR
model and/or of the FIRE model have to be estimated (Gouriéroux and Zakoïan, 2013).
When the parameters are estimated with errors, the resulting implied exposure may also
be biased. It is well known that this bias tends to disappear as the sample size increases.
The basic idea of these simulations is to assume a particular process for the changes in
the bank’s risk exposure and to check whether the FIRE methodology correctly estimates
them. For simplicity, we consider only one asset and some discrete exposures to ease the
comparison between the true and estimated exposures. On each date, the bank’s exposure
in the asset is assumed to change by ∆Wt%, where ∆Wt% is drawn from a multinomial
distribution on {-20%, -15%, -10%, -5%, -2%, 2%, 5%, 10%, 15%, 20%} with equal
probabilities.
In all experiments, the DGP of the asset return Rt is a GARCH(1,1) process.52
Moreover, given its exposure and a simulated sample of the returns, denoted {Rst}Tt=1 ,
the bank computes its VaR using its internal risk model. We consider three types of
internal models: a parametric model with estimated parameters (GARCH), a parametric
model with fixed parameters (RiskMetrics) and a non-parametric method (historical sim-
ulation). Finally, bank VaRs are used to estimate the implied exposure of the bank with
the FIRE methodology. In our simulations, we consider three types of FIRE volatility
52The parameters are the following: constant = 8.5965e−7, ARCH parameter = 0.0692, and GARCH parameter =
0.9242.
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models: GARCH, RiskMetrics, and historical volatility based on a rolling window of 250
days.
We consider four experiments that are presented in Panel A of Table 3.3. In the first
experiment, we consider the first type of model risk in which both the bank VaR model
and the FIRE model are assumed to be RiskMetrics whereas the DGP is a GARCH(1,1).
Note that there is no estimation risk in this case. In the second experiment, the bank VaR
model is RiskMetrics and the FIRE model is a GARCH. Since the GARCH model nests
RiskMetrics, there is no model risk in this case. However, since the GARCH parameters
have to be estimated, estimation risk is present. In the third experiment, there is model
risk (second type) but no estimation risk. The bank VaRs are produced by historical
simulation and the FIRE is based on a historical volatility obtained with the same rolling
estimation window. Finally in the fourth experiment, the bank uses historical simulation
to produce its VaR whereas the FIRE is based on a GARCH model, inducing both model
risk and estimation risk.
In order to quantify the relative importance of model and estimation risks, we need
to compare the true and implied risk exposures obtained for each simulation. This com-
parison is based on three statistical criteria: the percentage of matching signs, the Mean
Absolute Error (MAE), and the Mean Absolute Percentage Error (MAPE). We also report
the average R2 statistics obtained by regressing the true position change on a constant
and the exposure extracted with the FIRE methodology. The sample size T ranges from
250 to 2,000 observations and we run 100,000 simulations for each experiment.
The results are reported in Panels B-E of Table 3.3. Overall, we observe that the
percentage of positive matching signs between the true and implied changes in exposure
is always greater than 92% (91% for the percentage of negative matching signs). This
result indicates that the FIRE methodology accurately predicts the direction of the change
in the true risk exposure. Moreover, the bias in the exposures is relatively small whatever
the experiment and the sample size considered since the R2 is always larger than 89%.
Several other conclusions can be drawn from this series of experiments. First, risk
model does not affect the performance of the FIRE except if it stems from a mismatch
between the bank VaR model and the FIRE model (see experiments 1 and 2). Second,
according to all evaluation criteria and sample sizes, the bias is the largest in the fourth
experiment. For instance, for a sample size of 250 observations, the MAE is about 0.5%
in experiments 2 and 3 whereas it is equal to 3% in the fourth experiment. This result
clearly indicates that estimation risk as modeled in experiment 2, or moderate model risk
as modeled in experiment 3, have limited impact on the FIRE methodology. In particular,
the influence of estimation risk is very limited even in small samples (T = 250). Third,
the magnitude of the bias decreases with sample size when there is estimation risk. For
instance in the second experiment, the MAE drops from 0.65% to 0.48% when the sample
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size goes from 250 to 2,000 observations. When only model risk is present, the MAE does
not change with sample size. In experiment 3, it is constant and equal to 0.58%.
Table 3.3 Monte Carlo Experiments
Panel A: Design of the Monte Carlo Experiments
Exp. 1 Exp. 2 Exp. 3 Exp. 4
DGP of the return Garch(1,1) Garch(1,1) Garch(1,1) Garch(1,1)
Bank VaR Model RiskMetrics RiskMetrics HS HS
FIRE Model RiskMetrics Garch(1,1) HV Garch(1,1)
Panel B: Experiment 1 - Model Risk
Sample Size Matching Signs (%) MAE MAPE (%) R2
250 100 (100) 0.0000 0.0000 1.000
1,000 100 (100) 0.0000 0.0000 1.000
2,000 100 (100) 0.0000 0.0000 1.000
Panel C: Experiment 2 - Estimation Risk
Sample Size Matching Signs (%) MAE MAPE (%) R2
250 99.18 (99.63) 0.0065 11.8779 0.9924
1,000 99.38 (99.83) 0.0054 9.9131 0.9948
2,000 99.51 (99.91) 0.0048 8.7629 0.9960
Panel D: Experiment 3 - Model Risk
Sample Size Matching Signs (%) MAE MAPE (%) R2
250 99.29 (99.33) 0.0058 10.6340 0.9925
1,000 99.29 (99.33) 0.0058 10.6336 0.9923
2,000 99.29 (99.33) 0.0058 10.6332 0.9923
Panel E: Experiment 4 - Model and Estimation Risks
Sample Size Matching Signs (%) MAE MAPE (%) R2
250 92.01 (91.71) 0.0306 56.1063 0.8978
1,000 92.03 (91.57) 0.0305 55.8513 0.8987
2,000 92.05 (91.49) 0.0304 55.6789 0.8995
Notes: This table presents the design and the results of the Monte Carlo simulations. In the four experiments,
we vary (i) the data generating process (DGP) of the return, (ii) the bank VaR model, and (iii) the FIRE model
used to extract the conditional volatility. HV denotes historical volatility and HS historical simulation. For each
experiment, we report the percentage of positive and negative (in parentheses) matching signs between the true
change in risk exposure and the implied change in risk exposure extracted with the FIRE methodology. We also
display the average of the Moving Absolute Error (MAE) and the Moving Absolute Percentage Error (MAPE)
between the changes in the true risk exposure and the implied risk exposure extracted with the FIRE methodology.
Finally, we report the average R2 statistic obtained by regressing the true position changes on a constant and
the implied risk exposure. In each experiment, we vary the sample size from 250 to 2,000 observations and we
use 100,000 simulations.
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3.2.5 Commonality in Volatility Within an Asset Class
The FIRE methodology relies on a certain degree of commonality in volatility across
the assets that belong to the same asset class, as shown in Equation (3.8). While Herskovic
et al. (2014) have recently documented that equity volatility exhibit a strong factor
structure, we test in Table 3.4 whether this holds true for other asset classes, such as
fixed income, foreign exchange, and commodity. We follow Herskovic et al. (2014) and
regress, for each asset, the asset-level volatility, σift, on the equally-weighted average of
volatility within the asset class f , σft:53
σift = intercepti + loadingi σft + eift. (3.19)
The volatility measures are the historical standard-deviations of the daily returns, which
are available for the period January 1, 1999 to June 20, 2014 (respectively, end of 2013
for equities). For equity, we extract from CRSP the daily returns of the 500 constituents
of the S&P 500 stock index at the end of 2013. For fixed income, we extract from the
FRED database the daily yields of all (148) securities within four categories: commercial
papers (30), corporate bonds (98), Treasury bills (4), and Treasury constant maturity
(16). For FX, we select the ten largest currencies based on the percentage shares of
average daily turnover in April 2013 (BIS, 2013).54 Then, we extract from Bloomberg
the daily exchange rates for the 45 pairs of currencies and compute their daily returns.
For commodities, we consider the constituents of the Dow Jones-UBS Commodity Index.
To avoid issues due to expiration dates, we extract from Bloomberg the price of the
Generic 1st month Futures for 20 components of the commodity index, as well as the
S&P GSCI Kansas Wheat Index.55
Table 3.4 reports the cross-sectional averages of the intercept and loading coefficient
estimates and of the R2 for each asset class. In this table, we consider three frequencies:
yearly in Panel A (like in Herskovic et al., 2014), quarterly in Panel B (like in the rest of
this study), and monthly in Panel C. The main conclusion from all three panels is that the
high degree of commonality in volatility discovered by Herskovic et al. (2014) for equities,
is persistent across all main asset classes. The cross-sectional average R2 is particularly
high for equity (56.3%-66.8%), interest rate (45.1%-50.9%), foreign exchange (52.2%-
59.2%), and slightly lower for commodities (29.5%-34.1%). Note that for some asset
classes, the average intercept and slope coefficients differ from zero and one, respectively,
because of the unbalanced panel structure of the data. We also notice that for equity,
53While Herskovic et al. (2014) also document commonality in idiosyncratic volatility, we only test for commonality in
total volatility since the FIRE methodology is based on total volatility. In each regression, we require a minimum of 10
observations.
54The list of currencies, sorted in decreasing order of importance, includes the US Dollar, Euro, Japanese Yen, British
Pound, Australian Dollar, Swiss Franc, Canadian Dollar, Mexican Peso, Chinese Renminbi, and New Zealand Dollar.
55The 20 Generic 1st month Futures are Natural Gas, WTI Crude Oil, Brent Crude Oil, Heating Oil, Live Cattle, Lean
Hogs, Wheat, Corn, Soybeans, Soybean Oil, Soybean Meal, Aluminum, Copper, Zinc, Nickel, Gold, Silver, Sugar, Cotton,
and Coffee.
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Table 3.4 Commonality in Volatility Within an Asset Class
Panel A: Yearly Volatility Estimates
Equity Interest Rate Foreign Exchange Commodity
Loading (average) 1.006 1.007 1.000 1.000
Intercept (average) 0.028 0.031 0.000 0.000
R2 (average univariate) 0.668 0.451 0.581 0.341
R2 (pooled) 0.631 0.416 0.326 0.345
Observations 6,659 2,004 670 315
Number of assets 451 146 45 21
Panel B: Quarterly Volatility Estimates
Equity Interest Rate Foreign Exchange Commodity
Loading (average) 1.007 1.010 1.000 1.000
Intercept (average) 0.035 0.037 0.003 0.000
R2 (average univariate) 0.642 0.509 0.592 0.333
R2 (pooled) 0.612 0.463 0.354 0.309
Observations 27,347 8,353 2,766 1,302
Number of assets 485 148 45 21
Panel C: Monthly Volatility Estimates
Equity Interest Rate Foreign Exchange Commodity
Loading (average) 1.011 1.008 1.000 1.000
Intercept (average) 0.056 0.034 0.003 0.000
R2 (average univariate) 0.563 0.499 0.522 0.295
R2 (pooled) 0.548 0.446 0.339 0.267
Observations 82,373 25,051 8,297 3,906
Number of assets 498 148 45 21
Notes: This table presents the estimated coefficients obtained by regressing the asset-level volatility (in log) on
the average volatility (in log) within the asset class. In each panel, the average volatility is defined as the equally-
weighted average of securities’ volatilities in a given time period: one year in Panel A, one quarter in Panel B,
and one month in Panel C. The volatility measures are estimated using the historical standard-deviation of the
daily returns, which are available for the period January 1, 1999 to June 20, 2014 (respectively, end of 2013 for
equities). Cross-sectional averages of both loading and intercept estimates and R2 are reported for each asset
class. The pooled factor model R2 comes from a panel regression with securities’ fixed-effects and a common
volatility (within estimator). The table also reports the number of observations in the pooled model as well as
the number of securities used in each asset class.
the R2 reported in Table 3.4 with a yearly frequency tend to be higher than those in
Herskovic et al. (2014), which are around 0.35. This difference is likely due to the much
longer sample period (1926-2010) and much broader cross-section of assets (20,000 stocks)
considered in their original study. We complement the univariate analysis by displaying
the R2 of a pooled regression obtained from a panel regression model with securities’ fixed-
effects (within estimator). The results indicate that our findings are robust in a panel
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model that imposes common loadings for all the assets. The degree of commonality in
volatility remains particularly strong within equities and fixed income securities.
3.3 Changes in Risk Exposures at Large Banks
3.3.1 First Input: VaR
In this section, we study the actual changes in risk exposures at large banks before,
during, and after the 2008 crisis. These risk exposure changes are extracted from the
VaR of ten large US and international banks between 2007Q3 and 2013Q3 (see Appendix
3.6 for a list of the sample banks). VaR figures are publically disclosed in the quarterly
and annual reports of the firms. These reports have been retrieved from the EDGAR
database for US banks and from the firms’ websites for international banks. The VaR
figures typically have a one-day horizon and a 99% confidence level and are available on
Figure 3.3 Evolution of the Factor VaR
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Citigroup Credit Agricole Credit Suisse Deutsche Bank
Notes: This figure displays the one-day ahead 99% factor VaR of Citigroup, Credit Agricole, Credit Suisse, and
Deutsche Bank for four risk factors (equity, interest rate, foreign exchange, and commodity). All values are set
to 100 in 2007Q2.
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four different risk factors: equity, interest rate, FX, and commodity. In our tests, we
use end-of-quarter VaRs for all banks, except for Bank of America and BNP Paribas for
which we use average VaRs over the quarter.56
We first show in Figure 3.3 and Table 3.5 that the factor VaRs only exhibit some weak
positive covariation across banks. Figure 3.3 displays the Value-at-Risk of four sample
banks (Citigroup, Credit Agricole, Credit Suisse, and Deutsche Bank). We notice in this
graph that the evolution of the VaR is quite erratic, with large changes from one quarter
Table 3.5 Correlation in Factor VaR across Banks
Average Correlation Equity Interest Rate Foreign Exchange Commodity
Bank of America -15 14 -9 -11
BNP Paribas 49 49 4 32
Citigroup 53 47 23 36
Credit Agricole 56 57 18 8
Credit Suisse 54 49 -1 34
Deutsche Bank 59 63 3 -21
Goldman Sachs 49 55 24 35
JPMorgan Chase 12 53 22 25
Morgan Stanley 32 31 7 27
UBS 56 15 11 26
Sample Average 41 43 10 19
% of Matching Signs Equity Interest Rate Foreign Exchange Commodity
Bank of America 39 53 50 45
BNP Paribas 50 64 51 36
Citigroup 50 52 50 53
Credit Agricole 40 62 32 24
Credit Suisse 50 55 54 50
Deutsche Bank 52 59 52 42
Goldman Sachs 44 58 62 54
JPMorgan Chase 46 63 52 49
Morgan Stanley 50 55 46 46
UBS 50 52 54 37
Sample Average 47 57 50 44
Notes: The upper panel of the table presents the average correlation between the quarterly VaR of a bank and
the quarterly VaR of all other sample banks for each risk factor between 2007Q3 and 2013Q3 (25 observations
per bank). The lower panel reports the frequency with which the quarterly VaR of banks i and j move in the
same direction (+/+ or -/-). For each bank, we compute the percentage of matching signs between the ∆V aRift
of that bank and the ∆V aRjft of all other sample banks, j 6= i. Values are expressed in percentage points.
56Our initial sample was the largest 25 banks in the world according to their total assets as of June 2012. We then
selected all banks disclosing end-of-quarter or average VaRs for the four main risk factors (equity, interest rate, foreign
exchange, and commodity). Then, we selected the longest possible sample period allowing us to get a balanced panel. See
the Appendix 3.6 for more details about the VaR figures.
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to the next. It is indeed not uncommon to see a VaR changing by a factor of 3 or 5 within
a given year. For some risk types, there is a common trend over the sample period.
For instance, the interest-rate VaR of all banks increased over 2007-08 and decreased
afterwards. Similarly, there is a clear negative trend for equity risk starting at the end
of 2008. Differently, there is much less comovement in the FX and commodity VaRs for
these banks. We extend the analysis to all sample banks in Table 3.5 and report the
average correlation between the quarterly VaR of a bank, V aRift, and the quarterly VaR
of all other sample banks for each risk factor, V aRjft, j 6= i (upper panel). We report
a positive average correlation for all four risk factors, which reflects the fact that VaR
numbers are affected by some common volatility shocks. However, the magnitude of these
correlations is not very high: in the 40%-45% range for equity and interest rate and less
than 20% fo FX and commodity. Furthermore, we measure in the lower panel of Table
3.5 the frequency with which the VaRs of banks i and j move in the same direction. The
percentage of matching signs between ∆V aRift and ∆V aRjft is rather low, between 44%
and 57%.
3.3.2 Second Input: Volatility
In order to control for concurrent changes in volatility, we use some factor volatility
indices. These indices are extracted from options written on the different underlying
factors and with maturities between one and three months. Specifically, we use the
CBOE VIX index to proxy the volatility of the equity market. The volatility on the
fixed income market is measured by the Merrill Lynch Move index, which tracks the
implied volatility of Treasury bond prices. The volatility on the FX market is measured
by the CVIX, a measure of implied volatility of major currency exchange rates. Finally,
the volatility on the commodity market is measured by the OVX, a measure of implied
volatility in West Texas Intermediate crude oil prices.57 We display the evolution of the
volatility of each risk factor in Figure 3.4. As expected, there is strong commonality in
the volatility of these risk factors, with spikes after the Lehman collapse in October 2008
and the European sovereign-debt crisis during the summer 2011.
We show in Table 3.6 that the VaR and the factor volatility tend to be positively
correlated for all risk factors.58 The average correlation is lowest for commodity (16%)
and highest for interest rate (53%). We also notice that this correlation is not positive
for all banks. In fact, there are only five banks in our sample for which the correlation is
positive for all four factors. Furthermore, when we compute the percentage of matching
signs between the changes in VaR and in volatility, we find a frequency in the 40%-55%
range. This finding suggests that in many occasions, the evolutions of the bank risk
57We use the same volatility indices as in the Risk (2010) annual VaR survey. We obtain daily data on the factor
volatility indices from Bloomberg and Datastream.
58For banks that disclose end-of-quarter VaRs, the correlation is computed using end-of-quarter volatility. Similarly, for
banks that disclose average VaRs, the correlation is computed using average volatility.
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disclosures and market volatility diverge. Another implication of our preliminary set of
results is that market volatility does not seem to be a dominant driving force for factor
VaR.
Figure 3.4 Evolution of the Factor Volatility Indices
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Notes: This figure displays the daily factor volatility for each risk factor (equity, interest rate, foreign exchange,
and commodity) from 2007Q2 to 2013Q3. The volatility on the equity market is measured by the Chicago Board
Options Exchange VIX index. The volatility on the fixed income market is measured by the Merrill Lynch
MOVE index, which tracks the volatility of Treasury bond prices using implied volatility from 30-day options.
The volatility on the foreign exchange market is measured by the Deutsche Bank CVIX index, an average 3-month
implied volatility for all the major currency pairs. The volatility on the commodity market is measured by the
Chicago Board Options Exchange OVX index, a measure of 30-day implied volatility in West Texas Intermediate
crude oil prices.
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Table 3.6 Correlation between Factor VaR and Factor Volatility
Correlation Equity Interest Rate Foreign Exchange Commodity
Bank of America 12 -9 -5 -12
BNP Paribas 52 73 43 15
Citigroup 44 49 64 20
Credit Agricole 33 79 53 10
Credit Suisse 21 52 -1 36
Deutsche Bank 32 66 37 -6
Goldman Sachs -2 77 43 51
JPMorgan Chase 65 68 59 40
Morgan Stanley -13 8 -8 -8
UBS 26 68 15 17
Sample Average 27 53 30 16
% of Matching Signs Equity Interest Rate Foreign Exchange Commodity
Bank of America 52 40 44 48
BNP Paribas 44 60 56 36
Citigroup 76 40 36 52
Credit Agricole 44 48 36 28
Credit Suisse 48 56 48 40
Deutsche Bank 44 48 56 44
Goldman Sachs 48 64 52 60
JPMorgan Chase 48 68 48 44
Morgan Stanley 32 52 28 48
UBS 44 60 32 36
Sample Average 48 54 44 44
Notes: The upper panel of this table presents the correlation between the quarterly VaR of a bank and the
factor volatility between 2007Q3 and 2013Q3 (25 observations per bank). The lower panel reports the frequency
with which the quarterly VaR of a given bank move in the same direction as the factor volatility (+/+ or -/-).
For each bank, we compute the percentage of matching signs between its ∆V aRift and the ∆σft. Values are
expressed in percentage points.
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3.3.3 Implied Risk Exposures
To formally gauge the impact of volatility and risk exposure changes on VaR, we imple-
ment the FIRE methodology that was presented in Section 3.2. For each bank/quarter,
we plug the percentage change in VaR and the percentage change in volatility into Equa-
tion (3.17) to get the implied risk exposure variation for each risk factor. To have a first
look at the results, we superimpose the evolution of the VaR, volatility, and implied risk
exposure for equity in Figure 3.5. The message we obtain is unambiguous: the change in
risk exposures is the main driving force for equity VaR.
Another important finding is that changes in risk exposure and volatility tend to move
in opposite directions. We analyze the relationship between risk exposure and volatility
for all factors and all banks in Table 3.7. In the upper panel of the table, we show that
Figure 3.5 Equity VaR and its Driving Forces
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Notes: This figure displays the equity VaR (blue solid line), equity volatility (VIX index, red dashed line), and
the implied risk exposure (green dotted line) extracted using the FIRE methodology with factor volatility indices.
All values are set to 100 in 2007Q2.
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the percentage changes in risk exposure and volatility are negative for virtually all firms
and all factors. On average, this correlation is -53% for equity, -56% for interest rate,
-25% for FX, and -56% for commodity. Moreover, as shown in the lower panel of Table
3.7, rarely do the changes in risk exposure and volatility move in the same direction.
Table 3.7 Bank Risk Exposures and Volatility
Correlation Equity Interest Rate Foreign Exchange Commodity
Bank of America -59 -59 -33 -34
BNP Paribas -50 -35 -27 -54
Citigroup -34 -46 -13 -55
Credit Agricole -35 -50 -3 -41
Credit Suisse -59 -70 -26 -67
Deutsche Bank -58 -78 -28 -61
Goldman Sachs -69 -59 -22 -47
JPMorgan Chase -21 -44 8 -79
Morgan Stanley -77 -68 -70 -82
UBS -65 -47 -39 -43
Sample Average -53 -56 -25 -56
% of Matching Signs Equity Interest Rate Foreign Exchange Commodity
Bank of America 12 28 20 24
BNP Paribas 32 36 36 28
Citigroup 56 16 20 36
Credit Agricole 32 36 36 20
Credit Suisse 24 32 32 20
Deutsche Bank 24 24 32 24
Goldman Sachs 24 40 28 28
JPMorgan Chase 40 44 40 20
Morgan Stanley 12 28 20 16
UBS 28 24 24 20
Sample Average 28 31 29 24
Notes: The upper panel of this table presents the correlation between the percentage change in the quarterly
risk exposure of a bank and the percentage change in quarterly factor volatility between 2007Q3 and 2013Q3 (25
observations per bank). The lower panel reports the frequency with which the quarterly risk exposure of a given
bank move in the same direction as the factor volatility (+/+ or -/-). For each bank, we compute the percentage
of matching signs between its ∆Eift and the ∆σft. Values are expressed in percentage points.
Our conclusion on the negative relationship between risk exposures and market volat-
ility is consistent with the model and empirical findings of Adrian and Shin (2014). They
claim that financial firms cut back their asset exposure when the environment becomes
more risky in order to maintain a constant probability of default. They show that large
US banks reacted to the volatility spike in 2008 by sharply reducing their leverage. At
the same time, the VaR to equity ratio barely changed.
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We then move to the cross-sectional analysis of banks’ risk exposures. To test whether
risk exposures are correlated across banks, we report in the upper panel of Table 3.8 the
average correlation between the percentage change in risk exposure of a bank, %∆Eift,
and the percentage change in risk exposure of all other sample banks, %∆Ejft, j 6= i.
The lower panel of this table displays the frequency with which changes in risk exposure
of banks i and j move in the same direction. The main takeaway from this table is that
there is some strong commonality in bank risk exposures. Indeed, 39 out of the 40 average
correlation coefficients among the changes in risk exposures are positive. Moreover, risk
adjustments at two random sample banks go in the same direction between 58% and 66%
Table 3.8 Commonality in Bank Risk Exposures
Average Correlation Equity Interest Rate Foreign Exchange Commodity
Bank of America 30 35 -2 26
BNP Paribas 42 19 7 23
Citigroup 15 19 8 43
Credit Agricole 21 40 5 29
Credit Suisse 38 42 13 43
Deutsche Bank 47 44 9 36
Goldman Sachs 50 38 26 32
JPMorgan Chase 18 37 8 46
Morgan Stanley 49 33 12 40
UBS 48 36 24 23
Sample Average 36 34 11 34
% of Matching Signs Equity Interest Rate Foreign Exchange Commodity
Bank of America 64 59 52 64
BNP Paribas 68 52 55 55
Citigroup 58 63 62 65
Credit Agricole 56 63 57 65
Credit Suisse 66 63 56 71
Deutsche Bank 69 66 60 63
Goldman Sachs 68 63 62 68
JPMorgan Chase 64 66 55 68
Morgan Stanley 68 65 60 70
UBS 67 64 64 67
Sample Average 65 62 58 66
Notes: The upper panel of the table presents the average correlation between the percentage change in quarterly
risk exposures of a bank, %∆Eift, and the percentage changes in quarterly risk exposures of all other sample
banks, %∆Ejft, j 6= i, between 2007Q3 and 2013Q3 (25 observations per bank). The changes in risk exposures
are obtained using the FIRE methodology. The lower panel reports the frequency with which the quarterly
changes in risk exposure of banks i and j move in the same direction (+/+ or -/-). Values are expressed in
percentage points.
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of the time, which is between 5 and 22 percentage points higher than the values for the
VaR in Table 3.5.
We also model changes in risk exposures using a multivariate panel regression. Our
baseline specification is:
%∆Eift = δi + δ1 %∆Ejft + δ2 %∆σft + δ3 Rft + δ4 CDSit + δ5 RoEit + eift (3.20)
where δi is a bank-specific intercept, %∆Ejft =
∑
i 6=j %∆Ejft/(N−1) denotes the average
percentage change in banks’ risk exposures, %∆σft is the percentage change in factor
volatility, Rft denotes the quarterly return of the risk factor, CDSit is the senior 5-year
CDS of the bank, and RoEit is the bank quarterly return on equity.59 The δ1 parameter
aims to capture any commonality in risk exposures among banks whereas the δ2 parameter
measures the relationship between risk exposure and market volatility.
In our tests, we use the following indices for the four risk factors: S&P500 Index
(equity), 3-Year Treasury Constant Maturity Rate (interest rate), Trade Weighted U.S.
Dollar Index (FX), and Dow Jones Spot Commodity Index (commodity). The data have
been retrieved from Datastream and the Federal Reserve Economic Database (FRED)
and cover the period 2007Q3-2013Q3.
We present the estimation results in Table 3.9 for each risk factor (columns 1-8) and
then for all risk factors stacked together (columns 9-10). We find evidence of strong
commonality in risk exposures as the OLS estimated coefficients associated with other
banks’ risk exposures are positive and significant (δˆ1 > 0). This finding holds true for
all factors but the effect is particularly strong for equity and interest rate. This result is
suggestive of commonality in risk exposures due to similar investment or hedging policies
across banks. We also report a negative and significant relationship between risk exposure
and factor volatility (δˆ2 < 0), which is consistent with the univariate results in Table 3.7.
We however find no evidence that banks with particularly poor performance or higher
probability of default tend to take on more risk (risk shifting). We also notice that the
inclusion of the control variables (Rft, CDSit, RoEit) does not alter our conclusions on
commonality in risk exposures and on the relationship between risk exposure and market
volatility, with the exception of FX.
3.3.4 Robustness Checks
We consider a series of robustness checks. First, we use alternative proxies for the
average change in banks’ risk exposures. We replace the equally-weighted commonality
proxy by a value-weighted commonality proxy (Table 3.10, Panel A) and by the first
principal component of the covariance matrix of the percentage changes in risk exposures
(Table 3.10, Panel B). Overall we find that our result on commonality in risk exposures
remains strong and significant with all commonality proxies. Second, we change the
59The CDS data were retrieved from Datastream and the RoE from the banks’ quarterly and annual reports.
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Table 3.10 Robustness Check
Equity Interest Rate Foreign Exchange Commodity All Factors
%∆Eift %∆Eift %∆Eift %∆Eift %∆Eift
Panel A: Value-Weighted Commonality Proxy
%∆Ejft 0.275** 0.389*** 0.321** 0.383* 0.349***
(0.089) (0.079) (0.128) (0.177) (0.059)
%∆σft -0.472*** -0.508*** -0.507** -0.652*** -0.501***
(0.068) (0.078) (0.159) (0.166) (0.057)
Panel B: First Principal Component as Commonality Proxy
%∆Ejft 0.234*** 0.225*** 0.204** 0.181* 0.211***
(0.067) (0.039) (0.080) (0.099) (0.016)
%∆σft -0.197 -0.332*** -0.321 -0.503* -0.300***
(0.127) (0.072) (0.184) (0.255) (0.053)
Panel C: Historical Volatility
%∆Ejft 0.749*** 0.630*** 0.567*** 0.313 0.619***
(0.113) (0.172) (0.016) (0.181) (0.056)
%∆σft -0.206** -0.292** -0.292* -0.638*** -0.300***
(0.070) (0.109) (0.142) (0.111) (0.053)
Panel D: Controlling for Factor Returns
%∆Eift −Rft %∆Eift −Rft %∆Eift −Rft %∆Eift −Rft %∆Eift −Rft
%∆Ejft −Rft 0.384** 0.885*** 0.378** 0.400* 0.663***
(0.142) (0.067) (0.164) (0.200) (0.052)
%∆σft -0.303*** -0.284** -0.467** -0.481*** -0.261***
(0.055) (0.091) (0.192) (0.130) (0.053)
Notes: This table presents the estimated coefficients and robust standard errors (in parentheses) for several
regressions of the percentage changes in risk exposures for the 10 sample banks using an OLS panel regression
with bank fixed effects in single factor regressions, columns (1)-(4), and with bank and factor fixed effects in the
regressions aggregating all factors, column 5. The dependent variable is the percentage change in risk exposure
(%∆Eift or %∆Eift − Rft). ***, **, * indicate that the coefficient is statistically significant at the 1%, 5%
and 10% confidence level, respectively. Each regression is run separately over an estimation period covering
2007Q3-2013Q3.
volatility proxy for the risk factors. Instead of using implied volatility indices, we compute
historical volatility measures within a given quarter. Specifically, we compute the 3-
month historical standard deviation of the return of the risk factor (Table 3.10, Panel
C). Using these new proxies for volatility changes, we recompute the implied change in
risk exposures using the FIRE method and re-run our regression. Overall, we see that
our main findings are robust to this change of volatility proxy.
Several reasons can explain the commonality in risk exposures documented in Tables
3.9 and 3.10. First, banks can rebalance their trading portfolios in a correlated way
because of common information. Second, they may have to curb risk at the same time
because they face similar regulatory constraints. For instance, when several banks operate
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at their VaR limit, even a small increase in volatility would force them to unwind their
positions in a correlated way. Third, the exposure of two banks with respect to a given
factor can also increase because the return of this factor was positive. In order to control
for the latter effect, we estimate the following panel regression:
%∆Eift −Rft = θi + θ1 %∆Ejft −Rft + θ2 %∆σft + eift (3.21)
where %∆Ejft −Rft is ∑i 6=j(%∆Ejft − Rft)/(N − 1). In this specification, we system-
atically remove the return on the factor from the change in risk exposure. Results in
Panel D of Table 3.10 clearly indicate that commonality in risk exposures is not mainly
due to factor returns. Indeed, the coefficient associated with other banks’ changes in
risk exposures (θ1) remains positive and significant for all factors, at least at the 10%
confidence level. We also notice that the strong negative relationship between volatility
and risk exposure is preserved (θ2).
Table 3.11 Subsample Analysis
Equity Interest Rate Foreign Exchange Commodity
Episode of Increase in Volatility (2007Q3-2008Q4)
%∆V olatility 26 23 27 22
%∆V aR 1 26 24 3
%∆E -15 9 -0.1 -13
Corr(%∆Eift,%∆Ejft) 19 28 5 46
% of Matching Signs 70 52 70 69
Episode of Reduction in Volatility (2009Q1-2010Q1)
%∆V olatility -15 -12 -11 -18
%∆V aR 10 -5 14 13
%∆E 31 16 30 41
Corr(%∆Eift,%∆Ejft) 3 58 24 23
% of Matching Signs 49 73 63 62
Notes: In this table, we contrast two subsamples. The upper (lower) panel presents the results for an episode of
increase (decrease) in market volatility. In each panel, we present the average quarterly percentage change in the
factor volatility index (%∆V olatility), the average quarterly percentage change in factor VaR (%∆V aR), the
average quarterly percentage change in risk exposure (%∆E), and the average correlation between the percentage
change in risk exposures of a bank, %∆Eift, and quarterly changes risk exposure of the nine other banks, %∆Ejft,
j 6= i. Values are expressed in percentage points.
Finally, in order to test whether our conclusions remain valid in different market con-
ditions, we split the sample into two subperiods. The first one covers 2007Q3-2008Q4
and corresponds to a period of sharp increase in market volatility (see Figure 3.4). The
second subperiod, 2009Q1-2010Q1, corresponds to a period of massive reduction in mar-
ket volatility. We show in Table 3.11 that the quarterly average change in factor volatility
ranges between 22% and 27% in the first period and between -11% and -18% in the second
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period. Overall, we find that our conclusions about the dynamics of the risk exposures
are persistent through the different phases of the volatility cycle. In particular, we find
that the negative relationship between changes in volatility and risk exposure is a robust
feature of the data. Furthermore, we report evidence of commonality in risk exposures
across banks in both volatility regimes.
3.4 Extensions
3.4.1 Other Types of Risk Disclosures
So far in this study, we have only focused on one type of bank risk disclosure, namely
the VaR. We now show how to infer information about risk exposures from other types
of banks’ risk disclosures. Under Basel III, all financial institutions with material trading
activities must compute both their VaR using recent data and their stressed VaR (sVaR)
using data from a particularly volatile period (Basel Committee on Banking Supervision,
2011b; Rossignolo, Fethi and Shaban, 2013). This measure is intended to replicate a
VaR calculation that would be generated on the bank’s current portfolio if the relevant
market factors were experiencing a period of stress. As an example, for many portfolios,
a 12-month period relating to significant losses in 2007/2008 would adequately reflect a
period of such stress.
The stressed VaR is an important innovation in financial risk management. The Ernst
& Young (2012) survey of financial services risk management reveals that stress test-
ing and stressed VaR have been the top two areas of improvement in 2012: 55% of
the respondents identify stressed VaR as the top area of improvement in transparency.
Moreover, under Basel III, stressed VaR is included in the computation of the capital
requirements for market risk, ct:
ct = max
{
V aRt;m · V aRavg
}
+ max
{
sV aRt;ms · sV aRavg
}
(3.22)
where m and ms are two positive multiplicative factors set by the regulators and subject
to an absolute minimum of 3, and the avg subscript stands for an average computed over
sixty business days.
We show in this section that it is possible to use the FIRE methodology with stressed,
instead of standard, VaR figures. In fact, it turns out that it is much easier to learn about
changes in risk exposures from stressed VaRs than it is from standard VaRs. The reason
being that changes in stressed VaR are only due to changes in risk exposures, and not to
changes in volatility (recall that, with stressed VaR, volatility is always measured during
the same high-volatility period). We make this point formally by defining the stressed
VaR as:
sV aRt = −Σ F−1(α) Et (3.23)
where Σ denotes the conditional variance of the return measured over a particularly
volatile period. We note that the variance parameter is not changing from one day to the
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next as it refers to a given high-volatility episode in the past. As a result, the change in
stressed VaR is given by:
∆sV aRt = sV aRt+1 − sV aRt (3.24)
= −Σ F−1(α)
(
Et+1 − Et
)
. (3.25)
The percentage change in VaR is:
∆sV aRt
sV aRt
=
−Σ F−1(α)
(
Et+1 − Et
)
−Σ F−1(α) Et (3.26)
= Et+1 − Et
Et
. (3.27)
Then, we conclude that:
%∆sV aRt = %∆Et. (3.28)
This equation shows that changes in stressed VaR only reflect changes in risk exposures.
Unlike with standard VaR, changes in stressed VaR are completely immunized from
volatility shocks, which greatly simplifies the analysis.
3.4.2 Generalized FIRE with Time-Varying Skewness and Kurtosis
It was shown in Section 3.2 that the α-quantile, F−1(α), of the standardized return
distribution must be constant for the FIRE to work. Obviously, if the skewness and/or
the kurtosis of the conditional distribution of the returns are/is dynamic, the α-quantile
may not be constant anymore and the implied exposure given by FIRE can be biased. To
illustrate this, we consider a simple model in which the return is given by Rt = σt εt where
εt is i.i.d. with E(εt) = 0 and V(εt) = 1. Denote by Ft(.) the cumulative density function,
st the skewness and kt the kurtosis of the distribution of εt. Using the Cornish-Fisher
expansion, we know that for any α ∈ [0, 1]:
F−1t (α) = zα +
st
6
(
z2α − 1
)
+
(
kt − 3
24
)(
z3α − 3zα
)
− s
2
t
36
(
2z3α − 5zα
)
(3.29)
where zα = Φ−1(α) denotes the αth quantile of the standard normal distribution. Then,
if st or kt is dynamic, F−1t (α) is not constant over time. As a consequence, a generalized
version of the implied exposure becomes:
%∆Wt =
1 + %∆V aRt
(1 + %∆σt)(1 + %∆F−1t (α))
− 1 (3.30)
with 1 + %∆F−1t (α) = F−1t+1(α)/F−1t (α). In this case, we need to make an assumption on
the dynamics of st and kt. For instance, we can use the generalized skewed Student’s t
distribution of Hansen (1994) with ARCH-type models for the skewness and kurtosis, or
the extension of Harvey and Siddique (1999, 2000).
At this point, a natural question arises. What is the cost of neglecting the dynamics
of the skewness and kurtosis when extracting risk exposures? One way to answer this
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question is to compare the exposures given by the FIRE and a generalized version of
the FIRE allowing for time-varying skewness and kurtosis. The difference in exposure
depends on the value of 1 + %∆F−1t (α). From Equation (3.29), we get:
1 + %∆F−1t (α) = 1 +
(
z2α − 1
6
)
%∆st +
(
z3α − 3zα
24
)
%∆kt
− (2z
3
α − 5zα)
18 st %∆st. (3.31)
For α = 0.01, st = −0.2, and a range of [−10%,10%] for both %∆st and %∆kt, the value of
1+%∆F−1t (α) remains between 0.9181 and 1.0819. This means that the size of the bias of
the exposure induced by neglecting the dynamics of the skewness and/or kurtosis ranges
from −8.92% to 7.57%. Moreover, we notice in Equation (3.31) that %∆F−1t (α) is more
sensitive with respect to the skewness than to the kurtosis. Indeed, the partial derivative
with respect to the change in skewness is (z2α− 1)/6− (2z3α− 5zα)st/18 = 0.5848 and the
partial derivative with respect to the change in kurtosis is (z3α − 3zα)/24 = −0.2338.
3.5 Conclusion
Because of the G20 Data Gap Initiative, more data will have to be disclosed by financial
institutions to allow policy makers and supervisors to better assess the evolution of the
financial system, as well as the intervention required (Cerutti, Claessens and McGuire,
2014). However, opportunities to observe actual positions or risk exposures of banks
remain extremely rare in practice (e.g. European Banking Authority’s 2011 stress tests).
In this paper, we present FIRE, a new technique to infer banks’ risk exposures from
current public disclosures; very much in the spirit of implied volatility extracted from
option prices.
The performance of the FIRE turns out to be quite good in practice, despite the
assumptions made to derive our key result. In the case study on Goldman Sachs, we
show that the implied risk exposures are systematically in line with the statements made
by the firm about its risk taking in public filings. We believe that this is reassuring
evidence that our method provides meaningful estimates. In addition, we assess the
performance of the FIRE by simulation by considering several situations in which model
risk and estimation risk could arise. Overall, we show that, in most situations, the bias
induced by model and estimation risks remains moderate.
Using a sample of large US and international banks, we find that the main driving
force of bank risk disclosures is the shifts in risk exposures and not market volatility. Fur-
thermore, we show that changes in risk exposures are negatively correlated with volatility
changes, which suggests that banks aim to reduce the variability of their VaR and regu-
latory capital. Most importantly, we provide empirical evidence of commonality in risk
exposures across banks, which supports the view that banks exhibit quite similar behavior
in trading. Our empirical conclusions have some important implications for the dynamics
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of banks’ regulatory capital. Indeed, our paper documents two sources of procyclicality
in bank capital. The first one is due to the original increase in volatility while the second
one arises from further volatility increases triggered by correlated risk exposures across
banks, through a feedback effect.
This new framework could lead a variety of applications in the future. Implied risk
exposures could, for instance, be used to study the empirical performance of the trading
strategies of banks, in the spirit of the study of Agarwal et al. (2013) on hedge funds. One
could also test whether some financial institutions lead their peers in terms of investment
behavior. FIRE could also be used in banking supervision by complementing existing
systemic risk measures (see Benoit et al., 2013, for a survey). Indeed, a situation in
which a pool of large banks have a growing, common exposure to an asset class can
become a serious source of concerns for banking regulators.
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Conclusion
This dissertation offers three essays which contribute to the systemic risk literature, from
the Systemically Important Financial Institutions (SIFIs) identification, to the evaluation
of these systemic risk measures. This work also sheds light on potential sources of systemic
risk. Bank run (Diamond and Dybvig, 1983; Chari and Jagannathan, 1988) as well
as bank contagion (Allen and Gale, 2000; Freixas, Parigi and Rochet, 2000) are two
fundamental channels which can work together to spread a financial crisis. The latter
was more prominent during the last crisis since the domino effect as well as the knock-on
effect have played crucial roles.60 The interconnectedness between financial institutions as
well as the network structure are two key components of financial contagion. Elaborating
precise mechanisms to explain this phenomenon is a source of intense research. However,
financial institutions do not have the same degree of contagion, and accurate systemic risk
measures have to be able to differentiate between contagious and non-contagious financial
institutions. Thus, the identification of Systemically Important Financial Institutions
(SIFIs) is a high-priority challenge to deal with systemic risk. Moreover, when contagion
happens in a financial market, fire sales (Begalle et al., 2013; Duarte and Eisenbach, 2013)
as well as herd behavior (Allen, Babus and Carletti, 2012) may exacerbate and propagate
the financial contagion effects to generate systemic risk. Even if incentives to herd have
been explained by Acharya and Yorulmazer (2007, 2008), an empirical revelation of the
asset class in which the herd behavior may take place has not been achieved so far.
Indeed, the level of banks’ risk exposures to a given asset class is a private information.
Yet this information could be useful for a regulator in order to know by how much banks
are exposed to a risk factor, and whether or not these exposures are the same across
banks.
The main aims of this dissertation have hence been (i) to propose an adjustment
of the popular market-based systemic risk measures to identify domestic SIFIs, (ii) to
theoretically and empirically evaluate these measures with respect to their ability to
capture systemic risk characteristics, and (iii) to measure changes in risk exposures across
banks, as well as their commonality, which is a potential source of systemic risk. Each of
the three chapters has respectively developed one of these goals.
60ECB (2009) mentions that the introduction of a deposit insurance scheme has probably shut the former channel down,
with the exception of the Northern Rock bank run case where the deposit insurance was partial.
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Chapter 1 offers a type of User-Guide to adjust the two market-based systemic risk
measures (SRIKS and ∆CoVaR) to the choice of the system. It has been highlighted
that these two measures are not able to clearly distinguish between domestic and global
(European) systemically important banks (D- and E-SIBs). On the contrary, the differ-
ence between the domestic SRISK and the global SRISK may produce accurate ranking
to identify D-SIBs and gauge the shortage of capital that a bank may have when this
bank is jointly identified as E- and D-SIBs. The main advantage of this approach is to
use publicly available data on stock returns and balance sheet components to propose
a policy direction to identify and determine the accurate amount of loss absorbency re-
quired for D-SIBs. To extend this work, an event study could be realized with respect
to banks whose distresses have only impacted their national financial market. From the
Bankia bailout in 2012 to the emergency loans to Monte Dei Paschi Di Siena issued by
the Bank of Italy in 2013, examples of banks facing losses are multiple in Europe, but
their local or global consequences have never been investigated. Such a survey may be an
interesting tool to validate our measure to identify D-SIBs. For example, Espirito Santo
was considered as the most domestically SIB in Portugal based on our methodology on
December 30, 2011 and this bank has been bailed-in in August 2014.
Chapter 2 provides an accurate comparison of the major market-based systemic risk
measures (MES, SES, SRISK and ∆CoVaR). Theoretically, these measures are derived in
a common framework allowing to show that these measures are nonlinear combinations
of standard financial risks (systematic risk, tail risk, correlation, and beta), as well as
firm characteristics such as leverage and market capitalization. Conditions under which
these different measures lead to similar rankings of SIFIs are also derived. Empirically,
it is shown that different systemic risk measures identify different SIFIs. This empirical
illustration enables the theoretical findings – that rankings based on these measures
mirror rankings obtained by sorting firms on market risk or liabilities – to be confirmed.
The latter result is reinforced by cross-section and time series regressions in which one-
factor linear models explain most of the variability of these systemic risk estimates. The
main conclusion of the chapter is that systemic risk measures fall short in capturing the
multiple facets of systemic risk, and this finding has been echoed by several academic
studies (Löﬄer and Raupauch, 2013; Tavolaro and Visnovsky, 2014; Idier, Lamé and
Mésonnier, 2012). To extend this work, simple rankings based on these measures may be
not accurate since the individual systemic risk contribution of two financial institutions
could be not significantly different. Hurlin et al. (2013) suggest an iterative procedure to
test the equality of the systemic importance of two financial institutions based on market-
based measures (see also Castro and Ferrari, 2012, who provide a test of dominance for
the ∆CoVaR).
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Chapter 3 develops the Factor Implied Risk Exposures (FIRE) methodology to in-
fer banks’ risk exposures from current public risk disclosures, such as the Value-at-Risk
(VaR). Indeed, we breakdown a change in risk disclosure into a market volatility com-
ponent and a bank-specific risk exposure component. The chosen approach relies on a
certain degree of commonality in volatility across assets within a given asset class, and
aims at documenting the presence of such a factor structure for the volatility across four
asset classes. The performance of this methodology is verified by simulations to evaluate
its potential biases due to model and estimation risk. Statements made by a large fin-
ancial institution about its actual risk exposures in public filings are compared with the
implied risk exposures given by the FIRE methodology. Then, we empirically show that
banks tend to decrease (increase) their exposures when volatility goes up (down). This
negative correlation between these two components can be seen as an attempt to damper
the procyclicality of bank regulatory capital. We find a positive correlation between
changes in risk exposures across banks, which is consistent with literature about banks
exhibiting commonality in trading and assets holding. To extend this work, additional
models to explain how badly common changes in banks’ risk exposures could propagate
and exacerbate the financial crisis should be of high interest. Moreover, tracking this
commonality over time could be a relevant tool for macroprudential purpose since we
could easily identify in which factors the banks get in or out.
In this dissertation, research on systemic risk has thus focused on three main aspects.
Yet systemic risk remains a promising avenue of research, notably on the aspects that
are about to be presented.
First, the quantification of systemic risk is based on models and the inherent risk of
those should be econometrically addressed. Danielsson et al. (2011) argue that market-
based systemic risk measures contain a high degree of model risk due to their dependence
to standard risk measures (VaR or ES), which are noisy riskometers. A remedy to model
risk by adjusting these systemic risk measures could be proposed in the same vein that
the one developed by Boucher et al. (2014) for the VaR. However, they use backtesting
procedures to realize the VaR adjustment but so far, we do not have econometric tools
to validate systemic risk measurement.
Second, the relevance of systemic risk measures should be empirically evaluated.
Whatever the model in which they are developed, to be informative for banking reg-
ulators, systemic risk measures should link financial sector crises and macroeconomic
effects. In other words, they should incorporate the dynamic interaction between the
financial and real sectors. Only a few systemic risk measures of the financial system as
a whole are based on this idea, such as the Default Intensity Model (DIM) proposed
by Giesecke and Kim (2011), and the systemic real risk indicator (GDP-at-Risk) as well
as the systemic financial risk indicator introduced by De Nicolò and Lucchetta (2010).
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To evaluate individual systemic risk measures, among others, Giglio, Kelly and Pruitt
(2013) evaluate these measures based on their ability to predict low quantiles of real
macroeconomic aggregates. They show that, taken individually, these measures fall short
to predict economic slowdown whereas an index based on those measures performs well.
As a consequence, strict criteria to gauge the degree of informativeness of these systemic
risk measures should be defined.
Third, financial market infrastructures are also subject to systemic risk. Most of
derivative exchanges use central counterparties (CCPs). Acharya et al. (2009) have
suggested that the lack of such clearing process for Credit Defaults Swaps (CDS), for
instance, have significantly exacerbated the severity of the financial crisis because they
were traded in bilateral transactions over-the-counter. Thus policy makers have asked
that CDS be now clear through CCPs. Indeed, as highlighted by Duffie and Zhu (2011),
systemic risk is well mitigated (by lowering counterparty risk) in a single CCP that
clears in the same time various derivative classes. The reverse side is that CCP default
becomes systemic since all clearing members will be affected at the same time.61 In their
2012 Annual Report, the Financial Stability Oversight Council (FSOC, 2012b) designates
eight CCPs as Systemically Important Financial Market Utilities (SIFMUs) due to their
predominant position in a market. Identifying these SIFMUs and potential channels that
are able to destabilize a CCP, such as crowded trades (Menkveld, 2014), remain attractive
fields of research to pursue our investigation on systemic risk.
61Hills et al. (1999) describe the consequences of three failures of CCP on the financial stability.
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Résumé en français
Le risque systémique, défini au sens large comme le risque d’un effondrement global du
système financier, est depuis longtemps un sujet de recherche fondamental en finance, à
la fois en économie et en gestion. L’exemple typique est celui de la crise bancaire et de la
grande dépression des années 1930 (voir de Bandt et Hartmann, 2002, pour une synthèse
des travaux majeurs de l’époque sur le risque systémique). Mais c’est sans conteste la crise
financière de 2007-2008 qui a conduit à profondément renouveler l’intérêt des régulateurs
et des chercheurs pour cette notion de risque systémique, notamment dans la perspective
de la mise en place d’une régulation macroprudentielle.
Cette thèse s’inscrit dans ce débat sur le risque systémique et la supervision bancaire,
et affiche trois objectifs principaux : (i) évaluer les principales mesures du risque systé-
mique, (ii) les appliquer et les évaluer d’un point de vue réglementaire et (iii) proposer
des pistes d’amélioration de ces mesures ou de nouvelles mesures. En effet, si le concept
de risque systémique est relativement clair, le problème de sa mesure se pose (voir Bisias
et al., 2012, pour une définition et pour une synthèse des principales mesures de risque
systémique). Par définition, le risque systémique est inobservable et seuls des évènements
systémiques peuvent être observés.62 Or, dans une perspective de régulation il convient
bien évidemment de mesurer et de « probabiliser » ce risque d’effondrement du système.
Plus spécifiquement, la mise en place d’une régulation macroprudentielle suppose d’éva-
luer la contribution de chaque institution financière au risque du système, à la manière
d’une externalité. Comment évaluer cette contribution d’une institution financière au
risque global du système ? Comment valider une telle mesure ? Ces enjeux et les consé-
quences dramatiques sur l’économie mondiale de la faillite de Lehman Brothers en 2008
ont conduit à une profonde remise en cause tant des régulations prudentielles (jusqu’ici
essentiellement axées sur une vision microprudentielle dans laquelle la stabilité des insti-
tutions garantit la stabilité du système dans son ensemble) que de la vision académique
du risque systémique (Hansen, 2014).
Au niveau académique, le risque systémique est souvent apparenté à la notion de
contagion des risques. Pour observer un évènement systémique, un élément déclencheur
est requis. Selon la Banque Centrale Européenne (2009), cet élément déclencheur peut
62Pour être plus précis, nous devrions évoquer la notion d’incertitude systémique (au sens de Knight), dès lors que l’on
suppose que les évènements systémiques peuvent être probabilisées.
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venir de deux sources : un choc exogène, c’est-à-dire un évènement idiosyncratique tel
que la défaillance d’un marché ou la faillite d’une institution financière, ou d’un choc
endogène à l’intérieur même du système financier, c’est-à-dire un déséquilibre macroéco-
nomique globale.63 Ce choc se diffuse alors à travers la totalité du système financier en
raison d’effets de débordement qui sont locaux et d’effets de contagion qui sont globaux.
Au final, l’économie réelle est affectée, entrainant une réduction du bien-être individuel
et collectif. Ainsi, la menace systémique fait référence à l’idée d’externalités négatives.
La prise de risque d’une institution financière peut avoir des effets pour ses actionnaires
et ses managers, mais aussi pour d’autres institutions financières (Lepetit, 2010). Cette
interdépendance provient notamment des transactions financières sur le marché interban-
caire (Rochet et Tirole, 1996) ou de prises de positions par les banques sur les mêmes
actifs (Allen, Babus et Carletti, 2012).
L’idée globale d’une réglementation macroprudentielle consiste à internaliser ces ex-
ternalités de risques financiers.64 Ce changement de paradigme dans la réglementation
prudentielle a été orchestré par une forte volonté politique internationale, comme l’illus-
trent les six rassemblements des chefs des gouvernements du G-20 au sujet des marchés
financiers et l’économie mondiale ayant eu lieu de 2008 à 2011. Cette ligne directrice est
à l’origine d’avancées significatives sur la régulation financière, se matérialisant en 2010
par le Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform et le Consumer Protection Act aux Etats-Unis et
par le troisième accord de Bâle signé par les états membres du Comité de Bâle sur la
Supervision Bancaire (Basel Committee on Banking Supervision, BCBS).65
Ainsi, si la protection des consommateurs contre le risque de faillite de leur banque
était au coeur des réglementations bancaires microprudentielles, la crise financière de
2008 a conduit à prendre en compte la protection de l’ensemble de l’économie et des mar-
chés financiers au regard d’une crise systémique (Rochet, 2008). Pour limiter le risque de
faillite d’une institution financière, la clé de voûte de la réglementation prudentielle Bâle
II consiste à contraindre chaque banque à détenir un niveau minimum de capital, pour
couvrir ses risques de marché, de contrepartie et opérationnel. Ces montants sont souvent
calculés par les banques elles-mêmes via leurs modèles internes de risque. Le passage à
une réglementation macroprudentielle (Bâle III par exemple) suppose donc d’identifier
les institutions financières contribuant le plus au risque total du système financier : les
institutions financières d’importance systémique (Systemically Important Financial Insti-
tutions, SIFIs). Comme ces SIFIs posent une menace majeure sur le système, elles doivent
être soumises à une supervision plus étroite, à des exigences supplémentaires en capital et
63Voir de Bandt, Hartmann et Peydró (2012) pour une distinction claire entre un évènement systémique au sens
« étroit » et au sens « large », ainsi que sa classification en un évènement systémique « fort » ou « faible ». La mise à
jour de leur revue de littérature sur le risque systémique se concentre sur les effets de contagion qui sont la conséquence
d’évènements systémiques forts au sens étroit du terme.
64Sans distinction des risques de marché, de crédit, de liquidité ou opérationnel.
65Les Etats-Unis sont membres de ce Comité.
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à un volant de liquidité (FSB, 2011a). Ces exigences supplémentaires en capital doivent
être proportionnelles à la contribution de chaque institution au risque du système.
Dans ce contexte, trois questions cruciales émergent : (i) comment identifier les institu-
tions financières d’importance systémique (SIFIs), (ii) comment mesurer la contribution
au risque systémique pour établir les surcharges en capital et (iii) comment révéler les
interdépendances dans les prises de risque des banques, afin de prévenir la survenue d’évè-
nements systémiques.
Identifier les institutions financières d’importance systémique
Par certains aspects, les systèmes biologiques et bancaires présentent de nombreuses
similarités en tant que systèmes complexes. C’est sans doute pourquoi l’analogie de la
contagion des chocs financiers à la contagion et la transmission des maladies infectieuses a
été si souvent reprise dans la littérature académique (Haldane et May, 2011). Les banques
en tant qu’entités interdépendantes (en raison de leurs positions croisées à l’actif et au
passif et leur exposition à des facteurs de risque communs) subissent et participent aux
mécanismes de contagion des chocs financiers. Néanmoins, si dans le cas des pandémies
on cherche à identifier le patient zéro, dans le cas d’un système financier on cherche
plutôt à identifier l’ensemble des institutions financières dont les caractéristiques (taille,
interconnections, rôle spécifique sur les marchés, etc.) et l’activité engendrent la plus
grande menace sur la stabilité du système financier dans son ensemble, les SIFIs ou G-
SIFIs pour Global Systemically Financial Institution.
Comment identifier les institutions financières d’importance systémique ? Au niveau
mondial, l’approche proposée par les régulateurs consiste à construire un score agrégé
sur la base de différents critères reflétant les différentes facettes du caractère systémique
d’une institution. Le cadre proposé par le BCBS (Financial Stability Board - Internatio-
nal Monetary Fund - Bank for International Settlements, 2009 ; FSB, 2011b ; Financial
Stability Oversight Council, 2012a) est ainsi fondé sur un score incluant cinq facteurs : la
taille des banques, leur interdépendance, leur activité transfrontalière à l’échelle mondiale,
l’absence de substituts directs ou d’infrastructure financière pour les services qu’elles four-
nissent et leur complexité. Les trois premiers facteurs sont inspirés de la recommandation
du rapport de la FSB-IMF-BIS de 2009, tandis que les deux derniers ont été proposés par
le BCBS pour tenir compte du fait que les SIFIs complexes et internationales sont rela-
tivement plus coûteuses et lentes à démanteler (BCBS, 2011a). Dans cette approche par
les scores, la question fondamentale qui se pose au-delà du choix des facteurs constitutifs
du score, est celle de leur pondération relative. Le BCBS a fait le choix d’une équipon-
dération, chaque facteur possédant un poids total de 20% dans la construction du score.
Sur le même principe, tous les indicateurs entrant dans la composition d’un facteur se
voient attribuer le même poids. Ces indicateurs correspondent à des valeurs comptables
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ou des valeurs de marché observables (pour une liste détaillée des indicateurs voir BCBS,
2013b).
Le score individuel d’une institution financière est utilisé de deux façons. Ce der-
nier est tout d’abord comparé à un score limite établi par le BCBS selon leur jugement
d’expert. Chaque institution financière ayant un score au-dessus de cette limite est consi-
dérée comme une G-SIFI et est soumise à une surveillance plus minutieuse. Les scores
servent par ailleurs à déterminer une surcharge en capital réglementaire. Les scores des
G-SIFIs sont segmentés en segments de risque homogène. Le niveau d’exigence addition-
nel d’absorption des pertes (Higher Loss Absorbency, HLA) appliqué pour couvrir leur
contribution au risque systémique varie alors selon la tranche dans laquelle se trouve la
G-SIFI. Cette surcharge en capital, exprimée en pourcentage des actifs pondérés en fonc-
tion des risques, va de 1% à 2,5%, ce qui correspond à une augmentation de 0,5% par
tranche. Depuis 2012, la liste des G-SIFIs est publiée une fois par an.
Ce cadre réglementaire constitue aujourd’hui la référence en matière d’identification
des SIFIs (Weistroffer, 2011), même si cette approche repose sur une agrégation de divers
indicateurs dont certains ne sont pas publics. Toutefois, cette méthodologie soulève de
nombreuses questions. Ainsi, Hurlin et Pérignon (2013) montrent que l’utilisation d’un
schéma d’équipondération dans la construction du score peut conduire à surévaluer l’im-
portance des facteurs et des indicateurs les plus volatils. Plus généralement, au-delà de
la méthodologie retenue, c’est l’idée même de la publication d’une liste de SIFIs qui peut
poser problème. Tout comme pour les institutions « trop grandes pour faire faillite » (too-
big-to-fail), le fait de qualifier publiquement une institution de SIFI peut conduire à ce que
cette institution soit perçue comme « trop systémique pour faire faillite » (too-systemic-
to-fail). Dès lors, sa valorisation par les marchés peut s’apprécier indépendamment de
ses efforts de gestion des risques. Autrement dit, les banques peuvent avoir intérêt à être
systémique au sens de la classification du BCBS même si cela induit une surcharge de
capital et une surveillance accrue de la part des régulateurs. Dans une étude empirique
récente, Moenninghoeff, Ongena et Wieandt (2014) montrent que la nouvelle réglementa-
tion affecte négativement la valeur de l’institution financière nouvellement régulée, mais
ils soulignent que la désignation officielle des G-SIFIs a partiellement annulé l’impact sou-
haité. Enfin, seuls les établissements bancaires sont jusqu’à présent pris en compte dans ce
cadre réglementaire. Or, d’autres institutions financières telles que les compagnies d’assu-
rance (van Lelyveld, Liedorp et Kampman, 2009) et les fonds d’investissement spéculatifs
(Hedge Funds) peuvent présenter un caractère systémique dans certaines circonstances
(Chan et al. 2006), l’exemple typique étant l’effondrement du fond spéculatif LTCM (Long
Term Capital Management) en 1998.
Un autre problème de cette approche réside dans la définition du périmètre du système
financier de référence (voir Zigrand, 2014, pour une définition de la notion de système
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dans le concept du risque systémique). Est-ce qu’un régulateur européen doit évaluer les
externalités de risque engendrées par l’activité des banques européennes sur les banques
asiatiques et américaines, ou au contraire se restreindre à l’analyse des impacts au niveau
du système financier européen ? Plus généralement cette question s’inscrit dans le cadre
de l’identification des G-SIFIs et des D-SIFIs pour Domestically Systemically Important
Financial Institutions (D-SIFIs). L’identification des D-SIFIs est primordiale dès lors
qu’un régulateur souhaite analyser l’impact d’un défaut potentiel sur un système financier
ou une économie nationale ou régionale. Par exemple, en août 2014, la banque portugaise
Banco Espirito Santos a été recapitalisée par une aide de l’Etat portugais de 4,4 milliards
d’euros en raison de ses trop grandes expositions au risque. Cette banque n’a pourtant
jamais été identifiée comme une G-SIFI bien qu’elle est obtenue de médiocres résultats aux
stress tests de 2011. Afin d’identifier les sources de risque systémique à l’échelle nationale,
le BCBS (2012) propose un ensemble de douze principes permettant de caractériser les
D-SIFIs et d’évaluer le niveau précis de leur HLA. Malheureusement, ce cadre n’est pas
encore opérationnel. C’est pourquoi l’identification des D-SIFI est aujourd’hui au centre
de l’agenda de recherche tant des régulateurs que des académiques (Brämer et Gischer,
2011 ; Engle, Jondeau et Rockinger, 2014). Cette thèse contribue à cette littérature en
proposant une méthode permettant de repérer les institutions financières qui pourraient
potentiellement être d’importance systémique au niveau de leur pays.
La méthodologie proposée par les régulateurs n’est pas le seul moyen d’identifier les
institutions financières systémiquement risquées. Les universitaires ont développé plu-
sieurs mesures à mêmes de capturer l’importance systémique d’une institution financière.
La principale difficulté pour ces derniers est qu’ils n’ont généralement pas accès à cer-
taines données permettant de mesurer l’interdépendance au niveau des bilans des banques
(Cerutti, Claessens et McGuire, 2014). C’est pourquoi les mesures de risque systémiques
issues de la recherche académiques sont pour l’essentiel fondées sur des données de marché
et des données de bilan publiquement accessibles.
Les mesures du risque systémique
Comme le montre l’approche réglementaire, le risque systémique ne peut pas se résu-
mer à un seul critère. Zhou (2009) met ainsi en évidence que la taille d’une institution
financière n’est pas nécessairement un bon estimateur du risque systémique. C’est sans
doute cette dimension multicritère qui explique pour partie le relatif foisonnement de me-
sures de risque systémique dans la littérature académique. Bisias et al. (2012) énumèrent
trente et une mesures de risque systémique provenant de la littérature économique et
financière, en partant de ses fondations granulaires jusqu’à des mesures de réseaux en
passant entre autres par les mesures prospectives du risque systémique. De Bandt et
al. (2013) rassemblent également un grand nombre d’indicateurs du risque systémique,
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en particulier ceux mesurant la contribution individuelle des institutions financières. Ce
dernier ensemble de mesures est très pertinent pour identifier les SIFIs.
Afin de juger de la contribution d’une institution financière au risque systémique,
deux approches peuvent être isolées. D’un côté, les mesures se basant sur des données
de marché, comme les rendements boursiers ou les données sur les contrats d’échange
sur défaut ou Credit Default Swaps (CDS), de l’autre, les mesures utilisant les bilans
comptables et les données des régulateurs (lorsqu’elles sont disponibles) telles que les
expositions bilatérales des institutions financières.
Le premier sous-ensemble de mesures s’appuie sur des données de marché. Adrian et
Brunnermeier (2011) étendent la VaR avec le concept de CoVaR, le préfixe Co signifiant
conditionnel, contagion ou co-mouvement. La CoVaR capture la perte du système finan-
cier conditionnellement aux tensions financières d’une institution. La ∆CoVaR mesure la
contribution d’une institution au risque du système. Elle est définie par la différence entre
la CoVaR calculée lorsque l’institution se trouve dans une situation difficile et la CoVaR
obtenue lorsque l’institution est à son état médian. Acharya et al. (2010) définissent la
Marginal Expected Shortfall (MES) ainsi que la Systemic Expected Shortfall (SES). La
MES est égale à la contribution marginale d’une firme à l’Expected Shortfall (ES) des
rendements quotidiens du marché.66 La SES d’une institution correspond au montant de
capitaux propres se situant en dessous d’un certain niveau lorsqu’une crise systémique
survient. En d’autres termes, la SES mesure la sous-capitalisation potentielle d’une ins-
titution financière lorsque le système dans son ensemble est sous-capitalisé. Brownlees et
Engle (2012), Acharya, Engle et Richardson (2012) ainsi que Engle, Jondeau et Rockinger
(2014) combinent la MES avec la capitalisation boursière et le montant total de dettes
afin de définir une nouvelle mesure, la SRISK, qui est sans doute aujourd’hui la mesure
la plus populaire. La SRISK prend en compte le levier et la taille et mesure le manque de
capital attendu lorsque le système financier est en situation de stress.67 Les auteurs in-
terprètent la SRISK comme un manque de capital, ce qui permet de faire un lien évident
avec l’objectif réglementaire d’accroissement de la stabilité financière avec une plus grande
exigence en capital. Toujours en utilisant des rendements, Billio et al. (2012) proposent
une mesure de causalité au sens de Granger permettant d’identifier les interconnexions
(interprétées comme des effets de débordement) et in fine le risque systémique. Dans le
même esprit, Diebold et Yilmaz (2014) proposent plusieurs mesures d’interconnexion ob-
tenues en utilisant une décomposition de variance basée sur la volatilité des rendements
boursiers. Les deux précédentes études identifient ainsi la topologie du système. Corradin,
Manganelli et Schwaab (2011) introduisent un schéma de régressions quantiles multiva-
66Brownlees et Engle (2012) étendent cette mesure à un horizon temporel de six mois via la LRMES en utilisant une
formule de conversion ou des simulations.
67La SRISK est étendue par Engle et Siriwardane (2014) en incorporant un modèle GARCH structurel qui propose un
nouveau modèle de volatilité où le levier financier amplifie la volatilité des fonds propres.
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riées pour jauger de la contribution d’une institution financière. Straetmans et Chaudhry
(2012) appliquent une analyse statistique multivariée des valeurs extrêmes pour réaliser
une comparaison transatlantique du risque systémique totale. Comme l’explique Markose
et al. (2010), les CDS ont eu un rôle stratégique dans la crise financière et des mesures
de risque systémique basées sur des données de CDS ont donc été proposées, telles que le
Systemic Risk Ratio. Huang, Zhou et Zhu (2009) fournissent une estimation de la proba-
bilité de défaut neutre au risque avec l’indice Distress Insurance Premium (DIP), tandis
que Giglio (2012) calcule le risque de défaut joint des institutions financières. Au-delà
de ce vaste mais non exhaustif ensemble de mesures de risque systémique basées sur
des données de marché, un autre sous-ensemble de mesures mobilisent d’autres sources
d’information.
Le second sous-ensemble de mesures s’appuie sur les données de bilans bancaires ainsi
que celles des régulateurs. Greenwood, Landier et Thesmar (2012), en se basant sur les
données publiées par l’autorité bancaire européenne (European Banking Authority, EBA)
sur les expositions des banques à la dette souveraine européenne, distinguent la contribu-
tion d’une banque à la fragilité du secteur financier de sa propre vulnérabilité au risque
systémique. Brunnermeier, Gorton et Krishnamurthy (2014) s’intéressent à la liquidité
pour comprendre la crise et proposent un Liquidity Mismatch Index (LMI) pour éva-
luer l’importance systémique d’une institution financière. Comme souligné par Caballero
(2010), le risque systémique est intrinsèquement lié à l’importance des interconnexions
entre institutions. C’est pourquoi de nombreux travaux s’inscrivent dans une logique de
modélisation du système financier en réseau. Cont, Moussa et Santos (2012) proposent
ainsi le Contagion Index pour capturer l’importance systémique d’une institution, défini
comme la perte attendue sur le système déclenchée par le défaut d’une institution à la
suite d’un scénario de stress. Dans leur travail, l’importance systémique est basée sur
les expositions dues à leurs contreparties. Gouriéroux, Héam et Monfort (2012) utilisent
également une base de données unique et privée sur les expositions interbancaires bilaté-
rales. Leur méthodologie permet de séparer les effets directs d’un choc (tels qu’un choc
commun sur les actifs ou un choc spécifique sur une banque), des effets de contagion
présents à l’intérieur du système bancaire. Demange (2011) propose le Threat Index re-
flétant l’externalité imposée par une banque faisant défaut sur le remboursement de la
dette de toutes les autres banques. Cet indicateur est une mesure alternative du risque
de contagion induit par une banque, la plupart du temps défini comme le nombre at-
tendu de faillite suivant sa faillite initiale (voir Upper 2001, pour un résumé sur ce sujet).
Acemoglu, Ozdaglar et Tahbaz-Salehi (2014) s’intéressent quant à eux à la topologie du
réseau financier et mettent en lumière la nature robuste mais fragile des réseaux finan-
ciers mondiaux. Ce résultat signifie notamment qu’un certain type de réseau peut être
très résistant à une certaine catégorie de chocs, mais fragile à un autre type de chocs.
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Cette thèse se concentre sur un sous-ensemble de ces mesures individuelles du risque
systémique. L’échantillon choisi pour notre étude est composé des mesures suivantes :
MES, SES SRISK et ∆CoVaR. Ce choix a été guidé par leur importance dans la sphère
académique et dans le débat public, leur portée auprès des régulateurs, la pertinence de
leur interprétation économique et la disponibilité publique des données nécessaires à leur
construction. L’objectif est donc de contribuer à la littérature visant à évaluer la validité
de ces mesures de risque systémique. Brunnermeier et Oehmke (2012) proposent une dé-
finition de ce que devrait être une mesure pertinente du risque systémique, ils mettent
en avant le fait que le principe d’allocation est primordial. Dans un article connexe,
Brunnermeier et Cheridito (2013) suivent ces principes et suggèrent la mesure SystRisk.
Une approche alternative est de développer une axiomatique des mesures de risque sys-
témique (Chen, Iyengar et Moallemi, 2013), à l’image de celle proposée par Artzner et al.
(1999) pour les mesures de risque individuelles. L’approche présentée dans ce travail est
complémentaire à ces deux approches puisque nous comparons leur performance quant
à l’identification des SIFIs et leur capacité à synthétiser en une seule mesure toutes les
caractéristiques du risque systémique.
Mesurer le risque systémique et identifier les SIFIs requièrent une analyse en profon-
deur des institutions financières. Une part significative du risque systémique peut uni-
quement être identifiée par une analyse détaillée des activités et des stratégies communes
entre les institutions financières.
Similitudes entre banques
Les institutions financières contribuant le plus au risque systémique sont soumises à
un contrôle accru. Ceci signifie que les activités de marché, telles que les positions prises
sur le marché et leur besoin de liquidité associé, ainsi que les expositions encourues, sont
sous surveillance. Une gestion des risques saine ne constitue pas un nouveau pilier de la
réglementation puisque les modèles internes développés par les banques sont déjà validés
par les régulateurs à travers une approche microprudentielle. Toutefois, les superviseurs
visent aujourd’hui à intégrer dans cette réglementation une dimension dite macropruden-
tiels, ayant pour objectif d’éviter une trop grande concentration des risques mais aussi
des expositions communes et cela même lorsque prises individuellement ces institutions
(FSB, 2011a).
La dépendance des risques associés aux activités des banques peut provenir de diffé-
rentes sources. Tout d’abord, les banques ont parfois des incitations communes à surinves-
tir au même moment dans des classes d’actifs spécifiques et ce résultat peut être exacerbé
par la réglementation. Par exemple, les législateurs ont demandé que les CDS soient dé-
sormais échangés via des chambres de compensation (Central Counterparty, CCP), ce
qui pourrait radicalement augmenter la demande globale de collatéral, entraînant de po-
tentiels effets déstabilisateurs puisque seuls quelques types d’actifs sont éligibles comme
150
garantie par les chambres de compensation tels que la dette souveraine (Duffie, Scheicher
et Vuillemey, 2014). Hirshleifer, Subrahmanyam et Titman (1994) montrent que la nature
séquentielle de l’arrivée d’information a un impact significatif sur les décisions d’investis-
sement. Les investisseurs recevant une information commune ou privée avant les autres
deviennent des « preneurs de profits » de court terme et ont tendance à échanger les
mêmes actifs. Acharya et Yorulmazer (2007, 2008) soutiennent que les banques ont une
forte incitation à se copier, en particulier les petites banques, dans le but de maximiser
leur probabilité de renflouement. Ce type de comportement augmente la vraisemblance
d’une crise systémique et pose aux régulateurs le problème du « trop nombreux pour
faire faillite » (too-many-to-fail). Farhi et Tirole (2012) affirment que les choix d’endette-
ment privé dépendent de l’anticipation de la réaction politique sur l’inadéquation globale
de la maturité. Ainsi, les banques dans leur ensemble utilisent cette asymétrie dans les
échéances (en ayant recourt à trop de dettes à court terme) menant à une corrélation
plus importante du risque.
En résumé, les institutions financières ont des incitations qui les poussent à prendre des
positions corrélées sur des actifs potentiellement surévalués. Or, ces positions ne sont pas
rendues publiques et seul le régulateur est en mesure de surveiller le degré de dépendance
des risques issus de ces expositions communes.
Bien évidemment, la présence de risques corrélés est particulièrement problématique
lorsque des crises financières surviennent. En effet, au moment où la volatilité de marché
atteint son pic, le capital réglementaire et la demande de collatérales tendent à augmenter
mécaniquement pour toutes les institutions financières. En réponse, beaucoup de banques
sont obligées de liquider à la hâte leurs positions et contribuent ainsi à la crise (mécanisme
de fire sales). Adrian et Shin (2014) illustrent empiriquement cet aspect et montrent que
pour maintenir une probabilité constante de défaut, les institutions financières ajustent
très fortement leurs expositions au risque lorsque l’environnement économique devient
plus risqué. Brunnermeier et Pedersen (2009) proposent un modèle pour expliquer le fait
que l’on observe des similitudes sur la liquidité de marché entre actifs, ce qui amplifie
au final la volatilité de marché. Morris et Shin (1999) expliquent que des expositions au
risque corrélées (interdépendances) entre banques conduisent à une plus grande volatilité
puisque les institutions financières tendent à vendre les mêmes actifs au même moment.
Ce côté caché entraîne des réactions adverses pouvant avoir des conséquences dramatiques
en période de crise (Persaud, 2000). Le comportement mimétique est difficile à prouver
étant donné le manque de données fiables à ce sujet. Allen, Babus et Carletti (2012)
développent un modèle théorique pour analyser les interactions entre les similarités entre
actifs et la durée de maturité des financements capables de générer du risque systémique.
Cai, Saunders et Steffen (2014) mesurent les similitudes entre les portefeuilles de prêts
syndiqués de deux banques et trouvent une corrélation positive entre cette mesure d’in-
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terdépendance entre banques et diverses mesures du risque systémique basées sur des
données de marché telles que la SRISK et la CoVaR.
Il est donc primordial de prendre en compte les dépendances pouvant exister entre ins-
titutions financières. Mais force est de constater qu’il n’existe pas d’outil capable d’iden-
tifier et de synthétiser les expositions au risque au niveau d’un établissement financier
pour tous ses secteurs d’activité et d’en mesurer les dépendances par rapport aux autres
institutions financières. Nous nous efforcerons de répondre à cette problématique dans
cette thèse en proposant une méthode innovante et simple pour mesurer les expositions
au risque des banques. Cette nouvelle méthodologie peut constituer un moyen efficace de
révéler les co-mouvements des expositions au risque des banques et ainsi de limiter les
risques systémiques.
Le principal objectif de cette thèse est de contribuer à cette nouvelle littérature cher-
chant à évaluer le risque systémique en proposant trois essais sur le sujet.
Contributions
Le premier chapitre s’intéresse à l’identification des établissements bancaires ayant
une importance systémique au niveau domestique (D-SIBs). Nous proposons dans ce
chapitre un ajustement original de trois mesures de risque systémique, conçues dans un
cadre global, afin d’évaluer leurs capacités à identifier à la fois les D-SIBs et les G-SIBs.
Suivant l’esprit des accords de Bâle, ce chapitre met l’accent sur les besoins en capital
qu’une banque est susceptible d’avoir en période de stress lorsque cette dernière est à la
fois identifiée comme G- et D-SIB.
Le second chapitre propose une analyse théorique et empirique des principales mesures
de risque systémique (MES, CoVaR et SRISK) fondées sur les données de marché (ren-
dements quotidiens). Pour ce faire, nous considérons un modèle commun et dérivons un
certain nombre de propriétés théoriques de ces mesures. Nous insistons notamment sur
les conditions sous lesquelles peuvent apparaître des divergences de diagnostic suivant ces
mesures pour une même institution financière. Cette analyse théorique est complétée par
une analyse empirique réalisée sur un échantillon de 94 banques américaines.
Le troisième chapitre propose une mesure implicite de l’exposition des banques à plu-
sieurs facteurs de risque. Cette approche permet d’extraire une information privée au
sujet des changements de l’exposition au risque des banques à partir d’une information
divulguée dans les rapports d’activité de ces banques, c’est-à-dire les VaRs désagrégées
par grands facteurs de risque. Cette mesure nous permet d’étudier les dépendances exis-
tantes dans les expositions au risque de 10 grandes banques internationales.
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Chapitre 1 : Where is the System ?
Le chapitre 1, intitulé « Where is the System ? », élabore une méthodologie pour
identifier aussi bien les D-SIBs que les G-SIBs.68 En s’appuyant sur le fait que les mesures
standards de risque systémique basées sur des données de marché, telles que la SRISK et la
∆CoVaR, sont capables d’identifier les G-SIBs, ce chapitre propose un ajustement simple
de ces mesures afin d’étudier la contribution au risque systémique d’une certaine banque
au niveau domestique. L’objectif est au final de mettre en place un dispositif spécifique
pour les D-SIBs comme le préconise le comité de Bâle sur la régulation bancaire (BCBS).
Dans ce contexte, même lorsque le système de référence change, ces mesures ne peuvent
pas être utilisées pour distinguer une D-SIB d’une G-SIB. Ce résultat montre d’une part
que la SRISK est principalement sensible au montant total de dettes de la banque, cet
élément ne dépend pas de la taille du système. D’un autre côté, la ∆CoVaR est largement
sensible au choix du système de référence, ce qui mène à une distinction claire entre le
niveau domestique et global dans lequel l’institution agit.
Nous montrons tout d’abord que même lorsque le système financier de référence
change, ces mesures ne permettent pas de distinguer une D-SIB d’une G-SIB. Ce ré-
sultat s’explique par le fait que la mesure SRISK est principalement sensible au montant
total de dette de la banque. Or, cet élément ne dépend pas du choix du système financier
de référence (domestique ou global). Ce problème est illustré à l’intérieur de l’eurozone
où l’identification des D-SIBs est très importante. Nous proposons un indicateur basé sur
la différence entre deux SRISKs calculées respectivement au niveau national et européen.
Nous montrons que cet indicateur est un outil prometteur dans l’optique d’identifier les
D-SIBs et d’évaluer le manque de capital potentiel qu’une banque peut avoir lorsque cette
dernière est considérée à la fois comme D-SIB et G-SIB.
Chapitre 2 : A Theoretical and Empirical Comparison of Systemic Risk
Measures
Le chapitre 2, intitulé « A Theoretical and Empirical Comparison of Systemic Risk
Measures », délivre une analyse théorique et empirique des principales mesures de risque
systémique basées sur données de marché (MES, SES, SRISK et ∆CoVaR) actuellement
utilisées par les banques centrales et les agences de régulation bancaire.
Le comité de stabilité financière (Financial Stability Board, FSB) recommande qu’une
mesure de la contribution d’une institution financière au risque systémique global doit
refléter la taille, le levier, la liquidité, l’interdépendance, la complexité et la substitua-
bilité de cette dernière. Or, les résultats de ce chapitre indiquent que ces mesures ne
remplissent pas complétement cette tâche et ne reflètent qu’imparfaitement la nature
multidimensionnelle du risque systémique. Cette recherche constitue la première tentative
68Ce chapitre est publié dans la revue International Economics.
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de comparaison, théorique et empirique, de ces principales mesures de risque systémique.
Le résultat principal de notre étude est que la plus grande part de la variabilité de ces
mesures systémiques peut être capturée par de simples mesures du risque de marché (pris
en isolation) ou alors par des caractéristiques de la firme.
Nous proposons tout d’abord une analyse théorique de ces mesures à partir d’un
cadre unifié. Dans ce cadre stylisé, nous dérivons les expressions analytiques des mesures
de risque systémique et nous mettons en évidence le lien théorique entre le risque sys-
témique et les mesures standards de risque de marché (risque systématique, risque de
queue, corrélation et beta) ainsi que des caractéristiques classiques des firmes, comme
le levier et la capitalisation boursière. Plus spécifiquement, nous montrons que la MES
est proportionnelle au beta, tandis que la CoVaR est fondamentalement liée à la VaR de
l’institution et que la SRISK est déterminée par le beta et le quasi-levier. Nous étudions
en outre les conditions sous lesquelles ces différentes mesures peuvent donner un diagnos-
tic convergent sur le classement des institutions financières suivant leur degré de risque
systémique.
Cette analyse théorique est complétée par une analyse empirique réalisée sur un échan-
tillon de quatre-vingt-quatorze banques américaines sur la période allant de janvier 2000
à décembre 2010. Dans cette analyse empirique, nous adoptons exactement les mêmes
méthodes d’estimation que celles préconisées dans les articles fondateurs. Nous montrons
que ces différentes mesures empiriques de risque systémique conduisent à identifier dif-
férentes SIFIs. De plus, nous montrons qu’un modèle linéaire à un seul facteur explique
entre 83% et 100% de la variabilité de ces indicateurs de risque systémique, ce résultat
traduisant la dimension monocritère de ces mesures. En coupe transversale, la MES et la
SRISK sont respectivement expliquées par le beta de la firme et par son montant total
de dettes tandis que la ∆CoVaR, considérée dans la dimension temporelle, est principa-
lement expliquée par la VaR.
Chapitre 3 : Implied Risk Exposures
Le chapitre 3, intitulé « Implied Risk Exposures », présente une méthode novatrice
permettant de révéler les expositions au risque des grandes banques.69 Cet essai répond
ainsi au problème crucial de données auquel font face les praticiens et les chercheurs sur
ces expositions (Cerutti, Claessens et McGuire, 2014). Même si les stress tests menés par
l’autorité bancaire européenne (European Banking Authority, EBA) permettent d’obser-
ver les positions ainsi que les expositions au risque des banques, ces tests ne sont pas
réalisés chaque année. Pour surmonter ce problème, ce chapitre développe une méthodo-
logie appelée Factor Implied Risk Exposures (FIRE) permettant d’inférer les expositions
au risque des banques à partir des publications légales de ces dernières.
69Cet article est à paraître dans Review of Finance.
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L’originalité de cette technique est de montrer comment déduire des mesures de risque
reportées dans les rapports d’activité, telles que la Value-at-Risk (VaR), une mesure im-
plicite de leur exposition au risque par rapport au marché action, au taux d’intérêt, au
taux de change et aux matières premières. Puisque ce chapitre prend en considération
un large éventail de risques, il étend de fait la littérature actuelle qui se focalise exclusi-
vement sur les expositions au risque des banques par rapport au taux d’intérêt, comme
examiné par Begenau, Piazzesi et Schneider (2013) ainsi que Landier, Sraer et Thesmar
(2013). Il est également montré que la structure factorielle de la volatilité du marché des
capitaux, mise en évidence par Herskovic et al. (2014), est persistante pour nos quatre
classes d’actifs, ce qui met en lumière un certain degré de similitude sur la volatilité des
actifs au sein d’une même classe d’actifs. La méthode est évaluée en comparant systé-
matiquement les expositions au risque implicites données par la méthodologie FIRE, aux
déclarations faites dans les documents publics d’une grande institution financière au sujet
de son actuelle exposition au risque. Les biais, sur cette mesure implicite des expositions,
qui pourraient être provoqués par un risque de modèle et un risque d’estimation sont
également étudiés par simulations.
L’application empirique sur dix grandes banques américaines et européennes montre
que les expositions au risque sont négativement corrélées avec la volatilité de marché et
que les changements de ces expositions sont positivement corrélés entre banques, ce qui est
consistant avec le fait que les banques présentent des similarités dans leurs transactions
financières. Le premier résultat suggère que les banques gèrent activement leurs exposi-
tions au risque en fonction des conditions de marché. Ce phénomène peut être vu comme
une tentative de réduction de l’effet procyclique dû à une hausse de la volatilité sur le ca-
pital réglementaire des banques. Le second résultat indique que les banques rééquilibrent
leurs portefeuilles d’une manière corrélée. Toutefois, un groupe de grandes banques ayant
une exposition commune croissante à une certaine classe d’actifs est une source d’in-
terconnexion entre institutions financières, ce qui augmente le risque systémique. Cette
préoccupation est particulièrement pertinente pour les régulateurs bancaires puisqu’ils
cherchent à contrôler cette interdépendance.
155


Sylvain BENOIT
Trois essais sur le risque systémique
Résumé :
Le risque systémique a joué un rôle clé dans la propagation de la dernière crise financière mondiale.
Un grand nombre de mesures de ce risque ont été développées pour évaluer la contribution d’une insti-
tution financière au risque de l’ensemble du système. Toutefois, de nombreuses questions concernant
les capacités de ces mesures à identifier les institutions financières d’importance systémique (SIFIs) ont
été soulevées puisque le risque systémique possède de multiples facettes et certaines d’entre elles sont
difficiles identifier, telles que les similitudes entre institutions financières.
L’objectif général de cette thèse en finance est donc (i) de proposer une solution empirique pour identifier
les SIFIs au niveau nationale, (ii) de comparer théoriquement et empiriquement différentes mesures du
risque systémique et (iii) de mesurer les changements d’expositions au risque des banques.
Tout d’abord, le chapitre 1 propose un ajustement de trois mesures de risque systémique basées sur des
données de marchés et conçues dans un cadre international, afin d’identifier les SIFIs au niveau national.
Ensuite, le chapitre 2 introduit un modèle commun dans lequel plusieurs mesures du risque systémique
sont exprimées et comparées. Il y est théoriquement établi que ces mesures de risque systémique peuvent
être exprimées en fonction de mesures traditionnelles de risque. L’application empirique confirme ces
résultats et montre que ces mesures ne sont pas capables de saisir la nature multidimensionnelle du
risque systémique. Enfin, le chapitre 3 présente la méthodologie appelée Factor Implied Risk Exposures
(FIRE) permettant de décomposer une variation de la mesure de risque d’une banque en deux éléments,
le premier représentant la volatilité de marché et le second correspondant à l’exposition au risque de la
banque. Ce chapitre illustre empiriquement que les changements d’expositions au risque sont corrélés
positivement entre les banques, ce qui est cohérent avec le fait que les banques présentent des similitudes
dans leurs prises de positions sur le marché.
Mots clés : Risque systémique, Régulation bancaire, Institutions financières d’importance sys-
témique, MES, SRISK, CoVaR, Divulgation des risques, VaR, Capital Réglementaire.
Three Essays on Systemic Risk
Abstract:
Systemic risk has played a key role in the propagation of the last global financial crisis. A large number of
systemic risk measures have been developed to quantify the contribution of a financial institution to the
system-wide risk. However, numerous questions about their abilities to identify Systemically Important
Financial Institutions (SIFIs) have been raised since systemic risk has multiple facets, and some of them
are difficult to gauge, such as the commonalities across financial institutions.
The main goal of this dissertation in finance is thus (i) to propose an empirical solution to identify
domestic SIFIs, (ii) to compare theoretically and empirically different systemic risk measures, and (iii)
to measure changes in banks’ risk exposures.
First, chapter 1 offers an adjustment of three market-based systemic risk measures, designed in a global
framework, to identify domestic SIFIs. Second, chapter 2 introduces a common framework in which
several systemic risk measures are expressed and compared. It is theoretically shown that those systemic
risk measures can be expressed as function of traditional risk measures. The empirical application confirms
these findings and shows that these measures fall short in capturing the multifaceted nature of systemic
risk. Third, chapter 3 proposes the Factor Implied Risk Exposures (FIRE) methodology which breaks
down a change in risk disclosure into a market volatility component and a bank-specific risk exposure
component. This chapter empirically illustrates that changes in risk exposures are positively correlated
across banks, which is consistent with banks exhibiting commonality in trading.
Keywords: Systemic Risk, Banking Regulation, Systemically Important Financial Institutions,
MES, SRISK, CoVaR, Risk Disclosure, VaR, Regulatory Capital.
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